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Figure 1. The location of Sudan (CIA World Factbook 2013) 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of Sudan and the location of the New Halfa scheme (Note: the map does not show the national border of 
South Sudan). 
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1. Introduction 
 
In July 2011 South Sudan seceded from Sudan and became a newly independent country after 
decades of on-going power imbalances and political conflict. The situation at the New Halfa 
Agricultural Scheme, in eastern Sudan, however was calm and the turmoil at the border 
between these suddenly new neighbours did not have much effect on the everyday life of this 
agricultural community. The secession of South Sudan was a result of endless conflict over 
politics, power, rights to natural resources and the unsolved differences between the north and 
the south Sudan. Although the situation of South Sudan did not directly touch the 
communities in New Halfa, the same underlying issues of political power and access to 
resources have also affected the current state of the New Halfa scheme extensively.  
The country of Sudan, situated in the northeast of Africa, is renowned for its political 
instabilities, poverty and harsh climate through global media. The ethnic and cultural richness 
and the significant environmental resources are thus overshadowed by the continuing flow of 
negative news from the country. Nevertheless, Sudan is a country of diversity and complexity 
when it comes to geography, politics, culture and religion. Although South Sudan officially 
declared its independence on July 9th 2011, Sudan still remains the third largest country in 
Africa (UNDP Sudan 2013). The conflicts in Sudan cannot be blamed on its ethnic diversity, 
poverty or the geographical size of the country. Throughout its history Sudan has faced 
various eras of foreign and biased rule that has justified legitimacy over political power to a 
chosen few. This has arranged the ethnic fabric to such a way that some have claimed more 
political power at the expense of others. As a consequence the history and the landscape have 
been reshaped by the political power elite and the ethnic minorities have had to choose 
between submission and existence in periphery.  
One  of  the  apparent  manifestations  of  power  was  the  construction  of  dams  and  the  
transformation of the rural landscape. After 1956 the newly independent Sudan strived for 
development and economic growth. Unarguably the construction of dams brought 
development through water control, electricity and irrigation possibilities. They were also 
visible symbols of national growth and might. However, the downside of these development 
initiatives was the destruction of cultural heritage sites and the forced relocation of thousands 
of people of their traditional homeland. This was a high cost to those already marginalized 
that had to step aside and compromise their livelihoods. This became concrete during the 
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construction  of  the  Aswan High  Dam along  the  River  Nile  that  forced  the  relocation  of  the  
Nubians of Wadi Halfa to the New Halfa agricultural scheme. The more recent extensive dam 
constructions in Sudan, the Merowe Dam and the Kajbar Dam, have continued to displace 
thousands of communities away from their traditional land (International Rivers Network 
2013). It is primarily the poor and marginal people who are forced to sacrifice their lifestyles 
and traditions for the sake of modernity and growth without adequate compensation for their 
losses. Therefore these mega-scale development initiatives represent a one-sided view of 
progress. This nation building and modernisation that took place in Sudan also enforced the 
mainstreaming of the Sudanese nation and economy. This happened at the expense of minor 
ethnic groups such as the Nubians and the nomadic groups in the peripheries. The top-down 
view on development may not correspond to the views of the people affected when it is 
changing their lifestyle against their approval.  
In Sudan today, one may still come across isolated desert regions with sporadic nomad 
communities continuing their traditional lifestyles in contrast to massive irrigation schemes 
creating products for the global market. However, the increasing agricultural development has 
come at a cost. The development of agricultural schemes and the construction of large 
hydroelectric dams have collided with the more traditional lifestyles of subsistence farming 
and pastoralism. Many nomads have had to change their pastoral routes due to the irrigation 
schemes and settle for marginal land. The construction of dams has forced large populations 
to relocate to foreign areas and adapt to new methods of more mechanised agriculture. 
In spite of this, this hydraulic engineering is enabling the kind of development that will boost 
the economy and overall national growth that Sudan cannot resist. The development of the 
modern agriculture in Sudan has been made possible with the harnessing of the Nile waters 
and altering traditional livelihoods. Today, agriculture makes up a third of the economic 
sector in Sudan. Cash crops such as cotton and gum Arabic are the cornerstones of Sudanese 
agricultural export. However, problems of irrigation, technical maintenance, environmental 
degradation and poor transportation remain the greatest constraints to the growth of the 
Sudanese agricultural sector (UNDP Sudan 2013). Due to financial difficulties and lack of 
efficient natural resource management many agricultural schemes are now facing loss of land 
fertility and productivity. For an average farmer, the income at an agricultural scheme is not 
sufficient and many are migrating to Khartoum in the hope of more urban employment. The 
division between the Sudanese core and periphery, both geographically and socially, seems to 
grow deeper. The development-induced displacement of people and the construction of 
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irrigation schemes are still continuing, despite the unsolved challenges of the existing 
schemes. People in the schemes lack social cohesion and often feel rootless in their new 
surroundings. The privatization and neoliberalism that have reached the schemes are placing 
the farmers under pressure to produce more out of the deteriorating environment.  
The particular case of the New Halfa agricultural scheme is interesting as it is one of the 
oldest schemes in Sudan and was the destination of one of the largest population resettlement 
projects in the history of the country. Yet it has been facing both external and internal 
pressure to meet the standards that were set out for it. The scheme has been running for over 
40 years and the loss of productivity, insufficiency of the infrastructure and environmental 
degradation is visible to the eye. The Khasm el Girba dam that feeds the water to the scheme 
has become sedimented thus reducing the capacity of water distribution. The existing service 
sector has not been expanded sufficiently to accommodate the natural population growth in 
the scheme and the residents have had to turn to additional means of living as the income 
from farming is not satisfactory. The declining rates of production and increasing 
environmental degradation are causing headache for the farmers and some are looking into 
other sources of livelihood. The scheme consists of different ethnic groups that are facing 
different challenges and circumstances. Originally the New Halfa scheme was planned for the 
Halfawi  Nubians  that  were  resettled  due  to  the  construction  of  the  Aswan  High  Dam.  It  
attempted to remould the existing social composition by incorporating the detached Nubians 
and the self-sufficient nomads into a new social system of tenancy and intensive farming. 
New Halfa became a melting pot for different ethnic groups form varying socio-economic 
backgrounds (Dafalla 1975). One of the key challenges it has faced since the start of the 
scheme is the inequality between the different communities that has differentiated and 
fragmented the scheme. This has evidently had negative effect on the social cohesion of the 
scheme. Some farmers have managed to accumulate farmland and hire farm labour while 
pursuing other careers in contrast to other residents who are dependent on any work they can 
find on a daily basis (Sørbø 1985). 
Therefore, some of the first irrigation schemes in Sudan, such as New Halfa, have become 
crucial  points  of  focus  as  they  give  an  opportunity  to  observe  the  evolution  of  the  state  
controlled agricultural schemes towards the more neoliberal and differentiated schemes they 
are today. The challenges these schemes are facing have not been left unnoticed. However 
little has been done to solve these problems while new resettlements and agricultural schemes 
are being initiated.  
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1.2 Aims and justification of the study  
 
 
With the example of New Halfa, this study looks at the impacts of large-scale schemes and 
top-down development initiatives on the grass root level in the context of a developing 
country  like  Sudan.  It  is  particularly  relevant  today  as  new  dams  are  being  built  in  the  
northern parts of Sudan which forces communities to resettle in to other areas, commonly into 
irrigation schemes. The instability of the Sudanese politics, changing economic landscape and 
increasing urbanisation has all had an effect on the development of the agricultural sector.  
There is a need to find out whether these agricultural schemes have been conducive to overall 
rural development and sustainable in the long run. What is the current definition for a state 
driven irrigation scheme that was also designed as a resettlement project 40 years after its 
establishment? The legacy of the Nubian resettlement, sedentarisation of the nomads, and the 
influx of internal refugees from western Sudan have all influenced the development of the 
scheme and created increasing social differentiation due to different economic backgrounds.  
The local opinions about the scheme are particularly relevant as the future prospects of these 
schemes relies strongly on the choices and interests of the farmers and local residents. The 
sustainability  of  the  ecosystem,  the  sufficiency  of  the  Nile  waters  and  the  sense  of  purpose  
and future optimism of the farmers are the components that define the future of the Sudanese 
agricultural schemes.  
The example of the New Halfa agricultural scheme could give valuable insight into the 
relocation process and the sustainability of agricultural schemes. However, as new 
agricultural schemes are being established in Sudan, the current deteriorating state of the older 
schemes receives little attention. The recent droughts seen in East Africa and the increasing 
environmental degradation and climate change will further increase the demand for natural 
resources. Furthermore, the political power struggle to decide over the utilisation of natural 
resources will become even more agitated. The shift from food crop production towards cash 
crop production has made Sudanese agricultural industry more dependent on global price 
fluctuations and placed the local farmer at a more vulnerable position.  
With this in mind this study will focus on the following key questions: 
 5 
 
? After  almost  50  years  since  its  establishment,  how  has  the  New  Halfa  scheme  
succeeded in the resettlement process of the Halfawi Nubians and the nomadic 
groups?  
 
? Has the New Halfa scheme been conducive to social and agricultural development?  
 
? How  is  the  present  condition  of  the  scheme  viewed  by  its  residents  and  what  have  
been the social consequences for them? 
 
The varying degrees of social differentiation and inequality between the different ethnic 
groups  in  New Halfa  shows the  failure  of  the  scheme to  operate  with  the  principle  of  equal  
sized tenancies. The lack of attachment and ownership of the resettled Halfawi to the scheme 
and the failure to successfully incorporate the nomadic pastoralists in to a stationary 
agricultural lifestyle are also results of poor social planning by the scheme. The poor state of 
the agricultural resources, lack of services and deteriorating environment are also push-factors 
for people leaving the scheme. This can be put against the overall attempt of the Sudanese 
government to mainstream the Sudanese nation and to uniform the existing traditional 
lifestyles  into  a  more  modern  capitalist  economy.  However,  the  aim  of  this  study  is  not  to  
decide whether the New Halfa scheme was a failure that should have been avoided or a 
success of agricultural  development.  Rather,  I  want to bring forward the pitfalls  and risks of 
resettlement as a means for development and the challenges that must be considered in the 
planning. The local opinions will also be relevant as the future planning of resettlement and 
agricultural development will need more empowerment and contribution of the people 
involved. 
2. Theoretical framework  
2.1 A multidisciplinary approach to the theoretical framework  
 
The theoretical framework for this study is multidisciplinary as it seeks to explain the current 
state of development of the New Halfa Agricultural scheme in eastern Sudan from various 
perspectives. To be able to understand the current condition of the scheme we must discuss 
the joint effect of political and economic influences and the social and ethnic fabric of the 
Sudanese nation. The changing state of the environment has altered livelihoods and will 
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therefore play a crucial role in the future scenarios of the scheme. Although the case of New 
Halfa is a typical example of a post-independence state-owned irrigation project aiming to 
increase agricultural production and social cohesion, it should be considered as a unique case 
and the opinions of the farmers interviewed as subjective views to the situation. The way 
people view their landscape and territory is related to who they are and what they have 
experienced in that particular place (Lane 1997).  
As a case study, we look at New Halfa scheme as a state-driven development initiative that 
was a result of the resettlement of thousands of people caused by the hydropolitical changes 
and engineering in Wadi Halfa, north Sudan. Social integration, organization and the different 
aspects of development in New Halfa will be discussed. It is important to notice that the 
various social conditions and access to environmental resources are strongly linked with the 
cultural, economic and political realities taking place. The question of who has access to 
environmental resources and has the right to decide over land-use issues is crucial and reveals 
who is exercising power (Eskonheimo 2006).  
The decision over the inundation of Wadi Halfa and the question of resettlement of the 
Nubians to New Halfa was a consequence of the political elite practicing power over the 
people, their livelihoods and environmental surroundings. With this in mind, all the socio-
ecological interactions are manifestations of the political forces in action. In other words, the 
socio-ecological changes are the results of the political decisions taking place. When the 
people whose livelihoods are affected by these changes are not sufficiently consulted, or they 
oppose to them, they usually struggle to adapt to the changes in their surroundings 
(Eskonheimo 2006). Power also affects the environmental images and conceptions over a 
certain area. Whether an area should be used for agriculture or kept natural depends who you 
are asking from. The use of power often affects how different environments are perceived, 
managed and discussed (Eskonheimo 2006). This will be further discussed in the chapter on 
the political ecology approach.  
Resettlement as a development initiative has been widely debated and regarded as the 
necessary evil or sacrifice for the sake of long-term development. The effectiveness of 
resettlement will be reflected against the current social integration and cultural adaptation in 
New Halfa. Whether the sedenterisation of the nomadic pastoralist fitted in with the 
expansion of irrigated agriculture and whether any assimilation into new livelihood means 
took place will also be questioned.  
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Although New Halfa as a case study is considered as the focus of this study, the situation of 
New Halfa as an agricultural scheme is not unique in developing countries and does not exist 
in isolation when considering the effects of global issues such as land territorialisation and 
privatisation, neoliberal policies in agriculture and increasing urbanization. Therefore, the 
study will also reflect on the overall socio-political environment of Sudan and its effect on the 
development of New Halfa today.  
The abovementioned themes will provide a setting for discussing the local views of the 
residents in New Halfa. Although the theoretical framework for this study will provide tools 
for a deeper understanding of the underlying factors that have contributed towards the current 
state of New Halfa agricultural scheme and its communities, a strong emphasis will also be 
put on the various opinions of the residents of New Halfa interviewed for this study in 2011.  
2.2 Previous studies related to the topic 
 
The question of harnessing the Nile for social benefit has for long been discussed in academic, 
political and colonial discourse. Colonial interest in the River Nile grew during the British 
imperialism and Winston Churchill famously said that the waters of the Nile should be 
harnessed for the best possible human benefit (Staddon 1988; Collins 1990). It is quite clear 
to see that the need and desire to control and utilize the flow of the Nile has existed since the 
first  human settlements  in  the  area  and  the  political  rule  and  power  hierarchies  have  always  
played a significant role in setting the future course for the River Nile. However, what has 
changed in the more recent decades is the rapidly increasing utilization of the water resources 
and the physical alterations within the Nile basin. 
In this study I have greatly benefited from the book, The Nubian Exodus by Hassan Dafalla, 
which lives through the process of Nubian resettlement from their previous home, Wadi Halfa, 
now under the Aswan High Dam Lake, to the new development scheme of New Halfa in the 
1960s. It tells the story of the resettlement and the process of starting a new life at the 
agricultural scheme from the perspective of the Nubians and therefore highlights the social 
and cultural costs of megaprojects and resettlement (Dafalla 1975). Hassan Dafalla was 
working as the Commissioner for Emigration (1958-64) in organizing the resettlement of the 
Nubians and thus writes about the process with an unbiased yet sympathetic style. Due to his 
position as a state official the book is more of a diary with well-detailed and anthropological 
descriptions of the Nubian lifestyle and does not criticise the overall resettlement process.  
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Hassan  Dafalla  died  briefly  after  the  resettlement  and  thus  did  not  live  to  see  some  of  the  
emerging challenges at New Halfa (Ahmad & Abu Sin 1990).  The Nubian Exodus remains 
one  of  the  rare  books  that  record  some of  the  already  lost  cultural  habits  of  the  old  Nubian  
lifestyle on the both sides of the border between Sudan and Egypt. For this study the book is a 
thorough source of information of the starting point of the new resettlement in New Halfa and 
of the objectives of the scheme.  
After Dafalla many researchers have shown interest in the Sudanese agricultural 
transformation and land reclamation in the form of agricultural schemes. Since the Nile 
Waters Agreement of 1959, new developments along the Nile have changed the physical and 
social landscape of Sudan. However, even the greatest showpieces of hydro-engineering, such 
as the Gezira Scheme, have since started to show decrease in production and challenges of 
maintenance. Despite the ambitious development projects that have come up throughout the 
Nile and its tributaries it has started to prove challenging for the Nile countries to create a 
holistic plan for the development of the Nile Valley for the benefit of all its peoples (Collins 
1990). However, the increasing demand for water and energy has made massive development 
plans unavoidable (Salih 1985; Knott & Hewett 1990). The growing need for agriculture and 
food production to feed the population of Sudan and namely Egypt has also put constraints on 
the Nile waters. Although Sudan has adequate renewable natural resources available for its 
benefit, the current inefficiency of its economic and social infrastructures as well as the on-
going conflicts are causing serious constraints on reaching their full potential (Allan 1990). 
Therefore, as J.A. Allan writes, many of the agricultural schemes started in the 21st century 
have proven to be inefficient, in many cases due to the failure of the state to provide adequate 
social services and amenities for the communities and due to the unfavourable ratio between 
the farming inputs and outputs (Allan 1990).  
Irrigation agriculture, pastoralism and resettlement in eastern Sudan have been profoundly 
studied by Gunnar M.  Sørbø.  In 1977, 13 years after the establishment of the New Halfa 
Scheme, he wrote a study on “How to Survive Development: The Story of New Halfa (1977)” 
which describes the development of the scheme since its establishment and discusses some of 
the setbacks it encountered (Sørbø 1977). Some of his key findings are the continued 
dependence on traditional sources of income of the scheme residents and the processes of 
social differentiation taking place in New Halfa already in 1977 (Sørbø 1977). According to 
Sørbø the tenant households are unable to live off one tenancy only and must find other 
sources of income to sustain their livelihoods or simply leave the Scheme (Sørbø 1977). He 
 9 
 
also claims that the wealthier tenants’ off-scheme interests and the capital thereof enable the 
labour force of the scheme to continue their work (Sørbø 1977). Therefore he states that the 
scheme is continuing to operate because the wealthier tenants have accumulated double 
tenancies, mostly due to the high absentee rate among the Nubians. The off-scheme interests 
and extra incomes are also attracting many farmers to have other urban jobs within the town 
of New Halfa. Sørbø argued that the lack of clear correlations between labour inputs, yields 
and income within agriculture is discouraging for some farmers and therefore a reason to look 
for other additional sources of income (Sørbø 1977).  
Gunnar Sørbø continues the study on the economic situation of the tenants in his later study; 
“Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan; a Study of Economic Adaptations in the New Halfa 
Scheme (1985)”. His study thoroughly discusses the various changes in the social structures 
and livelihood means in the communities of New Halfa (Sørbø 1985). He emphasises the 
growing income gap between wealthy and poor tenants and how for many it is necessary to 
have off-scheme pursuits. He observed that the nomadic tenants maintained their pastoral 
production when the Nubian tenants tended to prefer work in town (Sørbø 1985). According 
to  Sørbø,  this  has  also  led  to  further  absentee  rate,  as  the  wealthy  tenants  have  been  able  to  
hold many tenants and hire farm workers while pursuing other occupations (Sørbø 1985). 
Sørbø also discusses the juxtaposition of the Nubian tenants and the, mainly Shukriya nomads, 
in the scheme. The existing inequalities and unequal access to resources can eventually lead 
to conflicts between the different ethnic groups. In both of Sørbø’s works there is critique on 
the scheme as a development initiative. He argues that the overall challenges within Sudanese 
agriculture and the lack of participation among the project beneficiaries has always been a 
weakness and will produce more problems for the scheme management. However, he does 
point out the fact that there are a substantial number of households that have benefited from 
the New Halfa scheme and many of the objectives of the resettlement have been 
accomplished (Sørbø 1985).  
Tony Barnett has done extensive research on the Gezira Scheme and its implications on the 
social  development  of  its  tenants  (Barnett  1973,  1975).  He  claims  that  a  large  number  of  
tenants in the Gezira Scheme subsist on very low income and many of them receive credit 
from wealthier tenants with other sources of income. He continues to argue, that the whole 
scheme “is maintained in being as a link in underdevelopment” and therefore deepens the 
class divisions in the social structure of the scheme (Barnett 1973, 1975). 
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Salem-Murdock  Muneera’s  “Arabs  and  Nubians  in  New  Halfa:  A  Study  of  Settlement  and  
Irrigation (1989) is a more recent study that examines the variety of household economies and 
their adaptive strategies within the New Halfa Scheme. With an anthropological perspective 
she explains the different livelihood means of the local Arabs (meaning the Arabic-speaking 
tribe of pastoral herders) and the Halfawi Nubians within the scheme and notices the high 
income inequalities within the different residents. She therefore states that the scheme should 
not be evaluated based on only the macro-performance but the existing differentiation within 
the scheme should also be acknowledged. Some residents might have substantially improved 
their pre-scheme standards of living but on the other hand some residents have not greatly 
benefited from it or have even become further impoverished or marginalised. Salem-Murdock 
also calls for a more coherent planning of irrigation systems that involves, most importantly, 
the people who will reside on them (Salem-Murdock 1989).  
Paola Minoia’s dissertation refers to water geopolitics considering water infrastructures and 
irrigation schemes as national strategies of state materialization, and addresses the issues of 
power relations between state top-down planning and indigenous knowledge in small farming 
and pastoralism. The thesis presents a long historical overview of the water-related 
knowledge and livelihoods of the Nubians before the construction of the Aswan dam and after 
this extreme eco-political event that caused their displacement. This is particularly relevant as 
she thoroughly examines the entrepreneurial character of Nubians and the way their 
indigenous knowledge and internal organization traditionally gave them freedom and 
independence. The Nubians were used to their own sovereignty, since they were organized by 
tribes with alleged religious genealogy. Large families had land and resources that made them 
socially and economically independent in making their own decisions. Their main source of 
livelihoods was land and the Nile waters, apart from the most urbanized ones. However, this 
freedom in making economic and crop choices later collided with the large-scale planning 
that was imposed by the developmental state at the time of their displacements and allocation 
in the new Halfa scheme. Due to this the Nubian farmers’ relation with the state was difficult 
and eventually altered by the development plans (Minoia 1996). 
Some of the studies done on New Halfa were obtained during the field work for this study at 
the University of Khartoum, Sudan. Hassan Haydar from the University of Khartoum has 
done  a  profound  study  on  the  social  consequences  of  resettlement  in  his  study  “The  Social  
Cost of Resettlement; The Case of Halfawi at Suburban Khartoum” (2008). His study focused 
on the resettled Nubian Halfawi (Halfawi refers to the resettled Nubians originating from 
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Wadi Halfa) and especially those who later chose to leave the New Halfa scheme and move to 
Khartoum. His view on the future of New Halfa is quite discouraging. He sees forced change 
and resettlement as a failed development initiative and argued, that the outcome of the 
resettlement process was not only impoverishment of the relocated Halfawi but also widening 
of the gap between the comparatively well-off Sudanese and the poor ones (Haydar 2008).  
Unfortunately the case of New Halfa has not been widely debated in the 21st Century and a lot 
of the information available has become somewhat outdated. Some of the data I was provided 
at the NHAPC headquarters was also outdates and some had inconsistencies. Therefore for 
some of the more recent facts on New Halfa I have relied on the abovementioned dissertation 
by  Hassan  Haydar  and  also  on  the  Jörn  Laxen’s  dissertation  (2007)  on  the  effects  of  the  
Prosopis invasive alien tree within irrigation schemes, which also focuses extensively on New 
Halfa. 
2.3 Development perspectives 
 
The  building  of  the  Aswan  High  Dam,  the  relocation  of  the  Nubians  that  followed  and  the  
sedentarisation of the pastoralist nomads to the New Halfa agricultural scheme in eastern 
Sudan can all be seen as development initiatives of the Sudanese state to increase control over 
the waters of the Nile, to increase energy production, to develop the agricultural sector, to 
create employment and better living conditions for Sudanese people, and to increase the 
overall economic growth through export markets.  
The  problem  arises  when  we  try  to  define  development  through  the  narrow  perspective  of  
modernisation, technical advancement and increase in production. The non-material social 
aspects of development are also crucial components of positive national growth and well-
being. The term development itself is complex and the meanings and connotations behind it 
are open to various interpretations. It is difficult to measure and compare various stages of 
development. Economic growth and GDP are good indicators of financial wealth; however 
indicators such as the Human Development Index and GINI index give a better picture of the 
state  of  the  human development  and  social  wellbeing  in  a  country  (The  World  Bank 2013).  
Thus, the GDP of a country does not reveal whether there are vast income disparities within 
people or not, therefore the use of the GINI index is valuable in finding out whether there is 
enough income equality among people and social welfare systems to safeguard it within a 
country.  
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In addition to financial indicators, development can be measured in social terms that include 
educational and professional opportunities, freedom of speech and movement and in general a 
healthy and a long life. United Nations introduced the Human Development Index by 
combining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income (UNDP 2013). 
Although economic growth increases a nation’s total wealth, it does not always reduce overall 
poverty and increase people’s quality of life. At worst, growth can cause greater inequity, 
higher unemployment, weakened democracy, loss of cultural identity and overconsumption of 
natural resources (The World Bank 2013). This is eventually unsustainable.  
Understanding the various meanings behind the concept of development is important for 
looking at the cases of hydraulic and agricultural development in a country like Sudan. In 
recent history the world has seen many examples of large –scale hydraulic infrastructures 
being constructed and mass population displacements and involuntary resettlement caused by 
them. Although it is generally agreed that hydraulic infrastructures such as dams do increase 
energy production and improve the control over water flows, these development-induced 
mega-constructions tend to also cause severe environmental damage, population displacement 
and impoverishment (Cernea 1995). In the context of a country like Sudan measuring human 
development is difficult. The continuing conflicts, population displacement and the disparity 
between livelihood means among its people make it challenging to collect statistical 
information. GDP is not an adequate measure when a large amount of population is still 
making their living through pastoralism and subsistence farming. Concepts such as the 
Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations emphasize the importance of basic 
human rights such as access to health, education and eradication of poverty (United Nations 
2013). However, when discussing projects such as constructing dams and large-scale 
irrigation schemes the idea of development is portrayed from a certain perspective and 
imposed upon the targeted people. It should be emphasized that people perceive development 
in subjective ways and development as an external force is hardly constructive.   
This can be better understood when discussing the concept of cultural representation by 
Stuart Hall in which he explains, that all realities and the understanding of things are reflected 
through a person’s cultural background, position or social setting in which they stand. In other 
words, their meaning can be best understood from within. Therefore representation is the 
production of meaning through language (Hall 1997). Development for many can be 
explained through advancement, progression, modernisation and accumulation of wealth, 
resources and skill. For some the word development has less meaning and the sustainability 
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and continuity of the present lifestyle may mean the ultimate well-being.  The way some see 
fertile land as having potential for a large irrigation scheme others can see it best left for 
irregular utilization for cattle herding.  However, it is not to say that those who oppose to 
mega-engineering such as irrigation schemes automatically oppose to development and 
modernization. Rather, it is the acceptance and allowance of different means of livelihoods 
and comprehensions of well-being that promote sustainable social development.  
As a concrete example, Christoph Campregher studied how the construction of a 
hydroelectric dam in Costa Rica was seen differently by the development workers, indigenous 
activists and an independent researcher (2010). Each actor had a different perspective into 
development. The Costa Rican Electricity Institute emphasized that the dam would produce 
more than six hundred megawatts of electricity, promote the poor region’s economy, and give 
possibilities for employment, infrastructure and local tourism (Campregher 2010). The 
indigenous communities in the region of the proposed dam construction site had to then form 
a unified representation and be able to express themselves in concepts and notions that could 
be understood by external agents (Campregher 2010). Because they lacked the language skills 
of the external agents the local indigenous communities struggled with expressing their 
perspective into the matter, thus leaving it unheard. 
The communication usually happens through the shared cultural representations that allow 
actors to relate to the different interests of indigenous communities, environmental NGOs and 
dam construction agencies (Campregher 2010). In other words, because the indigenous actors 
have to adapt to the external cultural representations of, say, the notion of development, 
environment or territory, the meaning of the place through their perspective is not represented. 
In  addition,  it  can  also  be  a  challenge  for  the  local  communities  to  fully  understand  the  
proposed  dam  plans  and  models  and  the  real  effect  it  will  have  on  their  communities  and  
livelihoods.  
Like in the example above, the stakeholders with the least power often struggle to stand 
behind their opinions and know their rights and on the other hand understand the 
consequences and risks these megaprojects have. Therefore, the construction of megaprojects 
such as dams tends to create inequitable socio-hydrological conditions, as the hydraulic 
infrastructures are often put forward by the people in political, economic and social power. 
This often leads to further unequal development, as the people without social power are often 
excluded from access to natural resources or the state of the resources deteriorates 
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(Swyngedouw 2009). Those in power also tend to justify their actions by laying claim to 
property rights and their exclusive rights to them (Swyngedouw 2009). Rights taken for 
granted such as clean drinking water, clean air and the freedom to utilize natural resources are 
difficult to measure and therefore also easy to abuse. As natural processes are connected, so 
are also social processes and as environmental qualities are enhanced for some in a certain 
place they may deteriorate for others somewhere else (Swyngedouw 2009). This is especially 
true  when discussing  a  river  that  crosses  over  many countries  with  varying  populations  and  
needs.  
2.3.1 Displacement for development 
 
“The tree that has been transplanted will never make as pleasant a shade as the tree that grows where 
it has always stood.” –Baule proverb 
The concepts of displacement, forced migration and resettlement are intertwined and 
sometimes used with the same meaning. I have tried to divide theorizing the concepts of 
displacement and resettlement as the start and end of the same process, where displacement is 
focused on the problematic of forced removal from a place and resettlement as focused on the 
process of arrival and settling into a new place. However, they are both part of the same 
process and therefore in later chapters they will be discussed in the same context.  
Many top-down development initiatives include displacement and resettlement of people to 
make space for projects such as the construction of power plants, dams, mines and roads. This 
is called development-induced displacement (DID) (Grabska & Mehta 2008). In other words, 
displacement is a form of population redistribution used by the government to develop 
environmental resource utilization for the sake of benefiting the national economy. It can also 
be seen as a tool for the government to implement changes in the existing political structure 
and as a form of social engineering. This is part of the larger agenda of the transformation of 
peripheral regions and under populated areas into world economies (Plater 1994).  
In many cases the people affected lack rights to criticize this development and become merely 
bystanders instead of recipients of the fruits of these initiatives. They are powerless when it 
comes to the socio-political institutions or forces that demand the population displacement 
(Plater 1994). Most of the displacement has therefore been involuntary. Communities affected 
are usually the last to hear about the development projects and their displacement, thus they 
rarely participate in the planning and implementation process. Many of the communities may 
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have a historically deep relationship with the land but legally their rights to the land are 
informal and thus disregarded (Nixon 2010). In the national rhetoric the displacement is seen 
as a sacrifice for the greater good and development. However, it fails to acknowledge the 
basic  human  rights  of  rights  to  land  and  resources  of  those  affected  and  falsely  portray  the  
resettlement as a reward for their suffering (WCD 2000).  Needless to say, most communities 
strongly oppose the resettlement.  Many disputes also occur about who is responsible for the 
social component of the displacement. The state should be the one to safeguard the rights of 
all  its  citizens,  but  when  the  state  is  also  the  perpetrator  the  question  becomes  tricky.  The  
private sector also regards displacement and resettlement as the responsibility of the state 
(Morvaridi  2008).  It  may  also  not  be  the  best  actor  in  ensuring  poverty  reduction  and  the  
sustainable management of resources.  
Many problems emerge with displacement such as drastic changes in livelihoods, loss of 
autonomy, indigenousness, traditions and established community networks. It is generally 
known that displacement causes disruption and loss of assets both within the community and 
for the individuals and a greater likelihood for impoverishment and reduced access to rights 
entitlement (Morvaridi 2008). In many cases the displaced people have little or no say in 
deciding over the displacement and although the projects usually have a plan for resettling the 
displaced people, it is mostly created without consulting the affected people. The 
displacement is a heavy burden on its own and many of the other negative consequences only 
emerge after the resettlement process. It is also important to shift from focusing on the needs 
of the displaced to a more rights based approach of displacement and resettlement. This 
includes active participation in the whole process of resettlement, rights to secured livelihoods, 
autonomy, land tenure rights and rights to self-sufficiency and citizenship (Grabska & Mehta 
2008). In essence this comes down to acknowledging the rights of the displaced in deciding 
over their own lives and futures.  
As has been proven in many global instances, some displacement, even for the sake of 
development, may be inevitable. However the negative consequences of displacement could 
be mitigated or even avoided. This needs a thorough social impact assessment, the 
consultation of the people affected as well as a comprehensive resettlement plan. The rights of 
the people should be respected and not violated against. In most cases this has not happened 
and the situation after the displacement and resettlement has been neglected or left forgotten. 
Especially  with  developing  countries  such  as  Sudan  that  is  already  entangled  in  a  web  of  
continuing conflicts the resources, capacity and financial means cannot always support a 
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comprehensive social resettlement plan. When the people affected by displacement are 
already marginalized and peripheral, it is highly unlikely that they will be better off after the 
displacement.  
2.3.2 Resettlement consequences 
 
Many resettlement projects such as agricultural schemes are designed to benefit both the local 
displaced people and the country as a whole. In most cases the communities that face 
development-induced displacement are resettled into one of these schemes. Initially many 
resettlements were integrated into rural development plans in order to improve the economic 
and social life of the rural poor, in a way that would also contribute to the national economy 
(Barraclough et al. 1997).  Particularly in North and East Africa large nomadic pastoral 
populations were incorporated into resettlement schemes as part of a sedenterisation 
campaign. Many nomadic groups are still seen as impediments to development and their 
support to the economy as non-existing. Through the various objectives these resettlement 
projects have become instruments of nation building, economic growth and means of 
promoting the nation’s political profile (Plater 1994). 
Since the 1950s the World Bank has been lending developing countries money for 
infrastructure projects and agricultural schemes in support of economic growth. Poverty 
alleviation has also been a core goal for the projects. Some of the expected outcomes of these 
projects were the modernization and monetization of rural society and a transition from 
traditional isolation to integration with the national and global economy (World Bank 1975). 
However, in many cases the resettlement schemes have proved to be failures. According to 
their own evaluations later on the rural development projects funded by the Bank, nearly half 
of the 262 projects have been called failures (World Bank 1989). Another study claims that 
only one of all the resettlement projects funded by the World Bank had involved adequate 
compensation and rehabilitation for those resettled. In all the other cases the displacements 
resulted in declining quality of life: nutrition, health, infant mortality, life expectancy and 
environmental sustainability (Nixon 2010). According to the records the economic 
performance of the resettlement schemes has also proved weak and that the resettlements 
projects have resulted as both human and environmental failures (Plater 1994).  
Although many resettlement schemes do provide employment and services to those resettled, 
in many cases the long-term plans of maintenance and monitoring are inadequate or non-
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existing. In essence the resettlement is not temporary but should provide the resettled people 
and the forthcoming generations a possibility to build a new life on a permanent basis. 
However the future scenarios are difficult to predict. The effect of global trends and changes 
in economy and agriculture has brought about unexpected impacts and the resettlement 
schemes have had to adapt to them. It is therefore challenging or impossible to rate the 
success or failure of the resettlements as it is essentially a never-ending process. Many 
immaterial factors such as social rootedness and lack of adaptability to new livelihoods and 
environments are tricky to evaluate and may surface only years later.  
Michael Cernea from the World Bank combined the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction 
Model (IRR) for Resettling Displaced Populations (Cernea 1997). This soon became the 
dominant model used to approach involuntary resettlement within the context of large-scale 
projects (Koenig (2001:1) cited in Cernea (2005)). The model argues for the need to secure 
the compensation and invest in the development and recovery of those resettled. According to 
Cernea the negative impacts and risks of displacement are landlessness, joblessness, 
homelessness, marginalization, increased morbidity, food insecurity, loss of access to 
common property and social disarticulation (Cernea 1997). These eight distinct components 
of impoverishment are interconnected and potential risks that can lead to actual 
impoverishment if they are not reduced through counter-risk strategies and reconstruction 
plans before the displacement takes place (Cernea 2005). If the risks are not properly 
addressed and mitigated the resettlement may result in new poverty that would not have 
materialised without the resettlement. Cernea further divides the types of displacements 
according to the original cause for displacement. Here we are mostly concerned with the 
displacements by development programs (in infrastructure, public utilities etc.) (Cernea 2005).  
To be able to fight against these risks in the resettlement and reconstruction phase the nation 
should have strategies and financial means to mitigate these negative consequences. However, 
in order for the resettlement to be successful and sustainable, one must also look at the factors 
of entitlement to rights, social articulation, integration and cultural well-being (Morvaridi 
2008). As in the case of the Nubians in Egypt and Sudan, the resettlement caused an 
irreversible experience of social rejection from the government and bitterness for the lack of 
respect and protection for their traditional land, culture and livelihoods. Thus, the 
displacement and the resettlement that follows gives an impression that the utilization of 
natural resources weighs more on the nation’s scale than the integrity and continuity of its 
people’s sustainable livelihoods and traditions. An important factor to consider is also the 
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extent that resettlement affects the host population’s future livelihoods. As will be discussed 
in the following chapters the resettlement of the Halfawi Nubians to New Halfa caused 
emerging inequalities between the resettled and the host population that were to share the 
resources for the years to come. The influx of other Sudanese into the scheme further changed 
the social composition. Therefore, resettlement projects should also consider the equal 
treatment and benefits of the host populations and ensure a more equal setting for the future 
sustainability of the scheme.  
2.4 Political ecology, land rights and territorialisation 
2.4.1 Political ecology 
 
The political ecology approach is included in this study to deepen the understanding on how 
environmental changes and transformations can be seen as acts of politics and power. With 
the perspective of political ecology we can see for instance the construction of the Aswan 
High Dam and the creation of the Lake Nasser as manifestations of political decision-making 
power over the environment. The conflicts over natural resources and the shift from 
subsistence farming and pastoralism to mechanized irrigation schemes is also a way for the 
decision-makers to practice their rule over people and consequently alter their livelihoods. In 
other words environmental issues are part of the economic and political context within which 
they are created (Paulson et al. 2003). Political ecology will assist in realising the forces 
behind the socio-environmental actions and how certain land-use methods are seen as more 
justified or favourable. Therefore, political ecology discusses the access to and control over 
resources and environmental change and the social outcomes of environmental change. This 
can further help to analyse and discuss the rights to access environmental resources and the 
question  of  who  is  entitled  to  them  (Schubert  2005).  For  instance  when  discussing  state-
driven development initiatives such as construction of dams and irrigation schemes it is clear 
to see that access to resources has become politicized and the way environment is seen is 
socially constructed. The question of who has access to natural resources and the power to 
decide on their  utilisation has always been socially determined or politicised.  For this study, 
the concept of political ecology is important to understand, as it looks at nature and society as 
undivided and it reveals the political forces at work in environmental access, management and 
transformation (Robbins 2004).  
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The destruction and construction of nature has always taken place, but what has changed 
more recently is the scale of it. The acts of power taking their form as environmental 
construction and harnessing of nature have shifted in magnitude from a sustainable and 
communal manner to a more unsustainable, commoditized and primarily larger in scale. The 
hydraulic engineering that has taken place in the river Nile is a case in point, such as the 
construction of dams and irrigation schemes for instance. This may bring economic gain to 
the state and enable development; however the increasing resource utilization may decrease 
the resources available for other users such as pastoral nomads. The growing need for natural 
resource utilisation is also increasing the risk of environmental degradation. As people do not 
merely need natural resources for survival and subsistence, but also to be able to seek 
personal benefit and financial surplus, especially in the growing global market economy, the 
environmental systems may become overexploited and unsustainable. As surplus value must 
constantly be extracted from people and the environment, for instance the soil and the farmer, 
the required conditions of human health and soil quality cannot be sustained in the long run 
(Robbins 2004). In the times of global capitalism this inevitably results in increased 
inequalities between the owners of this mean of production and the people of pre-capitalist 
peripheries; the tenants and the wage farm workers. This is also understood to be true also in 
the case of New Halfa agricultural scheme in Sudan, which has seen both environmental 
degradation and unequal income accumulation together with the growing shift towards cash 
crops such as cotton. In the end, it is all about who profits from changes in control over 
natural resources and “who takes what from whom” (Robbins 2004).  
The degradation and marginalization thesis can also be a useful tool in looking at the 
transition in the local production systems to overexploitation of natural resources as a 
response to state development intervention or increasing integration in regional and global 
markets. Especially with declining economic margins the costs of production are triggered 
down to the local producer who has no choice but to extract everything possible from the 
environment to meet the economic needs (Robbins 2004). This increased demand for 
production consequently causes strain on the communities and the natural resources. The 
environmental degradation increases and at the same time the land use intensifies. This 
process can be explained as a “pattern of appropriation and accumulation of natural capital, 
transformed into currency, at locations away from the site of the production” (Robbins 2004). 
In other words, the farmers and producers at the local level may have to work harder and 
exploit the land to unsustainable measures but the agricultural outputs are still not sufficient to 
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support their livelihoods. The reliance of cash crop incomes may cause dependency on the 
system and the increasing usage of natural resources may lead to environmental degradation 
which is harmful for the local producers in the long run.  
2.4.2 Land rights and territorialisation  
 
People’s access to land varies from their social circumstances and the politics of land 
allocation. Whether decisions are made by traditional leaders, local or state government, or 
they are influenced by the actions of the global economy and privatisation policies; people’s 
access to land varies greatly and can be highly unequal. The access to land however is 
socially determined and thus depends on the social context people live in and who happens to 
have the power of exercising decision-making power (Eskonheimo 2006). Traditionally, local 
traditional leaders have allocated lands to different communities or tribes, or people are 
accustomed to pastoralism and changing environments. In more recent history national states 
have started to practise agricultural transformation, intensification and engineering for 
instance in the form of agricultural irrigation schemes and the green revolution. People have 
gained access to land through property rights and land tenure systems (Eskonheimo 2006). 
These changes have been particularly problematic when discussing the lifestyle of nomadic 
pastoralists. They have traditionally used land for their pastoral needs that is not owned by 
them but rather regarded as common property resources (Eskonheimo 2006). In Sudan, as in 
many developing countries, the economic circumstances of nomadic pastoralists have 
deteriorated as a consequence of the government policies of favouring sedentary farming and 
the later on increased privatisation (Eskonheimo 2006). The land law of 1970 (Unregistered 
Land Act) left the Sudanese pastoralists and some subsistence farmers without rights to the 
lands they have traditionally used. Therefore it is clear to see that the Sudanese government 
has had a tendency to prioritise sedentary agriculture rather than nomadic agriculture 
(Eskonheimo 2006).  
Rob Nixon gives similar examples of the rural communities in India in his article 
‘Unimagined communities: Developmental Refugees, Megadams and Monumental Modernity’ 
where the communities that suffer from the dam construction are called developmental 
refugees and are, in his words, “inundated by development” (Nixon 2010). This means that 
they have been displaced and dispossessed of their traditional lands and its resources, in 
Arundhati Roy’s words for ‘the greater common good’ (Roy 1999). Many indigenous peoples 
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or traditional communities do not have legal ownership or title deed to the environment they 
inhabit. They may have utilised the natural resources sustainably and lived in co-existence 
with nature, however without land ownership the land may not belong to them (Nixon 2010). 
Although territory has traditionally been connected with the political institution of the modern 
nation-state it is important to notice that territories, large or small, are primarily social 
products and can range from national borders to homestead hedges and vague pastoral lands. 
It is basically an understanding of “inside and outside” or secure and insecure”. Seeing 
territories in social life, relationships and interactions depends therefore on the perspective 
(Delaney  2005).  The  notion  of  territory  is  relevant  to  my  study  as  it  looks  at  the  territories  
between ethnic communities, territories created by the nation-state and the infrastructural 
megaprojects such as dams or irrigation schemes as socially created entities, and often, based 
on  power  and  hierarchy.  Thus,  the  ones  with  social,  political  or  economic  power  define  
territories and territorialisation reflects and incorporates features of the social order that 
creates them (Delaney 2005; Minoia 2012). In the case of the construction of hydraulic dams 
many groups of people, who have traditionally inhabited the space that the planned hydraulic 
dam occupies, are forced to leave their socially determined territory. In most cases the final 
say in decision-making is within the nation-state that has the power to justify the social 
displacement in the wake of the need to harness natural resources for the greater benefit.  
This is to say, that there are as many variations and manifestations of territories as there are 
social organisations and entities. The way nomadic people define their livestock herding 
territory is different to the more clearly defined entity of farmer’s land and how a 
multinational company can claim territorial rights to, for instance, natural resources in a given 
area (Delaney 2005). Territories also overlap each other and have an effect on each other. For 
example the good intentioned establishment of clearly fenced wildlife conservation parks in 
Africa might at the same time hinder the livelihoods of subsistence farmers or nomadic 
livestock herders. However, as David Delaney points out in his book on Territory; there is an 
on-going re-territorialisation of social life that may change its form through the process 
changes in the social organisation (Delaney 2005). Therefore re-territorialisation is strongly 
connected with the reproduction and transformation of culture and society. Generally among 
traditional societies and communities, territory defines social relations, culture, identity and 
belonging (Natter & Zierhofer 2002; Delaney 2005). Thus, the focus is more on inclusion 
rather than exclusion. The territorialisation of nation-states and private ownership has later 
created stronger territorial boundaries that are more exclusive and distinct. How these ‘old 
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and new territories’ can be merged is in the end a question of power; whether political, social 
or economic.  However, as the global patterns of devolution and ‘glocalised’ governmentality 
are increasing and the growing networks of local, national and international actors are 
creating a web of interlinked policies, discourses and actions, the existing territories will be 
increasingly contested, if not altered completely (Natter & Zierhofer 2002).  
It is in the understanding of the concept of territory, that it is unquestioned or uncontested. 
However, drastic changes in the social organisation, such as the end of cold war or apartheid, 
caused questioning of territories (Delaney 2005). Furthermore, this process also reveals the 
dynamics of power and politics behind them. As Delaney continues, territories are boundaries 
with a meaning; manifestations of power (Delaney 2005). Territories define and tell who and 
what is included in a space and on the other hand what or who are excluded. Therefore it also 
symbolises the current social hierarchies within social groups and geographic areas. In 
essence, territoriality is closely bound to issues of conflict, discrimination, exploitation as 
well as negotiation and justice. Above all, territoriality cannot be thought in a politically and 
ethically neutral sense (Natter & Zierhofer 2002). 
Although territorial boundaries are mostly obeyed as a consequence of coercive force, the law 
and power, the boundaries can even aggravate social conflict and cause further resentment in 
those excluded (Delaney 2005). This is also the case with state or privatised territorialisation 
of natural resources that can cause social conflict, apathy towards the state and in some cases 
even exacerbate state disintegration. Unequal access to basic human needs such as water is 
also a problem that is related to territorialisation and power. The more recent question of the 
commodification of natural resources and on the other hand the growing demand for them is 
creating boundaries between those who have access to, say, clean drinking water and those 
who have not. Although water has its own spatial dynamic and resistance against attempts to 
channel its mobility (Natter & Zierhofer 2002), people, political entities and international 
actors are increasingly trying to privatise and commoditise it.  
In conclusion, territory means a variety of things from public-private spaces, socially 
determined spaces to nation-state boundaries. In terms of this study on the agricultural 
development in Sudan, it is relevant to understand the changing territories in time and space; 
from the anthropologically identified shifting territories of nomadic tribes, pastoralists and the 
more sedentary farmers to the territorial reconfigurations of the colonial and post-colonial 
state law, processes of land reform and privatization (Delaney 2005).  The forced removal of 
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the  Nubians  out  of  their  traditional  and  cultural  territory  to  a  new,  state-owned  agricultural  
scheme damaged their livelihoods and cultural integrity. At the same time the nomads and 
other ethnic groups at New Halfa had to surrender some of their traditional territories for this 
new development. These will be further discussed in the chapters on New Halfa.  
3.   Methodology 
  
3.1 How the methods were chosen for the study 
 
The scope of the study was developed during the participation in the seminar on Blue Nile 
Watershed Management and Ecosystem Services that took place at the University of 
Khartoum, Sudan, in June 2011. The seminar was organised by the Viikki Tropical Resources 
Institute (VITRI) of the Department of Forest Sciences of the University of Helsinki together 
with the University of Khartoum and Wondo-Genet college of Forestry in Ethiopia, through 
the North-South-South Higher Education Institution Network Programme of the Finnish 
Ministry of Education. The seminar gave a profound understanding on watershed 
management in the context of the Blue Nile and the case of New Halfa was also discussed. 
However, a large share of the primary and secondary data for this study was gathered during a 
two-month stay in Sudan that followed the seminar. I became intrigued in the story behind the 
Nubian resettlement to New Halfa and how it was an interesting place as one of the oldest 
agricultural schemes in Sudan. With my interest and orientation to Development Geography 
and Sociology I wanted to learn more about the current situation in the scheme with regards to 
the Halfawi Nubian resettlement and the sedenterisation of the local nomads. I collected 
further background information on Sudanese culture, environmental characteristics, ethnic 
groups and the history of hydrological development to better understand the context in which 
the New Halfa Agricultural Scheme is situated. Later I met experts from the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Khartoum with whom I was able to discuss the social issues in 
New Halfa that were relevant for my research. As my objective for the study soon became to 
understand the social consequences of resettlement, hydropolitics and agricultural 
development, I chose to use qualitative ethnographic research methods on  the  field  such  as  
semi-constructed interviews, expert interviews and observation (Genzuk 2003). However, due 
to  the  limited  possibility  for  actual  field  work  at  the  New  Halfa  scheme,  the  study  was  
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primarily based on a comprehensive historical overview of New Halfa and a literature review 
on the current challenges in resettlement and irrigated agriculture.  
The departments of Forestry and Agriculture at Khartoum University have a substantial 
amount of studies conducted on the New Halfa scheme or similar agricultural schemes, 
primarily  focusing  on  the  geophysical  changes  in  the  environment  at  New  Halfa.  I  also  
utilised the main library of the University of Khartoum for reviewing data with a more social 
perspective. Unfortunately many of these sources were outdated or written in Arabic and I 
could not benefit from them, however a few relevant sources were acquired. In addition the 
sources available at the University of Helsinki were utilized and during the last stages of my 
research project I was also able to benefit from the information resources of the Nordic Africa 
Institute in Uppsala, Sweden. 
3.2 Methods 
 
Therefore, in addition to the historical overview as the main method for this study I also used 
qualitative methods particularly while visiting New Halfa scheme. In order to better 
understand the social context within New Halfa the qualitative research methodology from the 
social sciences was chosen in order to “understand and analyse the social world from the 
point  of  view  of  the  people  that  are  studied”  (Bryman  1988).   To  start  of  the  field  work  I  
needed  to  find  relevant  contacts  to  know  more  about  the  situation  in  New  Halfa.  The  
academic cooperation between the universities of Khartoum and Helsinki gave valuable 
academic contacts and fieldwork assistance, however many important contacts and 
interviewees were also found using the snowball technique (Secor 2010) at the University of 
Khartoum and at the field site of New Halfa. This method of establishing contacts can be one 
sided as it usually works through a network of already established acquaintances, however it 
enabled me to approach interviewees with various specific information and personal 
experiences of New Halfa. Once the basic information on the current situation of New Halfa 
was gathered, it was possible to combine the questionnaire and structure for the semi-
structured interviews held with the residents and stakeholders at New Halfa. A draft of a 
simple interview questionnaire was made before entering the field (See Annex 1). However, 
since many of the issues regarding the current state of the New Halfa scheme could only be 
fully acknowledged once entered on the research site and its varying spaces, the questionnaire 
served as a framework for discussions and some of the questions for the interviews were 
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modified on site. Although the name and the age were asked during the first interviews, this 
was later disregarded as it created confusion and made some respondents uncomfortable.  
The interviews held at a public place often became open discussions as more and more people 
wanted to join in the discussions and share their opinions and thoughts. Although this made it 
challenging to keep track of the interviewees it also gave valuable new insight into the issues 
and brought many unexpected topics on to the table. Hence, some of the most valuable 
information was gathered in open group discussions. Although observation and interviews 
make the study more subjective, it was necessary to be able to connect with the interviewees 
in a way that enabled them to share their own thoughts and feelings of the current situation in 
New Halfa.  
In New Halfa, the fieldwork started with gathering information and conducting interviews 
with various stakeholders and professional experts at the New Halfa Agricultural Production 
Corporation (NHAPC) headquarters. This enabled the scope of the study to be introduced as 
well as to get baseline information on the background, agricultural productivity, historical 
data and village information of New Halfa. This assisted in deciding which areas to visit for 
observation and interviews in order to include various ethnic groups both in the centre of New 
Halfa as well as in the peripheries. The areas and villages visited were chosen beforehand, yet 
no interviews were arranged prior to the visits. Many farmers and their families were 
requested for interviews with on-site recruiting (Secor 2010). This is due to the experienced 
difficulty and time constraint of organising interviews in advance in the communities and also 
to be able to interview a mixed group of people from different occupations and life situations. 
This method also enabled a more natural setting for observation with the locals and getting to 
know the villages. Most of the interview situations were therefore casual meetings. 
Sometimes we would walk around in a community and people would invite us to visit  their  
homes to share a cup of tea. At the same time we could see the problems and deteriorating 
state of the housing, such as asbestos ceilings in the Halfawi houses, the storages for the 
harvest, and the overall state of the infrastructure. In one Halfawi village we were invited to 
see the date palm trees growing in a garden. The old Nubian tradition of offering dates to a 
guest (Dafalla 1975) had been well preserved and we were given fresh dates to taste. The 
hospitality was genuine in all the different villages and I was made to feel welcome. It was a 
very positive experience to be well received. People were respectful and instead of treating 
me as an intruder or somehow superior the people showed interest in my study and valued the 
fact that their opinions are being heard. Although it was difficult for me not to feel 
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compassion during some visits, especially within the more destitute communities, a good 
mutual spirit of respect and optimism was held.  
Two Sudanese post-graduate students in Forestry from the University of Khartoum were hired 
as assistants for the fieldwork period. They played a key role during the fieldwork, as it was 
necessary to have interpreters in translating from Arabic to English as well as in creating a 
more familiar setting for the interviews with the researcher and the interviewees. The male 
assistant helped with the interviews with male participants and the female assistant was 
especially important while interviewing women only. Many of the local customs, traditions or 
specific vocabulary was also translated and explained by the assistants, which was essential 
for my discretion and approachability.  
The fact that the field work period was shortened due to transport permit problems and the 
reduction of available time due to start of Ramadan and the rainy season, conducting 
participant observation was not possible. Nevertheless I was able to benefit from personal 
experiences on site, semi-constructed interviews and documents received on site. I wanted to 
interview people in their everyday context in a natural setting and preferably without prior 
organising. In this way I was able to engage myself in observations and receive new relevant 
information through semi-constructed interviews and informal conversation (Genzuk 2003). 
The qualitative data gathered through the interviews and observation will serve as a basis for 
understanding the local perspective and experiences of development schemes, shared natural 
resource management and agricultural change. To understand the reasons behind the situation 
the  study  aims  to  look  at  the  previous  research  on  the  abovementioned  issues  as  well  as  to  
provide empirical yet subjective data on how the people perceive this form of development, 
what the consequences have been for them and how they perceive their position within the 
agricultural scheme. Therefore the combination of observation and semi-constructed 
interviews proved to be an efficient method for the fieldwork of the study; the observation 
worked as an ice breaker in getting to know the people before the interviews took place and 
the snowball method and on site recruiting made it possible to find relevant stakeholders and 
people with various perspectives (Allsop et al. 2010; Secor 2010). However, these methods 
were also combined with in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders such as 
representatives from farmer’s associations from different villages and the representatives of 
the New Halfa Agricultural Production Corporation. Other methods of the study were 
interviews and discussions with various lecturers and professors at the University of 
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Khartoum on the issues related to New Halfa, dam construction and the ethnic groups living 
in New Halfa.  
As  an  example  of  the  on-site  interview situations,  the  research  assistants  and  I  would  drive  
into a community and engage in conversations with the residents on the streets and request a 
possibility  for  an  interview.  It  was  important  to  explain  the  purpose  and  scope  of  the  study  
and ensure the ethical approach. Especially on a Friday after the prayer at the local mosques it 
was easy to get farmers together for a focus group interview, as this was the day when farmers 
did not work on their fields and rather socialised in the communities. Many focus group 
interviews also gathered interest and attracted passers-by to join in the discussions, as the 
topic was regarded as relevant and interesting. In some cases, though, this made it difficult to 
keep track of the number of participants and allow everyone to share their thoughts (See 
figure 3). Although the research team visited various communities of different socioeconomic 
statuses, the respondents were generally very supportive and friendly to the research team and 
often  offered  them to  visit  their  houses  and  homesteads.  This  was  also  a  good way to  meet  
and discuss with the women who stayed at home.  
 
Figure 3. A group discussion held at the Halfawi village No. 20. (Baballa 2011) 
Research ethics were also taken into consideration. Although the issues of access to basic 
needs and community wellbeing are sensitive and sometimes difficult to discuss with 
outsiders, it was important for the research team to approach possible interview candidates 
with respect of privacy, dignity and personal opinion. Any possibility of negative 
consequences or risking the wellbeing of the interviewees had to be avoided at all times 
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(Bless et al. 2006). Especially with cross-cultural interviewing it is also important for the 
researcher to be culturally sensitive and acknowledge cultural biases and ethnocentrism of the 
researcher (Leslie and Storey 2003).  
3.3 Analysis of the data  
 
After the field work the interview results were transcribed, categorized and divided under 
thematic headings such as issues with natural resources, housing and infrastructure and 
livelihood means. Excess and repetitive material was reduced. I went through the interview 
outcomes several times looking for consistencies in order to present the relevant outcomes 
and to underline the most common issues (Genzuk 2003).  It  was also my aim to present the 
opinions and views of the residents of New Halfa in their own right to highlight the different 
understanding and experience of living within the scheme. This will make it easier to 
understand the individual experiences and perceptions of the current state of development in 
New Halfa instead of trying to draw conclusions and generalisations. In presenting the 
interview outcomes I have chosen to use direct quotations, although translated from Arabic to 
English by my interpreters, in order to emphasize the local narratives. Due to the fact that the 
number  of  individual  interviews  was  relatively  small  and  all  the  various  ethnic  groups  and  
their respective communities could not be visited during the fieldwork I have not used 
quantitative methods in analysing the results. This is however in line with the overall aim of 
presenting local independent opinions and discussions on the topics instead of aiming at 
general conclusions.  
However, despite the case-specific scope of the study, the field work outcomes will be further 
discussed in the broader theoretical framework of understanding development, social 
consequences of resettlement and developmental state interventions in order to find 
consistencies. This was done by looking at trends and patterns that emerged out of the 
interview results and then interpreted together with the theoretical framework and the 
historical review done for this study. Therefore, the purpose was firstly to find out whether 
some of the issues discussed in the previous research on New Halfa are still to be found in the 
scheme or whether some things have changed or are contradictory. Secondly the idea was to 
see whether the theories of resettlement and state-driven development and territorialisation 
have manifested themselves in the case of New Halfa scheme.  
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3.4 Fieldwork Experiences 
 
Despite careful planning and preparation there were some unexpected difficulties in 
conducting the fieldwork for this study. The delay in issuing a travel permit to New Halfa 
within Sudan caused the fieldwork period for this study to be postponed and shortened. In 
addition the start of the Ramadan in August caused strain on the schedule as Ramadan would 
not have been an ideal time for conducting fieldwork and traveling.  
Due to this I spent more time in Khartoum conducting expert interviews and literary reviews 
at the University of Khartoum. As the time at New Halfa agricultural scheme was shortened, 
the number of interviews held at New Halfa had to be cut down. However, this was partially 
solved by organising a few larger group interviews at different villages in order to have more 
participants at the interviews. The fieldwork period took place between July and August 2011 
during the rainy season in eastern Sudan. This caused some roads to be closed due to rain and 
mud and thus prevented us from accessing the communities furthest away from the New 
Halfa town.  
Lastly, as I was not able to communicate in Arabic the interviews with the locals had to be 
interpreted by my two field assistants. This was difficult during some interviews as every 
reply had to be translated in order for me to understand the discussion. Especially when the 
outcome of the interview questions was particularly interesting and further questions were 
needed  to  clarify  some points.  However  at  most  times  this  was  not  a  problem and  for  most  
interviews there was sufficient time available. My assistants also kept writing their own notes 
during  the  interviews  which  they  explained  to  me afterwards.  Although the  interviews  went  
well and I was able to express my understanding and appreciation through gestures and body 
language, it must be acknowledged that knowing Arabic would have made the interviews 
even more fruitful. Despite the hard and immaculate work of my field assistants, some words 
are always lost in translation and the local phrases and idioms cannot be made justice when 
translated into English.  
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4. Background to the topic 
 
4.1 The Nile as the source of life in Sudan 
 
The source of The River Nile lies in the Great Lakes region in central Africa and in the 
Ethiopian highlands. There the White and the Blue Nile tributaries start to twist their way 
down and finally merge together in Khartoum to become the great River Nile. Nearly 80% of 
Sudan lies within the Nile basin, making it the most important source of freshwater in Sudan. 
Sudan has a total natural renewable water resource of 149 km3/year of which 20% is from 
rainfall  and  80%  from  the  Nile  water  flows  from  upstream  countries  such  as  Ethiopia  and  
Uganda (UNEP 2010).  
The River Nile is a natural process that is constantly altering its surrounding environment and 
influencing the biophysical ecosystems it flows through. It has provided opportunities for 
sustainable human settlement and agriculture for over 7000 years (Chesworth 1990). 
Throughout history people have looked for various ways to benefit from the river, thus a 
relationship between the environment and the society has always existed. However, since the 
human population and settlements have expanded around the Nile river valley, the need for 
industrialisation and irrigated agriculture has consequently increased. This has resulted in the 
growing demand for alterations and harnessing of the river Nile. The physical environment is 
changing through the increasing socio-political actions of constructing dams, agricultural 
schemes, industrialisation and overall human utilization of natural resources (Swyngedouw 
2009; Minoia 2012). It is important to note that these human alterations and the new forms of 
produced environments are a natural result of socio-biophysical processed that have to a 
certain extent always taken place. They are therefore nothing new or contradictory to nature 
(Harvey 1996; Swyngedouw 2009). Thus, utilising and benefiting from natural resources is 
necessary for human survival and development. However it is the increasing exploitation and 
mismanagement of natural resources that is putting the sustainability of the biophysical cycle 
at risk.  
Due to Sudan’s location in the arid and semi-arid regions of Southern Sahara, freshwater 
resources are a critical question. Despite the constant water flows of the Blue and White Niles, 
many Sudanese struggle to receive enough freshwater for household use and agriculture. The 
water infrastructure in urban areas is inadequate and differs between more affluent and poorer 
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areas. In rural areas people are using traditional ways of collecting water for agriculture or 
have joined the irrigation schemes. Despite this there are vast differences in the quality of 
water and a broad disparity in water availability at the regional and social levels. In places 
such as western Sudan, access to and use of environmental resources plays a central role in 
causing conflicts as the power struggles between ethnic groups defines their rights to water 
resources and pastures (Manger 2005).  
The waters of the Nile have always been a source of livelihood for Sudanese people and in 
many ways unified the ethnically diverse nation. The River Nile also plays an important role 
in the cultural and historical traditions of Sudanese people. However, in the last century or so 
the waters of the river have been harnessed in many ways to support the development and 
modernisation of the country. The construction of dams has changed the landscape, produced 
electricity and decreased flooding. This has enabled a more versatile use of the waters and 
made population growth and agricultural development possible. Irrigated agriculture has also 
contributed towards poverty reduction through agricultural inputs as the average irrigated 
yields are 60 per cent higher than yields from rain-fed agriculture. Irrigated agriculture also 
offers citizens possibilities of enhancing their livelihoods (Oestigaard 2012).  
Despite this the privatization and control of previously collective natural resources has created 
new dilemmas and vulnerability to social conflicts. For securing successful national 
development and prevention of further conflict it is therefore important to stress the 
importance of equitable use of water resources and sharing of benefits (UNEP 2010).  
4.2 Dams as catalysts for development:  Hydraulic engineering in Sudan 
 
“Nowhere is the power of policy narratives and paradigms illustrated more clearly than in 
environmental planning in developing countries”. -Hoben (1995) 
Hydraulic engineering is a necessary part of the overall development of a country and its 
growing  population.  Some  of  the  first  dams  were  built  in  the  Middle  East  in  3000  BC  and  
dams were used for hydropower generation for the first time in 1890. In the 20th Century the 
construction of dams boomed and by the end there were over 45 000 dams worldwide (World 
Commission on Dams 2000). The construction of large hydroelectric dams and the formation 
of artificial lakes in Africa have been a trend in development initiatives since the early 20th 
century. In Sudan, hydroelectric development and the construction of large irrigation schemes 
was a necessary step in meeting the needs of the growing nation and economy. For many 
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developing countries with a history of colonial rule, such as the Sudan, gaining independence 
and decolonisation became the political motor for the construction of megaprojects such as 
dams. New leaders of newly independent developing countries such as Nasser, Nkrumah and 
Nehru were all striving for the positive symbolism of dams and geographic engineering. 
Besides their pragmatic purpose, the constructions served as concrete examples of modernity, 
prosperity and autonomy (Collins 2008; Nixon 2010).  
The first official agreement over the utilization of the Nile waters between Egypt and Sudan 
was made in 1929, when the Anglo-Egyptian Waters Agreement gave Egypt a 
disproportionate share of the Nile waters. Later, as the British dominance over the Nile Basin 
collapsed and the newly independent countries of upstream states wanted to claim their shares 
of  the  Nile  waters,  Egypt  found  itself  in  a  hurry  to  secure  a  sufficient  flow  of  the  Nile  to  
support the independence and development of Egypt. In 1959 Egypt and Sudan signed the 
Nile Waters Agreement, which increased the water shares for both countries and initiated 
plans to construct the Aswan High Dam (Collins 1990). Although the local consequences of 
the  building  of  the  Aswan High  Dam were  socially  disastrous,  it  gave  Egypt  and  Sudan the  
necessary water and power to support their visions of development and much needed growth 
of the agricultural sector.  
As the technological advancements in irrigation and agriculture created more possibilities, 
and the need for water, power and food continued to increase, Sudan constructed the Roseires 
Dam to support the impressive Gezira Agricultural Scheme and Khasm el Girba Dam for the 
New Halfa Scheme. Alarmed by the hydrological engineering of Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia 
also wanted to reserve the waters in her territory for the benefit of Ethiopians. New plans for 
the development of the Blue Nile basin were made in Ethiopia but the building of dams 
upstream started only later.  
As a result all newly independent riparian countries wanted to secure the maximum share of 
the Nile waters for themselves. This sacrificed the coherent planning for the holistic 
development of all countries in the Nile Valley with a shared water resource. In essence, this 
was nationalism promoted as technological advancement and development (Collins 1990). 
Often the development plans had limited or no consideration over the impacts on the people 
and  ecosystems  affected  by  these  developments.  However,  the  Aswan  High  Dam  and  the  
Gezira scheme constructions altered the socio-geographical environments to such extend, that 
social and economic development plans had to be created for the sustainability of the 
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communities affected. Pressure from outside also grew, as the international environmental 
groups and United Nations Environmental Programme became concerned over the effects on 
the environment and climate in South Sudan. Furthermore the livelihoods of many groups of 
peoples have been changed due to the changing environmental conditions and many 
traditional lands have been taken over by the developments (Salih 1985).  
As we have seen, hydrological development such as constructing dams, reservoirs,  canals or 
power plants often comes with a cost of negative social and environmental consequences such 
as environmental degradation, social resettlement and loss of traditional and cultural land 
(Staddon 1988). The aquatic ecosystem may face negative impacts due to the changes in the 
water flow and the inundated area, silt and debris is deposited and aquatic weeds start to build 
up. In addition, the large water reservoirs cause higher evaporation that should be avoided in 
already arid regions (Omer 2007). The constructions of a megaproject, such as the Aswan 
High Dam between Sudan and Egypt or the Three Gorges Dam in China have already proven 
serious consequences for the local residents and the surrounding environment. Besides the 
negative consequences in the socio-physical environment, the dam constructions have 
resulted in even more economic and political indebtedness of the developing countries to the 
first and second worlds (Nixon 2010).  
The United Nations Environment Programme completed an environmental assessment in 
Sudan in 2007 and also inspected all of the existing dams. Unarguably the benefits of the 
dams in Sudan are visible through electricity creation and irrigation. However, many negative 
environmental impacts were also detected (UNEP 2007). All of the dams visited had 
performance problems and visible environmental problems. Upstream land degradation 
caused sediment deposition and loss of reservoir capacity and downstream impacts, due to 
water diversion and changes in the flow regime, were detected. For instance, the Khasm el 
Girba dam that supports the New Halfa scheme had lost capacity up to 54% of the original 
capacity since the year of commissioning in 1964 (UNEP 2007). However, the construction of 
the Tekeze dam in Ethiopia in 2009 has since resulted in the reduction of the sedimentation of 
the Khasm el Girba reservoir.  
Hydraulic engineering is continuing its alteration of the hydraulic infrastructure in Sudan, as 
the need for natural resources and desire for territorial power sees no end. New countries, 
such  as  China,  are  interested  in  their  share  of  the  possibilities  of  the  Nile  basin.  The  most  
recent addition to Sudanese dams, the Merowe dam, below the fourth cataract of the Nile, is 
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Sudan’s largest construction project to date. It is estimated that the construction cost up to 2 
billion US dollars and it has been partly funded by China’s Exim Bank, several Arab funds, 
and partly by the Sudanese government’s national budget for development (Jok 2007; Cockett 
2010). The Merowe dam is supposed to benefit the whole country, through electricity, 
employment and agricultural development. It will roughly double Sudan’s power supply and 
will help irrigate land that is now barely arable. It has even been seen as the symbol of 
Sudan’s future (Jok 2007).  However, at the moment it is only benefiting the region in the 
north of the country and some of the negative aspects of the dam are the forced evacuations 
and resettlements of thousands of people (Jok 2007; UNEP 2007; Cockett 2010). A full and 
transparent environmental, economic and social impact assessment has not been conducted 
and the positive and negative features of the project have not been widely discussed (UNEP 
2007).  The project has been criticised for only benefiting the Sudanese power elite and 
increasing the disparities between the social core and periphery. Jok Madut Jok goes as far as 
to say that the construction of the Merowe Dam in northern Sudan is a hydrological project 
implemented by an influential political group within the military government that wants to 
monopolize the electricity sector to serve their own purposes (Jok 2007). The criticism for the 
project has been strong both internally and internationally, and the International Rivers 
Network and the Corner House published a report complaining about the false promises and 
non-existing services promised for the people being relocated due to the project (Jok 2007). 
The Nubian people particularly complain that the development and industrialisation of Sudan 
is being carried out at the expense of their heritage and dignity (Jok 2007).  
Despite the negative consequences, the necessity and benefits of hydro-engineering must also 
be stated. With the Nile basin being partly situated in one of the world’s most arid regions 
with a rapidly growing population the need for securing food and energy sources is top 
priority. For many African countries the construction of dams is the only feasible option 
(Oestigaard 2012).  Naturally there are many economic benefits to hydro-engineering. It 
makes it possible to regulate the flow of water to control flooding, for power generation and 
to channel water for irrigation purposes. This is mostly done by constructing dams, irrigations 
schemes for agriculture, huge reservoirs and directly changing the river’s flow (Oestigaard 
2012). For many nations and regions, these megaprojects are also a way of creating 
employment, advancing technology and producing a concrete symbol for national 
development and pride (Staddon 1988). Some developing countries have also seen the 
construction of megaprojects such as hydraulic dams or irrigation schemes as a concrete 
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evidence of catching up with the developed world and showcasing the technological 
advancements and development of the country (Nixon 2010). It must also be acknowledged 
that the need for dam construction is considerable. The present power generation in Sudan is 
lagging behind demand. The feasibility of dams for energy production is clear and there are 
many  potential  sites  for  hydropower  generation  on  the  main  Nile  and  its  tributaries  (Omer  
2007). Despite the fact that the construction of dams is a controversial topic that evokes 
strong opinions for and against, the common consent is that their benefits outweigh the 
negative consequences. It is however important to consider the environmental and socio-
economic issues and carry out impact and risk assessment as well as pre-feasibility studies 
(Gourbesville 2008). Although the social implications of dam construction and irrigation 
schemes have been academically discussed, it has not had much impact on the policies of 
hydro engineering. Even the most recent dam constructions have not succeeded in mitigating 
the negative social and environmental consequences. Also, the maintenance of the old 
irrigation projects tends to be left aside. The Gezira Scheme and the New Halfa Scheme were 
one of the first and largest irrigation schemes in Sudan. Yet today they seem forgotten in their 
rural peripheries and are failing to fulfil the general objectives upon which they were based on 
(Haydar 2008).  
4.3 The changing agricultural landscapes of Sudan 
 
4.3.1 Development of the agricultural sector in Sudan 
 
In Sudan, the history of hydraulic and agricultural development took speed during the Turco-
Egyptian colonial rule (1821-1885) and later on during the British rule (Salih 1989). When 
the British occupied Egypt in 1882 the question over the Nile control and water supply 
became top priority for Britain’s imperium and remained so until Egypt and Sudan declared 
their independence (Collins 1990). The Nile control was essentially about regulating the water 
flows  of  the  Nile  to  prevent  flood  destruction  and  droughts  and  utilizing  the  waters  for  
irrigation and the growing human needs (Collins 2008). The colonial state introduced new 
administrative structures and economic measures such as taxes and export crops that 
intensified the agricultural production (Salih 1989). The deltas of the river Nile were 
expanded to make space for growing cash crops such as cotton. The government also imposed 
heavy taxes on citizens, which increased the farmer’s need for more agricultural production 
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(Salih 1989). Therefore, the Nile control also reflected the current political power struggle 
and territorialisation of its time (Collins 1990).  
In 1910 the English were interested in establishing irrigation schemes for cotton production 
and exporting in the Sudan and they constructed their first irrigation scheme at Taiba. This 
was later on followed by schemes in Barakat, Hag Abdalla and Wad el Nau in 1921. The 
Sennar Dam and the joint Gezira scheme of 300,000 feddans (1 feddan = 0.42 hectares) was a 
major landmark at the time of completion in 1925 and this was followed by more large-scale 
mechanized schemes in the Gedaref area (Chesworth 1990). Most of the schemes had been 
built to generate export revenues and were farmed by sharecropping tenants. The schemes 
were mostly privately owned and operated under governmental licence; however some were 
operated by the government or by parastatals such as the Sudan Gezira Board (Wallach 1988). 
Many of the mega-constructions of that time are concrete reminders of the colonialism that 
took place and showcase the British advanced engineering and the overall territorialisation in 
the region. Although the growing need for development was the general understanding of the 
motivation to harness the Nile water flows, it also reflected the dialogues of power and 
politics  of  that  time.  Many of  the  constructions  took  place  without  a  thorough study  on  the  
consequences for the environment or the changes to the local livelihoods. For instance the 
Jonglei  Canal  Scheme (formerly  known as  the  Sudd Canal  Project)  was  officially  approved  
without a thorough acceptance of the Nilotic inhabitants of the Upper Nile region; those that 
were eventually negatively affected by the Scheme (Collins 1990). However, it is noteworthy 
that many irrigation projects in developing countries were started by the colonial powers to 
achieve economic development in the form of cash crops and food production (Ertsen 2006). 
The  irrigation  schemes  and  river  control  were  good  instruments  of  transforming  the  rural  
social and material landscape. This would, it was thought, not just benefit the colonial powers 
but the colony itself. The schemes at the time were seen as symbols of civilisation, state 
formation and modernisation and an essential element of national development (Ertsen 2006). 
Although the agriculture intensified and became more productive, the farming of cotton and 
other cash crops for mostly European markets did not give a good basis for the Sudanese 
agriculture to support its own rapidly growing population later on. 
At independence on 1 January 1956, Sudan had approximately two million feddans of land 
irrigated by canals (Wallach 1988). Farmers were incorporated into the market economy as 
cash crop producers for the international market. These irrigation schemes became very 
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important to the Sudanese economy, of which the Gezira scheme was by far the most 
successful. In 1963 the Sudanese government extended the Gezira scheme with the Managil 
extension that doubled the command of Gezira altogether. Irrigation along the Blue Nile was 
also developed together with the Roseires storage reservoir near the border of Ethiopia in 
1966. The construction of the Khasm el Girba Dam in eastern Sudan started in 1959 and due 
to the construction of the much larger Aswan High Dam at the border between Egypt and 
Sudan many Nubians from the old Wadi Halfa were resettled at the New Halfa scheme off the 
Khasm el Girba Dam (Wallach 1988).   
This intensification in farming and the growth of urban and market centres also caused high 
increases in firewood and charcoal consumption and degradation of the soils as a consequence. 
Traditional farming and pastoral lands were transformed into large-scale irrigated or rainfed 
mechanised schemes, which resulted in displacing millions of small producers. The 
intensification of agricultural production caused extensive ecological stress on the 
environment and the quality and fertility of land started to decrease (Salih 1989). This also led 
to conflicts between the traditional subsistence farmers and pastoralists and the new farmers 
of  the  schemes.  Between  1970  and  1985  there  were  more  than  20  major  regional  tribal  
conferences solving land conflicts between various ethnic groups in Sudan (Salih 1989). This 
intensification and mechanisation of agriculture in Sudan eventually led to a conflict between 
the traditional and modern agricultural sub-sectors where the rural poor struggled to compete 
against the farmers of the agricultural schemes. Three years of drought in 1982-1985 
eventually led to famine and the agricultural sector in Sudan collapsed. At the time Sudan had 
a debt of over 10 billion US dollars and had to export some of its food products although they 
could hardly feed their own nation (Salih 1989). The situation has improved since but the 
continuous problem is the lack of sustainable yet efficient use of environmental resources and 
the shift from food crops to cash crops that can make the country vulnerable and less resilient 
in times of food shortage or drought.  
4.3.2 Agriculture in Sudan today 
 
Agriculture has for long been the backbone of the Sudanese economy (Sørbø 1985; NHAPC 
2011). In the 20th century agricultural schemes started to emerge around the river Nile and its 
tributaries and agriculture became the core of the Sudanese economy. Irrigated agriculture 
increased as the cash crops such as wheat, sugar cane and cotton started to bring revenue 
through foreign trade (Abdelrazig 1979). However, the Sudanese agricultural sector is facing 
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the challenges of increasing environmental degradation, insecurities of global market prices 
and the continuing climate of conflict and change within Sudan. While most of the 
agricultural schemes in the country are focusing on the farming of export crops for revenue, 
according to UNEP, at least 15 % of the population is dependent on imported food aid (UNEP 
2007). Population is growing, yields are declining and the environment is deteriorating. 
According to the Sudan Comprehensive National Strategy for the Agricultural Sector (1992-
2002) the main targets within its agenda were food security, sustained agricultural 
development, efficient resource utilisation and yield enhancement. These targets have not 
been successfully met but even more discouraging is the fact that very little has been done to 
improve the accessibility of the poor and marginalised to food and more focus has been 
placed on cash crops (Omer 2007).  
Nevertheless, approximately 40 % of the land area in Sudan is cultivable (UNEP 2007). With 
necessary maintenance and management the agricultural sector in Sudan could turn the 
negative prospects around. Despite the increasing importance of the oil sector in Sudan, 
agriculture still holds great potential in Sudan and continues to be relied on by millions of 
Sudanese. There are five main types of farming practised in Sudan; mechanized rain-fed 
agricultural schemes, traditional rain-fed agriculture, mechanized irrigation schemes, 
traditional irrigation and livestock husbandry/pastoralism (UNEP 2007). The irrigation 
schemes are further divided into two categories; the Nile flood and pump schemes, and the 
national irrigation schemes such as Gezira, Rahad, New Halfa and Suki which constitute over 
60 per cent of the total irrigated area (Haydar 2008). These schemes are the four largest 
national schemes of the country and consume 60% of the present Sudanese annual water 
abstraction (See figure 4.) (Omer 2007).  
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Figure 4. Irrigated agricultural schemes in Sudan (Modified from UNEP 2007). 
Most important crops are maize, groundnuts, sugar cane, sorghum and other local food crops. 
The agricultural policy in Sudan has focused on the irrigation sector as it is seen as reliable, 
sustainable and an important earner of foreign exchange (Haydar 2008). The increased export 
opportunities have further promoted the production of other crops such as cotton, gum Arabic, 
sesame, groundnuts, fruits and vegetables (UNEP 2007). In essence Sudan wanted to increase 
the agricultural production by expanding irrigated areas, mechanization, rain-fed agriculture 
and promoting efficiency. The irrigated agriculture is so important that even though it makes 
up only 7 per cent of the cultivated area, it accounts for more than half of the crop yields. For 
a long time it proved successful. However, although the irrigated agriculture has been the 
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most important economic investment of Sudan, many studies have shown that their 
performance has been below the expectations (UNEP 2007). The Gezira scheme is still one of 
the largest irrigation systems in the world yet it has turned out to have a general irrigation 
efficiency of less than 50 per cent. The farmers cannot earn a satisfactory income from their 
crops and the siltation in the canals has caused parts of the scheme to be without sufficient 
irrigation water (Oestigaard 2012). The Gezira scheme is not an exception and the current 
situation of many irrigation schemes, such as New Halfa, portrays a gloomy picture. Despite 
the development the dam or canal constructions that enable the irrigation have also brought 
environmental degradation due to siltation and social issues such as displacement of people 
and social conflict over land issues. In many agricultural schemes siltation in the canals has 
increased thus decreasing the storage capacity of water, land fertility has decreased and 
equipment has become outdated (Omer 2007). Since the start of the many irrigation schemes 
in Sudan, the performance of these schemes was not as good as originally hoped for (Wallach 
1988).  
Nevertheless, irrigation schemes have been a strong part of the Sudanese economy for a long 
period of time and continue to be so. There is no lack of arable land or water in Sudan, but the 
challenge is the maintenance of the schemes and the canal systems and how to bring enough 
profit also to the farmers themselves. Most of the irrigation schemes have been started as 
parastatal establishments but since Sudan adopted a free market economy, privatisation and 
decentralisation system, the aim is to make the schemes into private financially independent 
corporations. Farmers’ associations should have the upper hand in the funding and 
management and the communities should take more responsibility. Furthermore, agricultural 
cooperatives and the private sector are encouraged to operate the schemes (Omer 2007).  
Clearly the crop price fluctuations, decreasing land fertility and problems related to irrigation 
and agriculture infrastructure have made this goal impossible to reach. Most schemes 
continue depending on the state for financial support. 
 Irrigated agriculture has been a major source of employment for Sudanese people, but the 
challenge is to bring the farmer enough income to be able to focus solely on this livelihood 
and not be forced to look for other sources of income in addition. As with many other 
countries in Africa, Sudan is also dependent on export revenues from cash crops. Changing 
global economy, environmental degradation and the on-going political conflicts have also had 
negative effects on the agricultural sector. Sudan is facing high levels of urbanisation and 
many traditional nomadic groups are sedenterised and incorporated into mainstream Sudanese 
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economy. This will eventually change the social rural landscape and ultimately affect the 
sustainability of Sudan’s agricultural schemes.  In a seminar on Environment, climate and the 
Sudanese conflicts, Gunnar M. Sørbø stated that Sudan is suffering from crisis of livelihoods 
and governance. The shift from subsistence agriculture to mechanised agricultural schemes 
has dispossessed many local farmers and pastoralists of their customary rights (Sørbø 2012). 
In  times  of  climate  change,  increasing  food  demand  and  the  shift  to  cash  crop  farming  the  
conflicts over land rights and between different livelihoods may increase.  
4.5 The development of Sudanese economy in the global context 
 
Like many other countries in Africa, Sudan experienced various periods of colonisation 
before gaining its independence in 1956. In order to build the economy and develop the 
country, Sudan took loans from international banks and monetary funds. Sudan needed capital 
to invest in the infrastructural requirements of the growing irrigation and agricultural sector. 
However, already in the 1970s the prices of cash crops worldwide started to decline due to the 
increase in supply forcing the African economy to slow down its growth, or even stop 
completely (Teppo et al. 2011). Many of the African countries have only increased their debt 
since and a lot of the investments have fallen into the web of political conflict, corruption and 
inefficiency in governance. In the 1980s many international banks such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund started to support the privatisation processes of many state-
owned enterprises and companies and cutting down on public expenditure. However, as a 
result many African countries have only seen increased income inequities as a result together 
with a more one-sided production structure (Teppo et al. 2011). Due to the focus on cash 
crops the local food production in Sudan reduced and the fluctuations in cash crop prices 
created insecurity. This was also the case with Sudan and its irrigation schemes, such as New 
Halfa. In the 1980s the World Bank gave Sudan more loans and supported New Halfa with a 
rehabilitation project (World Bank 1992). However, many of the development goals of the 
project failed and left the scheme in the periphery with even less support from the government.  
In more recent years, the high capitalist competition for surplus profit in agriculture has also 
caused hardship for many agricultural schemes in Sudan. In many schemes soils have lost 
fertility and canals have become heavily sedimented.  The Sudanese government has been 
involved in internal conflicts, such as the Darfur crisis, and this has also influenced the overall 
state of development and governance of the country. The growing influence of China in 
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Africa, and Sudan, can mostly be seen in the sectors of mining, infrastructure, hydroenergy 
production, urban construction and trade. The future development of Sudan’s irrigation 
schemes is thus at risk of decline without more effective adjustments and improvements.  
4.6 Social consequences of dams’ construction and irrigation schemes 
 
Mega-scale water projects have for long been included in development initiatives that aim to 
provide water and electricity for growing economies. Although many of the recently seen 
hydrological megaprojects have been essential in providing electricity for the growing urban 
needs around Africa and elsewhere in developing countries, they may have deepened the gap 
between those who have access to water resources, through economic or political power; and 
those who have been forced to step aside and utilize the resources left available for them. As 
stated in the Millennium Development Goals, provision of water and sanitation is a basic need 
and human right. However, access to electricity and power is generally regarded as a 
prerequisite for to the achievement of all Millennium Development Goals (Boege & Turner 
2006). Therefore, hydraulic development may bring development and economic growth for 
many, but leave some with already poor access to electricity and other more urban amenities 
with even poorer access to clean drinking water, sanitation and possibilities for subsistence 
farming. A recent example, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project was a major development 
initiative that aimed to provide water to Gauteng, the urban-industrial heartland of South 
Africa. However, the World Bank that was involved in the project admitted that they could 
not guarantee that some people were not made poorer as a result of the project (Boege & 
Turner 2006).  
The growing need for water, energy and agricultural production is indisputable; however it is 
relevant  to  ask  who  has  the  power  to  decide  over  the  physical  changes  in  an  area  due  to  
infrastructural engineering, have the beneficiaries been openly identified and heard and who 
on the other hand has to sacrifice over their land and access to natural resources. The 
decisions over the changes in the biophysical conditions are often made by the socio-political 
elite in a country or a region, or more recently also including international organisations and 
multinational corporations. Citizens are usually kept at a distance when it comes to decision-
making (Staddon 1988). As water and other natural resources are becoming more and more 
commoditised it is often the less privileged or marginalised groups of people that suffer from 
these changes the most (Swyngedouw 2009; Minoia 2012). The political inequality in access 
to decision-making processes may also lead to unequal distribution of negative consequences 
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and benefits from projects (Staddon 1988). Often the communities directly affected by the 
infrastructural engineering are the ones who suffer the most and may even face issues of 
underdevelopment such as loss of cultural land and traditional income means. Especially in a 
conflict-ridden country like Sudan, this is very alarming for the minority groups that are not 
well represented in the national politics.  
The building of the Aswan High Dam and the resettlement of the Nubian people into the New 
Halfa Agricultural Scheme that followed did not prove to be a successful recipe for 
development.  Some have even called it  a “complete development disaster “(Bosshard 2011). 
The Nubian resettlement has by no means been the only social tragedy in the history of Sudan. 
The recent Merowe Dam and Kajbar Dam constructions in the northern part of Sudan have 
led to protests and violent clashes with the local Nubians and government security forces as 
the Nubians are, again, threatened by the resettlement (International Rivers Network 2013).  
It has also been argued, that many agricultural schemes end up bringing more impoverishment 
and other negative consequences than development and have consequently caused forced 
displacements of communities in various regions. The most affected people are usually 
subsistence farmers, herders, nomadic pastoralists and fishermen (Haydar 2008). These 
groups of people are often living in the periphery or otherwise marginalised and therefore lack 
power in decision-making. For compensating the loss of their land, governments have 
resettled people in planned agricultural areas. This has been done cohesively with the 
planning of megaprojects such as dam constructions. The possibilities for irrigation and 
agricultural development have been portrayed as beneficial for the marginalised people thus 
uplifting them from previous poverty or otherwise traditional lifestyles. However, these 
development initiatives that are forced upon a group of people such as the Halfawi can have 
negative implications and consequences that can contribute towards the success of the scheme. 
Many of these development initiatives have been carried out through assistance from 
international aid or investments (Haydar 2008). However, often the long-term consequences 
have not been thoroughly investigated and the negative impacts have not been properly 
assessed. The current state of many irrigation schemes needs further evaluation in order to 
plan new settlements more effectively and to understand the social consequences of 
hydroelectric projects.  
Furthermore, the development of the irrigated agricultural sector may cause conflicts between 
nomadic pastoralists and farmers in irrigated agriculture. Conflict may arise between central 
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governments, modern water sectors and the local communities over irrigation schemes and 
agricultural production for cash crops (Boege & Turner 2006). Negative impacts have been 
experienced in local communities that are highly dependent on subsistence economies and the 
local water resources. Those who have been forced to relocate due to development-induced 
displacement and resettlement (DIDR) have in many instances not benefited. On the contrary, 
many have become more impoverished by losing economic, social and cultural resources. 
Those who have been forcefully resettled due to the construction of water-related 
infrastructure  often  find  themselves  in  conflict  with  the  original  people  of  the  new  
resettlement area and the local government. Although national governments typically justify 
these development initiatives by invoking the larger goals of national growth and 
development it is often those already marginal who benefit the least and sacrifice the most for 
these initiatives (Haydar 2008). 
It is not to say, that construction of dams and agricultural development should be abandoned 
and subsistence farming and natural water resources kept intact. Instead, the economic, 
environmental and social consequences of hydraulic and agricultural development must be 
thoroughly examined prior to the development initiatives taking place and the local 
communities affected should be allowed a strong say in decision-making and sharing of the 
benefits.  It  is  typical  that  large-scale  development  initiatives  tend  to  constitute  development  
from above and are superimposed by national or regional agencies upon a local population 
with little say in feasibility studies, planning, implementation and sustainability of the project 
(Haydar 2008). Ultimately this leads to the question of to what extend can the ecosystem be 
modified for an intended larger good and how and between whom the costs and benefits are 
shared. Hydropolitics will most likely become an even more critical issue within the countries 
sharing the Nile water basin.  It  is  therefore crucial  that  the riparian countries maintain good 
command of international policy and agreements as the actions of one riparian country may 
cause negative consequences to the entire downstream region.  
5. Ethnicity and the transforming sense of national identity in Sudan 
 
I have dedicated a whole chapter to discussing the meaning behind ethnicity and national 
identity in Sudan as their influence in power and politics cannot be left unnoticed. When it 
comes to issues of land rights, territorialisation and social integration the question of political 
power plays a key role.  
 45 
 
Culture, ethnicity and even the concept of race are socially constructed notions that are 
constantly affected by change. To understand the instabilities and friction in the Sudanese 
society, it is important to know the background to the problematic of Sudanese identity and 
nationality. The concept of Sudanese identity has been discussed and debated for a long 
period of time. One of the underlying causes for its complexity is the variability in the social 
and political hegemonies within Sudan. The long history of conflict over power, resources 
and land has its roots in the different power hierarchies between ethnic groups based on the 
colonial foundation (Idris 2005). Prior to the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the 
population  of  the  country  as  a  whole  was  over  30  million  people  consisting  of  over  570  
heterogeneous ethnic and linguistic groups (Adar 2001; Collins 2008). Throughout the history 
these groups have been ruled by various political and ethnic establishments. The colonial 
construct together with the various eras of foreign rule have resulted in the ethnic and racial 
community becoming the basis for political and economic entitlement, instead of citizenship. 
The Sudanese government has failed to promote the development of a diverse yet equal 
society.  This  is  often  the  reason  for  emerging  tension  and  conflict  as  claims  of  
marginalization, exclusion and domination among the different ethnic groups are experienced 
(Idris 2005). It is not to say that the problem lies in the lack of fully adhering to the Western 
standards of democracy and rights of citizenship. However, without a doubt the Sudanese 
government has promoted a national development that attempts to mainstream and uniform 
the ethnic fabric of Sudan to the extent that it undermines the rights of ethnic minorities.  
The construction of “Africanism” and “Arabism” as competing political identities in Sudan 
(Idris 2005) has caused a national juxtaposition that has forced people to take a side and 
enforce their identities based on these categories and boundaries. In Sudan, the understanding 
of  the  composition  of  the  ethnic  classifications  is  also  understood  differently,  and  often  
“chosen by the people themselves” as race cannot always be attributed to physical 
characteristics  (Jok  2007).  The  colour  of  the  skin  thus  does  not  create  ethnic  divisions,  
although it is not irrelevant in Sudan (Ryle 2012). The challenge, however, in Sudan is the 
lack of entitlement to self-determination and the discriminatory policies that attempt to 
constrict diversity.  
5.1 The historical context 
 
The ethnic history of Sudan has many phases. The ancient Egyptians called Sudan the land of 
the Nahassi and they identified various ethnic groups such as the Kush, Mazzoi and Nobat (El 
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Mahdi 1965). The Greeks and Romans later occupied Egypt and also brought Christianity into 
the territory now known as the Sudan. The Sudanese people are a mix of Hamites, Negroes 
and Arabs and have experienced the rise and fall of Egyptian rule over Sudan, the Kingdom 
of Napata, Funj, the Meroitic Era, the Christian Kingdoms of Nubia, The Turko-Egyptian 
Period, The Mahdist revolution and lastly the British Condominium (El Mahdi 1965). All of 
these invaders and rulers have influenced the institutional and cultural development of Sudan 
and further diversified the Sudanese society (Collins 2008). In this process some ethnic 
groups have changed, merged with one another or disappeared. 
The Arabs visited Sudan already before its Islamisation but the impact of Islam as a religion 
grew  stronger  during  the  12th  Century.  In  the  fourteenth  century  the  conflict  in  Egypt  
encouraged the Arab migration further south in Sudan.  The indigenous populations were 
assimilated by marriage and peaceful proselytization. This merged local cultures into an Arab 
ethnicity (Ryle 2012).  Thus most Arab Sudanese of today are not purely of Arab origin,  but 
rather represent different Negroid, Arab, Beja and Nubian elements (El Mahdi 1965). Many 
indigenous languages continued to be spoken and traditional lifestyles did not change 
drastically.  
Therefore many of these now Arabic-speaking Sudanese are not Arab in ethnic or 
geographical origin, but have African heritage. However, they have adapted into the Arabic 
language and lifestyle and converted to Islamic faith in a way, that they now perceive 
themselves culturally more Arab than African. Therefore, Arab culture and Islam in Sudan 
means more than just  a religion, it  binds people to a shared identity and origin.  This helped 
the Sudanese ruling elite to create a coherent Sudanese nationhood based on the Islamization 
programmes that eventually would result in the transformation of Sudan into an Islamic State 
(Adar 2001). Today most of northern Sudanese have adopted Arab culture, the Islamic faith 
and the Arabic language as their own. In some parts new hybrid forms of indigenous culture 
and Arabic culture have mixed forming new identities (Abdalla 2008). 
As  many  of  the  nomadic  ethnic  groups  were  converted  to  Islam,  the  British  and  Egyptians  
further encouraged Islamisation as it was seen as a unifying element in the creation of the 
national Sudanese identity (Adar 2001). Therefore, the uniforming of the Sudanese nation was 
supported by the colonial rule and they further institutionalized the ethnic and racial 
entitlements, rights and privileged of the chosen group of people. Eventually this led to 
unequal forms of Sudanese citizenship (Idris 2005). 
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Since the British lost their control over the Sudan and independence was gained in 1956 the 
Sudanese government has pursued “ethno-religious-centred policies” of Islamisation and 
Arabisation throughout the country (Adar 2001; Collins 2008). In essence Arabisation means 
integrating other ethnic or religious groups into the “cultural values and beliefs of Muslims 
and Arabs in particular” (Adar 2001). This Islamisation has resulted in the polarisation of the 
country into cultural core-peripheries and also further enhanced the crisis of Darfur and the 
secession of South Sudan in 2011. The ruling elite in Sudan has for long seen the ethnic 
diversity as an obstacle and a disintegrating factor in the unification of Sudan. Adopting the 
Arab-Islamic paradigm was therefore used to ensure the national unity (Biong Deng 2005). 
This however has divided the nation, created a power imbalance between different ethnic 
groups and deepened the gap between the core and the peripheries. Many of the crisis in 
Sudan’s history have been caused by the exclusionary and discriminatory policies adopted by 
the ruling elite against the majority of the indigenous people that have denied their access to 
political and social decision-making, and therefore, often to power and resources (Biong Deng 
2005; Idris 2005). The imposition of the Sharia (Islamic  laws)  in  1983  together  with  the  
policy of Arabization caused marginalized groups of people and the people of (then) Southern 
Sudan to be regarded as inferior citizens, even to the extent of being brutalized by the military 
(Idris 2005).  This led to insurgencies in the peripheral regions, such as Darfur, and caused the 
migration of people avoiding conflict that is continuing to reshape the country.  
Those who identified themselves as more African in their identity, such as the majority of the 
now independent South Sudanese people, felt excluded and discriminated against. Most non-
Muslims opted for a secular nationalism that gave space for other religious and cultural values 
(Adar 2001). However, as we have seen with the secession of South Sudan and the possibility 
for the secession of Darfur and other peripheral regions of Sudan, the country is witnessing 
vast disparities and extensive differentiation regarding accessibility, wealth and societal status 
when it comes to the different ethnic groups of Sudan. The politics of Arabisation and the 
cultural mainstreaming create automatic hierarchies, inclusion and exclusion, that with a 
country as big as Sudan, there are bound to be conflict and power struggle between different 
groups of people. As with many African countries, Sudan has also been an artificial construct 
combining many geographically, religiously and ethnically different regions (Cockett 2010). 
The promotion of the Arabic language as the language of instruction in schools further 
divided the people, especially between the north and the (then southern) Sudan. The 
Arabization policy monopolized political power and eventually led to the growth of Arab 
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racial supremacy (Ryle 2005; Abdalla 2008). This has caused the minority groups, such as the 
Fur  and  the  Zaghawa  of  the  Darfur  region,  the  Nubians  of  the  north  and  the  people  of  the  
Nuba mountains in the Kordofan state to stand up for themselves that has eventually led to 
violent conflicts. The president of the opposition group Justice and Equality Movement of 
Sudan, Khalil Ibrahim from the Zaghawa ethnic group, was one of many Sudanese that saw 
the injustice and discrimination done by the ruling elite of Sudan. The revolutionary, yet 
illegal, document by the movement, the Black Book; Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the 
Sudan was widely distributed and discussed in Sudan. The book gives concrete examples of 
the institutionalised injustice and political hegemony of the Sudanese ruling elite that has 
discriminated against other ethnic groups and peripheral regions within the country (El-Tom 
2011). The favouring of central and northern part of Sudan within politics is widely known 
yet criticism of the existing political apparatus is strictly forbidden and dreaded. 
One of the negative consequences of this cultural mainstreaming is the slow decay of the 
multitude of cultures, traditions and historical symbols within the country. For instance the 
lack of interest towards the rich archaeological findings of the old Nubia of which many are 
now under the Lake Aswan. This imposed single vision of history and the Sudanese identity 
has neglected or destroyed the presence of a rich cultural and historical capital within Sudan. 
As Amir Idris states; “In the Sudanese context, history has never been about the past, but 
about the present contested realities.” (Idris 2005).  
5.2 The Nubians of Wadi Halfa  
 
“Nubia is a detached country, and the Nubians remained tied to their region, living in a 
world of their own. For this reason Nubia kept aloof and unresponsive to the great events in 
the Sudan in the nineteenth century.” (Hassan Dafalla 1975) 
The relative isolation of the region of Nubia in the north of Sudan and south of Egypt had led 
to the creation of a distinct and unique Nubian culture. Nubia used to be topographically, 
historically and ethnically a single country that was later divided with the arbitrary border of 
Egypt and Sudan. After the decline of the ancient Egypt, Nubia had remained an independent 
area  until  the  Arabs  came  to  Sudan  and  brought  the  influence  of  Islam  with  them  (Dafalla  
1975). The Nubians belong to the Hamitic ethnic group of Africa and the long formation of 
their identity has been much discussed. Hassan Dafalla describes the Nubians as peaceful yet 
demanding and advocating their rights (Dafalla 1975). Despite their relatively high level of 
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education, rich cultural history and distinct culture, the Nubians have for a long time been 
discriminated against both within Egypt and Sudan. Many of the particular cultural traits and 
characteristics of the Nubians have evolved within a long period of time in their distinct 
environment in Wadi Halfa and its surroundings. I will look at some of the characteristics of 
the Nubian culture in order to better understand the difficulties of adapting to the different 
environment of New Halfa.  
Besides farming, the date palm formed the backbone of the Nubian economy. It was the 
symbol of wealth and a concrete sign of security also for the future generations. At certain 
places along the Nile the riverbanks were covered with a high date palm forest (Dafalla 1975). 
Apart from the income and the security the palms gave shelter from the desert sun and were 
the source of inspiration to poetry and singing to an almost sacred extent. It is known as one 
of the symbols of Nubian culture and besides being a source of livelihood and food the palm 
leaves had an important meaning in many cultural ceremonies. All parts of the date palm were 
utilized from leafs to the trunks and many useful items were made. Local delicacies and gin 
was also made from dates (Dafalla 1975). All the date palms were later inundated by water 
when the Aswan High Dam slowly pooled into a lake.  The Nubians,  however,  were already 
relocated and thus saved from the sight. Back in their new home of New Halfa the date palm 
does not seem to thrive and only a few are grown, mostly for aesthetic and symbolic reasons 
(See figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. A date palm in a Halfawi Nubian village in New Halfa (Wallin 2011). 
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They are not kept for economic gain anymore but as constant reminders of the old way of life 
and the cultural roots that lie deep somewhere else than in the flat clay soils of the Butana 
plain. Besides sparse rainfall, the Nile was the only source of irrigation in Wadi Halfa. 
Traditional waterwheels, Sagiyas, were used for irrigation. Agricultural methods were not 
modern and the plots were relatively small. A rich variety or vegetables and fruit were grown 
according to the winter and summer rotation and the flood cultivation. Wheat, barley, peas, 
lentils, potatoes and beans were some of the staple crops cultivated that formed key 
ingredients of Nubian cuisine. An interesting aspect of the Nubian lifestyle in Wadi Halfa was 
the  emigration  of  the  working  aged  men  to  work  in  urban  regions  while  the  women  stayed  
behind looking after the orchards. In a census done prior to the displacement of the Nubians 
they discovered that nearly every cultivator in a tenancy was female (Dafalla 1975). Due to 
the migration for work of the working aged men a lot of the plots were given to caretakers or 
closest kin to utilize (Dafalla 1975). Nubians were thus already accustomed to absentees in 
farming in Wadi Halfa and farmlands were often shared among larger families. This would 
explain  some  of  the  high  absentee  rates  in  New  Halfa  and  why  so  many  Halfawi  Nubians  
have left New Halfa to work in Khartoum.  
The Nubian language is a strong continuation of the culture that is still used in New Halfa. 
Many turn to Arabic in public discussions, thus making the Nubians also more adapted to the 
Arab culture and language (Dafalla 1975; Adar 2001). Despite this the Nubian language 
continues to have a great meaning for many. The seclusion of the Nubians is also visible in 
the tendency to cling together instead of mixing with other communities. Marriage takes place 
within the Nubian boundaries and traditional ceremonies are present in all turning points of 
social life. The Nubian women wore traditional Nubian black dresses made of thin lace that 
protected from the sun yet allowed a cooling breeze to pass in the arid desert climate of Wadi 
Halfa. In New Halfa the tradition was not as prevalent as the clay soil became muddy when 
wet and it was therefore less practical. The distinct Nubian architecture of bold patterns on the 
walls and other decorations that were common in typical Nubian houses in Wadi Halfa are no 
longer continued in New Halfa (Haydar 2008). It is probable that the government-built houses 
in New Halfa felt alien and too impersonal to suit the decorations. 
The  traditional  Nubian  lifestyle  could  not  be  fully  sustained  in  the  different  environment  of  
the Butana region in eastern Sudan and some cultural aspects have been abandoned. The 
Nubians of Wadi Halfa had to sacrifice greatly for the greater development of the country, but 
also  for  their  own  future  survival.  The  stable  lifestyle  at  their  ancestral  land  turned  into  a  
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challenging lifestyle as a tenant farmer with shifting crop prices and other insecurities. 
Besides the concrete losses of tradition and cultural traits the resettlement came as an insult to 
their dignity. Unable to protest the changes, as Hassan Dafalla elaborates in his book the 
Nubian Exodus, many Nubian characters and cultural customs were slowly emerged into the 
mainstream Sudanese culture (Dafalla 1975). Evidently this is true within the Nubians of New 
Halfa today. However, according to the interviews held with the Nubians I must state that the 
Nubian identity and consciousness is resistant to change and even if their cultural traditions 
and customs have lost some of their distinctiveness they continue to safeguard their self-worth. 
The Halfawi I interviewed in the suburbs of Khartoum also took pride in the Nubian identity 
and seemed to be very aware of the threats to their ethnic roots.   
However, it is important to remember that even before the building of the Aswan High Dam 
the ancient Nubian lifestyle was bound to change sooner or later. As Mohamed Haydar writes 
in his study, the Social Cost of Resettlement,  the  Nubians  see  themselves  as  victims  of  the  
dam and the loss of traditional land as heart-breaking. However even before the construction 
of the first  Aswan dam the Nubians have had to leave their  farms to work in towns such as 
Cairo, Alexandria and Khartoum. The land of the old Nubia may have high cultural value but 
in terms of arable land it was not enough to support the growing population (Haydar 2008). 
Therefore the traditional lifestyle was subject to modernisation and the Nubians were already 
actively changing it. However it may be that the feeling of loss and nostalgia that Nubians 
continue to feel until this day is not so much about the concrete loss of their land but about the 
discrimination and insult they experienced with the inundation of Wadi Halfa, the loss of 
cultural integrity and the lack of ownership in deciding their future course.  
5.3 Sacrifices of land and identity 
 
“Roots of our past are important for our identity. People who have no memory have no 
future.”-Francesco Aloisi de Larderel in Nubia Submerged (2000) 
The building of the Aswan High Dam and the resettlement of approximately 50,000 Sudanese 
Nubians in 1963 (Dafalla 1975) to New Halfa also fit together with the direction of Sudanese 
nationalism as it destroyed the old town of Wadi Halfa and many traditional cultural lands of 
ancient Nubia in the Northern Sudan. The New Halfa agricultural scheme was built in order to 
resettle the Nubians from the north and to sedenterise many nomadic groups of Eastern Sudan 
to join the agricultural scheme. This was supposed to make it easier for these formerly self-
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sufficient and isolated groups to absorb into the Sudanese nation as well as to promote the 
growing economy of Sudan (Jok 2007). The Sudanese government’s exclusionary policies 
were not just based on religious differences, but the post-colonial policies attempted at 
eradicating the indigenous traditions and cultures of the non-Arab populations within the 
north (Jok 2007). Jok continues to argue, that the Sudanese government has embraced a form 
of political Islam and Arabist ideology that is unrepresentative of the Sudanese multitudes of 
cultures that ancient and contemporary heritage reveals (Jok 2007).  
The question of whether the Nubian people of Wadi Halfa were intentionally resettled and 
integrated to the Sudanese and Egyptian societies and economies is relevant and still widely 
discussed within the Nubian communities. Although resettled Nubians were compensated 
with money, land and housing, when it comes to losses of heritage, culture and traditions it is 
difficult  to  compensate  such  aspects  of  life.  Although  the  construction  of  the  Aswan  High  
Dam for power and agricultural irrigation was the main cause for the destruction of old Nubia 
in Wadi Halfa and the resettlement of its people, some scholars have argued that it was a part 
of the demographic engineering of Sudan that is still taking place (Hashim 2010). Sudanese 
academic Jalal Hashim argues, that the continuing construction of dams in northern Sudan is a 
way to create irrigated agricultural land for Egyptian farmers and at the same time break the 
existing Nubian communities in the area and incorporate them to the Sudanese society 
(Hashim 2010). Whether this is intentional or not, it is nevertheless taking place. The old land 
of  Nubia  was  for  long  a  distinct  cultural  territory  that  was  in  the  interest  of  both  Egypt  and  
Sudan to divide and disperse. Breaking the territorial hegemony of the Nubians made it easier 
for the governments to gain control over these areas and impose the Sudanese and Egyptian 
nationalism. In essence it was about replacing the territories of ethnic identity with political 
territories controlled by the central government. Adhering and opposing to the Sudanese 
politics largely defined the areas of the territorial core and periphery. These experiences of 
unequal distribution of land and regulation of customary rights to land are experienced among 
different Sudanese ethnic communities, the Darfur conflict being just one example.  
The politics of Sudanese nationalism have failed in its attempt to unify the diverse nation of 
Sudan into Islamic culture. Although the people of South Sudan no longer affect the ethnic 
composition of Sudan, there are still thousands of Southern Sudanese residing in Sudan that 
refuse to move to South Sudan. The hegemony of the Sudanese ruling elite makes it difficult 
for those representing minority ethnic groups to become successful in politics or business and 
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many people become excluded (Jok 2007). Eventually some ethnic groups are facing the 
choice of cultural immersion or existence in periphery.  
In his recent dissertation, Conflict of National Identity in Sudan, Kuel Maluil Jok explains the 
history of slavery in Sudan in which Muslim Arabs pursued the practice of trafficking in the 
Black indigenous Africans of Sudan as slaves that promoted the creation of racial categories 
of superiority and inferiority (Jok 2012). In order to prevent the trafficking the British 
thereafter introduced the Closed District Ordinance that separated areas of Southern Sudan, 
Nuba Mountains, Beja and Darfur from the Islamic and Arab North. Although this historical 
separation was not the reason for the existing ethnic and political conflict of today’s Sudan 
(Jok 2012), the abovementioned regions (except for the now independent South Sudan) 
continue to remain outside of the political  core of Sudan. Although the Arab North has held 
the political power since the independence 1956, the ethnic territorial nationalism that 
transformed Sudan’s national identity into an Arab-Islamic state began in 1983 when the 
Sharia law was imposed (Jok 2012). After this it was considered inferior to be a non-Muslim 
and the ethnic diversity of the country was seen as an obstacle to the successful fulfilment of 
Sharia.  
Regarding this study it is therefore good to understand how ethnicity in Sudan influences who 
has power over regional decision-making, resource competition and distribution of benefits 
and opportunities. This is evidently not unique to Sudan, but it makes it a crucial factor in 
Sudanese politics as the Arab hegemony of the ruling elite will prefer to promote the Islamic 
rule and Sharia law in a country, that is still in many cultural and geographical ways diverse 
and African. Since the secession of the South Sudan, the remaining country of Sudan is 
perceived now even more as an Islamic state. Therefore rights to and confrontations over 
resources and territories are decided upon based on ethnic origins and the power hierarchies 
induced by them (Jok 2007). Although the Sudanese state promotes equal rights of all races in 
its constitution, many non-Arabs however face discrimination and limited access to 
opportunities compared to their Arab counterparts (Jok 2007). Therefore, racism is deeply 
enrooted in Sudanese society, and above all it is more historical and cultural than based on 
colour and more institutional than ideological (Collins 2008).  
This study will  later discuss the issues of resource distribution in the agricultural  scheme of 
New Halfa in eastern Sudan, where also drastic differences in access to resources and 
opportunities are following ethnic divisions.  
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6. Study Area; the New Halfa Agricultural Scheme 
 
The New Halfa Agricultural Scheme is an agricultural settlement scheme of 440 000 feddans 
(184000ha) in size. The scheme was created in the early 1960s to settle the Nubians from 
Wadi Halfa in northern Sudan, after their home became inundated due to the construction of 
the  Aswan  High  Dam  (El  Arifi  1988).  In  addition,  this  scheme  was  to  improve  the  living  
conditions of the local pastoral nomads in the area. Each agricultural settler received a 
hawasha (tenancy) of 15 feddans to grow cotton, wheat or sorghum and groundnuts. The 
Nubians from Wadi Halfa also received a freehold land as a compensation for their lost land 
in northern Sudan (El Arifi 1988). At the time of the establishment of the New Halfa Scheme 
it was the second largest irrigation project in the Sudan after the Gezira Scheme, still the 
largest irrigation scheme in the world (Sørbø 1985). 
6.1 Historical context of the New Halfa Agricultural Scheme 
 
The New Halfa agricultural scheme started as the largest known planned resettlement project 
in Sudan at the time. This was caused by the Nile Waters Agreement between Sudan and 
Egypt to construct the Aswan High Dam that eventually inundated the historical town of 
Wadi Halfa under Lake Nasser (Abdelrazig 1977; Ahmad & Abu Sin 1990; Laxen 2007). The 
New Halfa scheme was partly established with Egyptian grant funds, as it was important for 
Egypt to secure the construction of the Aswan High Dam (Laxen 2007).  
Out of six alternative sites for relocation of the Nubians, the location of Khasm el Girba was 
eventually selected as the Khasm el Girba dam was completed in 1964 to support irrigated 
agriculture (NHAPC 2011). The project was established between 1964 and 1969 and in 1964 
the transfer of the majority of the Nubians took place (Dafalla 1975; Sørbø 1985). The New 
Halfa  scheme had  many objectives:  1)  It  was  to  resettle  about  50  000  Halfawi  from the  old  
Wadi Halfa 2) it was to settle the nomadic tribes that used to enjoy grazing and cultivation 
rights prior to the project and provide them with social services, better economic conditions 
and possibilities in agriculture; 3) it was to increase national income and foreign exchange 
earnings by growing cotton and groundnuts; 4) to promote self-sufficiency in wheat and sugar 
cane; 5) to utilise Atbara River waters more efficiently 5) and to utilise the fertile area of the 
so called “Butana region”, a grazing land formerly used by nomadic tribes for livestock 
grazing (Abdelrazig 1979; Haydar 2008; NHAPC 2011).  
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The scheme is 440,000 feddans in size of which 366 000 feddans were to be equally divided 
between medium staple cotton, groundnut and wheat cultivation (wheat was later replaced by 
sorghum cultivation by the nomads as it  is  their  staple crop).  Cotton was chosen as it  is  the 
major cash crop for generating hard currency for the government and profit for the tenants. 
Groundnuts are the second most important cash crop in the scheme and wheat and sorghum 
were cultivated for local consumption and the surplus was sold (Ahmed 2009). 
In addition 25 000 feddans were designated as freehold land to Halfawi people as a 
compensation for their loss of traditional land in Wadi Halfa (Sørbø 1977; Abdelrazig 1979; 
NHAPC 2011). Originally there were 22 367 tenants in the scheme, each cultivating a land of 
15 feddans (of which 5 feddans for cotton, wheat and groundnuts respectively), however later 
it was noticed that not all tenants reside in the project area. In the beginning, the absentee rate 
was already 40% (Abdelrazig 1979).  
The New Halfa scheme was originally a joint venture between the government and the tenants. 
The tenant provides the labour and supervision while the government provides the irrigation 
facilities, scheme administration, agricultural services, transportation and marketing of cotton 
(Abdelrazig 1979). The New Halfa Agricultural Corporation was to initiate agricultural 
reform in the project area in order to maximise social and economic benefits. In accordance 
with the agreement between the tenant and the Corporation, the share cropping applies only to 
cotton and the wheat/sorghum and groundnuts belong to the tenant who pays the Corporation 
according to the services it provides (Abdelrazig 1979). 
However, since the start of the scheme, the problems have started to emerge. Already in 1977 
Abdelrazig pointed out problems in the Khasm el Girba Dam such as water shortage caused 
by increased sedimentation and blockage by weeds, defective farm and canal layouts and 
inefficient application of irrigation water by tenants. In addition a shortage of fuels and 
increasing prices of fertilizer and insecticides was experienced (Abdelrazig 1977). Later on, 
the total cultivable land was reduced and the storage capacity of the Khasm el Girba dam is 
now reduced to 0.6 million cubic metres (NHAPC 2011).  
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6.2 Physical features of New Halfa 
 
6.2.1 Geographical context 
 
The area of New Halfa is situated about 400 km east of Khartoum, in the western part of 
Kassala State (Laxen 2007). The New Halfa Agricultural Scheme lies in the Butana plain that 
stretches to the east and west of the Atbara River. It is located in the catchment area of the 
Atbara  River,  a  tributary  of  the  Blue  Nile.  The  scheme  extends  110  km  in  North-South  
direction and 30 km in East-West direction. The scheme is situated between the latitudes of 
15 N and 17N, 35 E and 36 E. Approximately 80 % of the area is controlled and supervised 
by NHAPC (New Halfa Agricultural Production Corporation) which has divided the scheme 
into six administrative sections (See figure 6). Inside the scheme there is a sugar factory with 
10 000 ha of sugar cane plantations that do not belong to the New Halfa agricultural scheme 
corporation (Laxen 2007). There are also flour mills and industrial businesses near the town 
(Salem-Murdock 1989). 
The land is flat and featureless except for some rocky hills, odd trees and shrubs. It is part of 
the savannah belt (Sørbø 1985).  The soil is relatively fertile and it consists of highly uniform 
alluvial clay with heavy textured vertisols that swell when wet and crack when dry (NHAPC 
2011). The climate is semi-arid with an average annual rainfall of 250-500 mm, peaking 
between the months of July and August (Haydar 2008). The New Halfa Agricultural Scheme 
receives its waters from the Khasm el Girba Dam across the Atbara River. The villages of the 
resettled Nubians are situated close to the town of New Halfa and the villages of the nomadic 
tribes are situated further in the periphery. The scheme is based on a tenancy system of 
irrigated agriculture that has also been used at the Gezira scheme.  
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Figure 6. Map of New Halfa photographed at the NHAPC headquarters shows the scheme divided into different 
agricultural districts (Wallin 2011). 
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6.2.2. The irrigation system 
 
The water coming through the Khasm el Girba dam in the Atbara River is managed by the 
irrigation department (NHAPC 2011). The irrigation system is based on gravity flow where 
the main canal conveys water to the project area through the network of subsidiary canals 
together with the help of motorised pumps (Laxen 2007, Haydar 2008). The irrigation 
network consists of branch canals, major and minor canals, quaternary canals and tertiary 
farm ditches. The traditional method of the basin (Angaya) system is used in field irrigation 
(NHAPC 2011). Despite the canal system, there are great water losses due to evaporation 
which has negative consequences for water availability (Haydar 2008).  
 
Figure 7. The Khasm el Girba main canal (Wallin 2011). 
 
The Khasm el  Girba  dam was  completed  in  1964.  It  can  supply  water  to  the  main  canal  by  
different methods of operation depending on the difference in the water levels between the 
reservoir and the canal (See figure 7) (NHAPC 2011). The dam was originally designed to 
hold 1.6 billion cubic metres of water; however already in 1976 the storage capacity of the 
reservoir was reduced to 0.8 billion cubic metres due to heavy siltation coming from the upper 
reaches of the river Atbara in the Ethiopian highlands (Laxen 2007).  At the moment the 
capacity of the reservoir is approximately 0.6 billion (NHAPC 2011). Usually during the 
growing season the water flows continuously to the minor canals. However, some farmers 
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have complained that certain areas get more water than others. Due to declining capacity of 
the reservoir the irrigation area is consequently decreasing (See table 1). Further, the siltation 
and the lack of canal maintenance reduces the circulation of water in larger areas downstream 
thus creating uneven distribution of water within the scheme. 
Table 1. The declining cultivated are in the New Halfa Scheme 
Season Cultivated area/feddan % of the area under cultivation 
93/94 200 667 55 
94/95 218 720 60 
95/96 214 845 59 
96/97 225 165 61 
97/98 202 160 55 
98/99 189 935 52 
99/2000 140 120 38 
2000/2001 157 185 43 
2001/2002 170 565 46 
2002/2003 124 330 34 
2003/2004 142 725 39 
Source: New Halfa Agricultural Production Company 2008. 
The canal system from the head of the main canal down to the tail end of the minor canal is 
maintained  and  operated  by  the  Ministry  of  Irrigation  under  the  charge  of  a  Divisional  
Irrigation  Engineer  stationed  in  New  Halfa.  The  operation  of  the  field  outlet  pipes  and  the  
minor canals are however controlled by the NHAPC which is also responsible for the 
operation and maintenance of the quaternary canals (NHAPC 2011).  
6.2.3 The town of New Halfa and the surrounding villages 
 
The New Halfa town is the administrative and commercial centre of the scheme and it is 
situated at the centre of the scheme. It was planned with a grid-iron pattern with a central 
business district (CBD) and housing units of standard size (Ahmad & Abu Sin 1990). 
Although it is largely a residential area, it is the commercial and trade centre of the New Halfa 
scheme with numerous small shops, market places, public offices and restaurants. It also 
holds the New Halfa hospital and other services. The town of New Halfa has developed 
extensively since the start of the scheme. It is still surrounded by mainly Nubian and Shukriya 
villages thus other ethnic groups, such as Rashaida and Hadendowa, in the peripheral regions 
need to travel longer to reach the services available in the town.  The town is now providing 
urban amenities to approximately ten times the original population of New Halfa (Ahmad & 
Abu Sin 1990). Some of the buildings need repairing and the poor condition or lack of tarmac 
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roads makes the streets muddy and difficult to use during the rainy season, especially with the 
common  donkey  carts  (see  figure  8).  The  growth  of  migrant  labour  and  urbanisation  has  
generated many informal businesses that are scattered throughout the town (see figure 9). This 
influx of people has also resulted in the growing amount of illegal squatters and settlements 
emerging near the town. The competition over free land has caused some land disputes 
between the original inhabitants, internal refugees and migrants, merchants and the Shukriya 
tenants  who are  claiming  rights  to  some of  the  vacant  land  in  the  town (Ahmad & Abu Sin  
1990). The pressure within the town is understandable as the services available were initially 
designed to meet the needs of the original residents, not the tenfold population of today. 
Already during the census of 1993 the population in the whole scheme area was 385 250 
which has increased since due to natural growth (NHAPC 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The town of New Halfa (Wallin 2011) Figure 8. The town of New Halfa (Wallin 2011). 
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Figure 9. Informal market in New Halfa (Wallin 2011). 
 
Most of the surrounding villages in close proximity to the town have been built at the time of 
the  construction  of  the  scheme  and  allocated  to  both  Halfawi  Nubians  and  to  local  ethnic  
groups such as Shukriya, Hadendowa and Rashaida among others. The Halfawi villages are 
all  situated  within  close  distance  to  the  town but  most  of  the  villages  of  the  indigenous  ex-
nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes are further away and built to a much lower standard than the 
Nubian villages (Ahmad & Abu Sin 1990). Many of the nomads have also constructed their 
own houses in contrast to the Nubians who all were given houses by the scheme (Sørbø 1977). 
Villages designated for the nomads have also less extensive social services and amenities 
(Sørbø 1977; Haydar 2008). The communities are segregated and dispersed with agricultural 
land acting as buffer zones (Haydar 2008). Interestingly, already in 1975 the manager of the 
Scheme, Osman Idris, claimed that the inequalities between the social services in the villages 
have “slowed down any progress and paralysed any interest in agriculture” (Sørbø 1977). 
Therefore, social inequalities were rooted in the scheme from the start.  
The originally resettled 50 000 Nubians were inhabited in either pre-built brick houses 
constructed in 25 villages in the scheme area, or in the town of New Halfa itself (Laxen 2007). 
The Nubian villages consist of about 300 families resettled according to their former home 
villages in Wadi Halfa. Of all the tenancies approximately one third was given to members of 
the local population which had inhabited the region as semi-nomadic pastoralists. Besides the 
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15 feddans of land each of the Nubian tenants received some freehold land for vegetable 
growing and subsistence farming depending on their loss of land in the now inundated Wadi 
Halfa (Laxen 2007). The compensation was justified, however it created inequalities between 
the Halfawi Nubians and the local host populations who received less compensation.  
The construction of the Khasm el Girba dam and the New Halfa scheme demanded workforce 
that arrived from other parts of Sudan, mainly from west and central Sudan. Many of these 
remained in the scheme as farm workers and lived in hut camps or informal settlements 
scattered within the scheme. Many of these settlements became permanent but many still 
remain unofficial and not recognized by the scheme. The inhabitants of the informal 
settlements have been generally divided between the landless and the so called Arabs, of 
which the landless are mainly from western Sudan and the Arabs from eastern Sudan (Laxen 
2007).  
A railway line used to cross between the sugar cane factory and the town of New Halfa that 
was also connected to the national railway line.  However this is no longer in operation 
(NHAPC 2011). The deteriorating state of the infrastructure is a challenge and the poor 
maintenance of tarred roads or lack thereof is a challenge for transportation, especially during 
the rainy season when the soils become muddy (see figures 10 and 11). The number of farm 
workers, internally displaced people from conflict areas and foreign refugees has also 
increased in New Halfa causing further demand for services and housing. This has resulted in 
increased pressure on the infrastructure that was originally designed for a much smaller 
population  (Ahmad  &  Abu  Sin  1990).  For  instance,  the  town  of  New  Halfa  has  only  one  
hospital and therefore struggles to provide some basic health care services to the population of 
New Halfa and the growing settlements surrounding it. Already in 1990, the hospital of New 
Halfa  with  less  than  300  beds  had  to  provide  services  for  half  a  million  inhabitants  of  the  
scheme. This has been a challenge since the scheme has encountered serious outbreaks of 
water-borne diseases especially bilharzia, malaria and leishmaniasis that are endemic diseases 
to the area (Ahmad & Abu Sin 1990; Laxen 2007). The water-borne or related epidemics are 
a major threat in Sudan, especially within the irrigation schemes and the regions with rainy 
seasons. About 90% of epidemics in Sudan are water related and approximately 8 million 
Sudanese are infected by malaria annually (Omer 2007). Other challenges for New Halfa are 
the lack of adequate infrastructure and services and bridging the divide between the town and 
the peripheries, of which some lack basic services altogether.  
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Figure 10. Poor road conditions during the rainy season (Wallin 2011). 
 
Figure 11. The centre of New Halfa town after heavy rains (Wallin 2011). 
6.3 Ethnic groups 
 
The scheme of New Halfa has a variety of ethnic groups living together. Traditionally the area 
was inhabited by nomadic tribes; particularly from the indigenous pastoral Shukriya tribe 
(Haydar 2008, NHAPC 2011).  However,  when the Khasm el Girba dam and the New Halfa 
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scheme were constructed it did not change just the physical but also the ethnic landscape of 
the area profoundly.  
Generally the ethnic composition can be divided into tenant farmers, mostly of Nubian origin 
(30%), the traditional Butana nomadic groups of Shukriya, Beja and Rashaida tribes (60%) 
and the western and the eastern Sudanese landless people (10%) (See table No. 2) (Laxen 
2007; Haydar 2008). It is important to note that the Halfawi Nubians comprise only 
approximately  30%  of  the  total  population  in  the  scheme  even  though  the  scheme  was  
originally established primarily to resettle the Halfawis. The Shukriya are the dominant tribe 
in the area, but there are also smaller tribes such as the Arabic-speaking Lahawyien, Ahamda, 
Kawahla, Khawalda and Rashaida as well as the Beja-speaking Hadendowa, Beni Amer, 
Amrar  and  Bisharien.  The  nomadic  tribes  were  also  settled  in  the  scheme,  mostly  on  the  
outskirts (see figure 12), and the government hoped to sedentarise them for purposes of better 
revenue and state control (Haydar 2008).  
Table 2. Tenant population of New Halfa. 
Ethnic groups Number of tenants  % of nomadic tenants % of all tenants 
Nomadic groups       
Shukriya 7089 48 32 
Lahawin 2290 15 10 
Beja 2201 15 10 
Ahamda 1089 7 5 
Kawahla 1003 7 5 
Rashaida 685 5 3 
Khawalda 443 3 2 
Total nomads 14800 100   
Nubians 6553   29 
Other 1014   4 
Total  22367   100 
Source: New Halfa Agricultural Production Corporation estimates 2008.  
Most of the western and the eastern Sudanese landless people are migrant labourers from Fur, 
Zaghawa and Tama tribes originating from western parts of Sudan and some pastoral groups 
from the eastern parts of Sudan such as Beni Amer and Hadendowa (Laxen 2007). In addition 
the area has smaller populations of labourers that originally came from the Nuba Mountains in 
the central Sudan and of west African origin and increasingly Eritrean refugees (Sørbø 1985; 
Laxen 2007). Most of the western and south-western Sudanese immigrants had arrived in 
New Halfa already between the 1960s and 1980s during the drought in western parts of Sudan.  
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Figure 12. New Halfa agricultural scheme and the settlements. The mostly Nubian villages are officially named by 
numbers. The map shows that the Nubians were located in the central part of the scheme whereas the nomadic and 
semi-nomadic groups were further away. 
The poorest of the landless immigrant population is settled in the outskirt camps of the 
scheme (Laxen 2007). The ethnic composition within New Halfa and its surroundings is 
difficult to divide into groups, and there are different ways of differentiating between landless 
and nomadic groups according to the various sources. However, for this study it is important 
to differentiate between the Nubians from Wadi Halfa, the nomadic groups of the original 
area of New Halfa scheme that were partly incorporated into the scheme economy, and the 
landless migrant groups, such as internally displaced people (IDPs), that have joined new 
Halfa from various regions throughout Sudan. Many of these landless migrant groups tend to 
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practice different livelihoods from wage farm labour to petty businesses and transportation 
with donkey carts (Laxen 2007).  
The nomadic groups such as Shukriya, Rashaida and the Beja-speaking groups such as 
Hadendowa are integrated to the scheme to a varying extent. Some of the Shukriya groups 
were able to benefit from the scheme and become farmers whereas some did not. The 
Rashaida have originally emigrated from Saudi Arabia some 150 years ago and mostly 
engage with farming and camel herding practices. They tend to be isolated within the scheme 
and hold contacts to Saudi Arabia in the form of remittances (Laxen 2007).  The other Beja-
speaking groups also continue with pastoralism and engage in farming and other activities in 
the scheme to different extent but also feel like outsiders in the scheme (Laxen 2007).  
Although many Nubians resisted the resettlement plan and relocating to New Halfa, many 
migrant labourers chose to relocate there in the hope of finding employment in the 
agricultural sector. The resettlement of the Nubians was an exclusive project that was directed 
by the state and the complete destruction of their former home made it inevitable. However it 
is noteworthy, that many of the people working on farms or in the informal sector originate 
from other parts of Sudan and are internally displaced people that have had to flee the 
continuous conflicts in western Sudan, such as in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and the region 
that is now South Sudan. Sudan has more than five million internally displaced persons 
making it the highest producer of IDPs in the world (Assal 2008). The internal armed 
conflicts throughout Sudan have caused massive population displacements and many have 
settled in the regions within eastern Sudan. Many have come to New Halfa by choice in 
search of employment opportunities. Some have also been resettled due to the government’s 
experiment of relocating the IDPs to the productive areas, such as mechanized agricultural 
schemes  like  New Halfa.  The  original  idea  was  to  promote  the  self-reliance  of  IDPs  (Assal  
2008). New Halfa scheme is also home to many Eritrean former refugees, who have decided 
to  stay  within  the  scheme.  The  economic  opportunities  are  better  within  Sudan  and  the  
irrigation schemes, such as New Halfa, provide seasonal employment opportunities to many 
Eritreans in east Sudan. For them it has been easy to assimilate to the region as many ethnic 
origins and cultural and religious practices, are shared. For example the Beni Amer in the east 
Sudan has the same ethnic roots as some Eritreans (Kibreab 2008). Many of the Sudanese 
IDPs and the Eritrean former refugees have found the irrigation schemes to provide economic 
opportunities that prevent them from leaving back to their original homes. However, in 
contrast to people displaced by development, such as the Halfawi Nubians in New Halfa, the 
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IDPs and refugees that fled conflict areas have not been compensated and many of them lack 
the opportunities to exercise rights in their host areas (Assal 2008). In the case of New Halfa, 
these groups of people are often treated as secondary citizens, and their rights disregarded. 
Although they have provided the scheme with important workforce for a long period of time 
many still have an unrecognized status, remain neglected and have therefore limited and 
unequal access to services and agricultural opportunities within the scheme.  
Therefore, the Nubians that used to inhabit a very secluded and ethnically homogeneous area 
in the north of Sudan are now living in a multi-ethnic environment of nomadic tribes and 
agricultural workers from all around Sudan (Sørbø 1977; Ahmad & Abu Sin 1990). However, 
it was not just the Nubians but all the new residents of the agricultural scheme had to adjust to 
a physically and culturally different environment and the new lifestyle acquired by the 
tenancy farming system. Nevertheless the location turned out very unsuitable for the Nubians 
who were traditionally used to farming date palms and having urban businesses (Dafalla 
1975). The Nubians have expressed some concern over the changing ethnic landscape of the 
scheme, as the influx of now sedentary nomads and agricultural workers continues to grow. 
The Nubians initially agreed to resettle in New Halfa thinking it would be a “closed” area 
where they could maintain their identity and continuity of their cultural traditions (Ahmad & 
Abu Sin 1990). Before resettling to New Halfa, the Nubians in Wadi Halfa had very limited 
knowledge of the rest of the Sudan and some considered themselves more Egyptian than 
Sudanese (Dafalla 1975). Therefore, the adjustement to the new environment of New Halfa 
may have caused Halfawi to further isolate themselves from the rest of the inhabitants of the 
scheme in order to preserve their cultural customs and lifestyles. In more recent years due to 
population influx from elsewhere in Sudan the Nubians have become an ethnic minority also 
in New Halfa that has possibly further hindered their motivation for integrating to the multi-
ethnic environment of New Halfa.  Since then, many Nubians have become more urbanised 
and  have  left  New  Halfa  to  settle  in  the  suburbs  of  Khartoum  where  one  may  find  a  
community of many Nubians originally from Wadi Halfa. However, despite the multicultural 
composition  of  the  scheme residents,  the  ethnic  groups  continue  to  remain  within  their  own 
social compounds and lack of equal social interaction remains. During the resettlement 
process the different ethnic groups were settled separately due to their different origins and 
customs (World Bank 1992). As a result the scheme is socially fragmented and lacks affinity.  
According to Ahmad & Abu Sin (1990) the increase in the seasonal agricultural labourers 
from western Sudan could be politically motivated. Both the Nubians and the Shukriya 
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disapproved the government plans to settle them legally as this would increase the demand 
and competition for services and employment. The political motive could have been to fill the 
area of eastern Sudan that is traditionally represented by the competing party with more 
supporters of the Mahdist  Umma Party,  the leading political  party of Sudan (Ahmad & Abu 
Sin 1990). This would have promoted a more unified political stand within Sudan. However, 
whether this did happen or not, any further evidence of this taking place today was not found.  
6.4 New Halfa Agricultural Production Company 
 
The New Halfa Agricultural Production Corporation (NHAPC) is the central body responsible 
for the management of the scheme within the framework of the objectives set in the original 
plan. NHAPC was also designated to provide technical assistance and agricultural services for 
the farmers. It is also responsible for choosing where and which crops will be cultivated, the 
timing and insuring the execution of the various agricultural operations, for providing water, 
credits, fertilizer, pesticides as well as for setting the policy for pricing and for the allocation 
of tenancies and field supervision (Haydar 2008). The organization of the scheme is based on 
a partnership between the Government, NHAPC and the tenant. Basically the NHAPC is a 
parastatal company that provides most inputs and services while the Ministry of Irrigation is 
responsible for delivering irrigation water and the tenants supply the labour (World Bank 
1992). Therefore NHAPC is a statutory corporation established by legislation and also has a 
board representing the various interest parties. Because the growth of cotton is supported, the 
scheme provides the machinery services primarily for cotton cultivation (World Bank 1992). 
Eventually the target is to make NHAPC an independent and financially viable self-sustaining 
corporation but so far this has not succeeded (World Bank 1992). According to my personal 
interview with the manager of the scheme in 2011, the NHAPC is still dependent on the 
government for paying the salaries of the corporation staff and other running expenses. 
Considering the problems of governmental inefficiency and unmanageable internal conflicts 
the state of the agricultural schemes can easily become secondary for the political authority.  
6.5 Changes and challenges in New Halfa 
 
 The New Halfa scheme did not manage to live up to the original expectations and objectives 
and caused various disappointments to both the government and the tenants since the start. 
The long-term production plans of the corporation were based on the assumption that the 
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cropped land would remain constant and each tenant would continue growing the three crops 
annually in rotation. However, due to the scarcity of irrigation water the target cropping 
intensity was never reached. This reduced the irrigated farm land and consequently the living 
standards and economic situation of many tenants deteriorated (Ahmed 2009). Because of this 
many  tenants  had  to  look  for  different  additional  means  of  survival  that  led  to  some  
abandoning the scheme altogether and some accumulating extra tenancies whereas others 
looked for off-scheme professions elsewhere. It is important to remember, however, that the 
situation in New Halfa cannot be evaluated in isolation from the negative socio-economic and 
political conditions that have taken place in Sudan (Haydar 2008). The yields have been low 
and below targets due to overall environmental degradation, periods of drought, production 
costs have steadily risen and the overall profitability of cash crops has fluctuated. 
The environmental issues became one of the most detrimental to the scheme. Sedimentation 
in the water canals and loss of fertility in the land made farming even more challenging 
(Sørbø 1977). Gunnar Sørbø has researched some reasons for the low yields already in the 
1970s. He stated that the amount of water in the Khasm el Girba Dam had decreased due to 
siltation of alluvial deposits from the Atbara River. In addition, the rainfall is highly variable 
and weeds have growingly infested canals (see figure 13). The invasive species of Mesquite 
(Prosopis juliflora) invaded 40% of agricultural land in New Halfa and blocked water canals 
but it was later eradicated by the Sudanese government (Laxen 2007). The vehicle pool 
provided by the New Halfa Agricultural Corporation has also deteriorated as much equipment 
has broken down and spares have not been imported (Sørbø 1977; Sørbø 1985). This was also 
the situation when I interviewed the farmers in 2011 and they were complaining about lack of 
machinery and having to rely on manual labour instead. Therefore, the challenges of farming 
make it also understandable that the scheme has not replaced animal husbandry of the original 
nomads in the area and livestock herding continues to be an important source of income and 
security for many tenants.  
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Figure 13. Weeds infesting the canals is a problem (Wallin 2011). 
Again in the 1980s the overall state of the scheme was in a poor shape. Production was low, 
absenteeism was high, water shortages were frequent and the problems faced since the start of 
the scheme had not been solved. It was so severe, that the poor performance and conditions 
made people lose their morale and become helpless (Sørbø 1985). All of this also deepened 
the class differentiation, as the wealthier tenants were able to give credit to poorer tenants, 
thus enabling the scheme to operate even though the poorer tenants did not receive enough 
income from cultivation to survive but had to take credit in addition (Sørbø 1985).  
The deterioration of the scheme started in the 1970s and has aggravated further in the 1990s. 
This led to the increasing lack of attachment of the Halfawi Nubians. As a consequence many 
Halfawi left the scheme and moved to Khartoum. Absentee landlordism can be one of the 
possible causes for this in the long run, when there simply are no relatives left to look after 
the tenancy. In addition, the natural phenomenon of urbanisation and the growing 
employment opportunities in Khartoum may make life in New Halfa seem less appealing, 
especially for the younger generation. Consequently, those with the financial possibility to 
relocate to Khartoum leave New Halfa together with their capital and assets thus leaving 
behind the poor and the persistent (Haydar 2008). There were also many push factors for 
Halfawi for leaving New Halfa and moving to suburban Khartoum. Issues identified were 
difficulties in cultivation such as shortage of irrigation water, numerous fees and rising input 
costs, contaminated drinking water, deteriorating or collapsed social services, unemployment, 
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diseases such as malaria and bilharzia and deteriorating crop prices. Many of the houses built 
by the government also proved out to have asbestos roofs that caused health problems such as 
asthma and cancer (field work 2011).  
On the other hand, urban Khartoum proved to have better employment opportunities, social 
services and less waterborne diseases. The already existing Halfawi communities in the 
suburbs  of  Khartoum  were  also  easy  to  blend  in  with  (Haydar  2008).  The  growing  tenant  
absenteeism has therefore been a serious challenge to the scheme since the start. This was also 
studied by Sørbø (1977) who identified the following explanations. The Nubians resettled 
from the north of Sudan received tenancies in the scheme despite their original occupations 
and previous livelihood means in Wadi Halfa. This meant that they often looked for other 
farm workers to cultivate their land while they pursued other occupations elsewhere. 
Secondly, the income from cultivation proved unstable and inadequate. Many Nubians chose 
to leave their given tenancies to a relative who then acted on their behalf while the other 
pursued their careers elsewhere. Therefore, absenteeism of tenants and tenancy accumulation 
has existed in the scheme since the start (Sørbø 1977) and is still continuing today (Haydar 
2008). 
Gunnar Sørbø also noted the emerging social differentiation in New Halfa. He stated that the 
absentee landlordism and the accumulation of tenancies that followed made other tenants 
more competitive in agricultural production compared to the tenants with fewer tenancies to 
cultivate. Therefore, he stated, that the gap between the richer and the poorer started to widen 
(Sørbø 1977). The people were separated according to ethnic background and this led to the 
differentiation between villages. The Nubians received houses but most of the nomadic and 
migrants had to build their own houses. The living conditions vary greatly within the scheme. 
The services do not reach to all villages and many villages of nomads and migrants are 
excluded from the infrastructure network. As can be seen in the pictures, the lack of tarmac 
roads is a problem in all villages during rainy season, however the Halfawi villages are better 
connected to the infrastructure with electricity, piped water and services compared to the 
other villages (see figures 14-17).  
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Figure 14. A Halfawi Nubian village (Wallin 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. An informal settlement for migrant workers, IDPs and landless people (Wallin 2011). 
                   
Figure 15. A Beja village (Wallin 2011). 
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Figure 17. A Rashaida village (Wallin 2011). 
In  the  later  chapters  of  this  study,  I  wish  to  further  discuss  this  assertion  and  the  current  
situation of social inequalities in New Halfa. In his research, Hassan Haydar acknowledges 
the fact that many of the ethnic groups living in New Halfa tend to keep to themselves and not 
mix  culturally  with  other  groups.  According  to  his  study,  many  Halfawi  Nubians  chose  to  
leave New Halfa and move to Khartoum due to the poor situation in the scheme, one reason 
being the lack of security and the increasing fear from the ‘strangers’ in the scheme (Haydar 
2008). He also stated, that many Halfawi of Nubian origins chose to leave New Halfa scheme 
due to tensions with the local ethnic groups (Haydar 2008).  
6.5.1 Outcomes of the World Bank’s New Halfa Rehabilitation Project 
 
Due to the poor performance and the emerging problems within New Halfa the World Bank 
credited a rehabilitation project in New Halfa in the 1980s for the value of US$40 million. 
The objectives of the project were to improve the agricultural production on about 400,000 
feddans, assist Sudan’s Export Action Program to increase foreign exchange earnings, 
improve living conditions in the area and strengthen the financial and technical capabilities of 
the New Halfa Agricultural Production Corporation (World Bank 1992). I will highlight some 
of the outcomes in the Project Completion Report (PCR) because it explains the challenges 
that emerged within the scheme and to what extent they had been solved by the Rehabilitation 
Project. Although the perspective was strongly donor oriented the project remains one of the 
few comprehensive assessments of the scheme in the latter half of the scheme’s existence.  
According to the PCR, the project had, to some extent, achieved its objectives. However, the 
agricultural production returns were less than expected. The growth of wheat and sorghum 
continued as they form the staple food for most of the tenants despite the fact that they are not 
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economically profitable. The goal of NHAPC becoming a financially sound corporation had 
not  been  achieved  and  the  overall  agricultural  production  within  the  scheme  continued  to  
depend on the availability and condition of the agricultural machinery, the availability of 
water and other inputs, regular dam and canal maintenance and the good collaboration with 
the  Ministry  of  Irrigation  (MOI)  and  other  state  agencies  (World  Bank  1992).  The  
Rehabilitation Project did manage to upgrade and fix some of these challenges and the tenants’ 
incomes were raised due to the project. This was caused by higher yields for cotton and wheat 
and increases in harvested areas for sorghum and cotton.  
The service sector was also improved by constructing some new water treatment plants. The 
overall supply of irrigation water and water infrastructure was also improved but it was noted 
that it still remained insufficient. As a conclusion, it was stated that the needs of the farmers 
deserve further attention and for the sustainability of the project in the long run it is vital that 
the NHAPC is financially sustainable. The PCR however stated that the cooperation of 
NHAPC with the ministries such as PEWC and MOI is essential in ensuring the maintenance 
and serviceability of the canal networks and infrastructure within the scheme. It was also said 
that the health system will be operational for most of 1990 but the continued availability of 
chemicals  and  drugs  and  professional  staff  is  essential  for  the  health  services  to  be  able  to  
support the residents in the long run. The rural water supply was already lacking operating 
funds and therefore many of the water purification stations were not operating adequately 
(World Bank 1992). As will be later discussed in the interview results, according to the 
respondents the present situation regarding water supply and purification is in a poor state and 
needs further funds and support to be able to provide clean water for the scheme residents. 
Therefore it can be stated that the scheme continues to rely on the state for support, especially 
in terms of providing adequate and equal services to all of the scheme residents, and in 
ensuring the serviceability of the scheme machinery and infrastructure so that agricultural 
outputs can be maximised for the farmers and therefore their livelihoods secured. However 
the World Bank PCR argues that the sustainability of the scheme is contingent on 
macroeconomic conditions and consequently promotes the economic reform program of 
Sudan to be able to meet these conditions. Therefore it was stated that economic reforms 
should go hand in hand with project implementation (World Bank 1992).  
The  World  Bank  Rehabilitation  Project  did  temporarily  reform  and  improve  the  scheme  
conditions, but it was predicted that things will start deteriorating unless the foreign exchange 
earnings become sufficient for the scheme to be self-sustaining. As will be discussed in the 
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forthcoming chapters the present situation of the scheme is discouraging and according to my 
personal observation and interviews with the residents the scheme is continuing to struggle 
with the same challenges as the Rehabilitation Project attempted to alleviate. The economic 
reforms supported by the World Bank did not succeed to large extent and have only benefited 
a few well-off farmers whereas the majority of farmers are complaining about the high inputs 
of farming compared to the low outputs. The deteriorating water infrastructure and land 
fertility in the scheme is forcing the farmers to increase their inputs and on the other hand the 
outputs are also heavily dependent on the macroeconomic conditions and cash crop price 
fluctuations. Therefore it can be stated, that the state should continue supporting the overall 
maintenance and sustainability of the scheme in order to provide the farmers the good 
preconditions for profitable farming.   
6.6 Social consequences of the resettlement of the Halfawi Nubians  
 
The Sudanese President Abboud addressed the Nubian people on December 6th 1959, before 
the resettlement and the inundation of Wadi Halfa, by saying the following: “ I  promise  to  
accept your choice of place, wherever you want to go, in any part of the Sudan, and that none 
of you will be forced to go anywhere against his will.” However, although the people of Wadi 
Halfa were able to vote on various locations identified for possible resettlement, and the vast 
majority of votes went for Kadaru area and the north Gezira Extension South of Khartoum, 
the location of Khasm el Girba was eventually chosen by the government, against the will of 
the majority of people to be resettled there (Dafalla 1975). Although the government tried to 
assure the Halfawi in Wadi Halfa of the benefits of Khasm el Girba as a location by ensuring 
freehold land, developed infrastructure and other benefits, the Halfawi were more afraid of 
resettling into a completely different environment compared to Wadi Halfa (Dafalla 1975). 
The government also emphasized that the emigration to Khasm el Girba was not compulsory, 
but if a person chose to move somewhere else no benefits were given to them, except for free 
transport out of Wadi Halfa (Dafalla 1975). Some did resist the resettlement to New Halfa and 
moved to the urban suburbs instead (Ahmad & Abu Sin 1990). However the reality of losing 
their homes, sources of income and community gave the majority of Halfawi little choice but 
to agree to resettle in Khasm el Girba. The government addressed the Halfa people and spoke 
with admiration of the great sacrifice they made for the benefit of their mother-country 
(Dafalla 1975).  
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The government had built numerous villages for Halfawi in New Halfa with housing, services 
and cultivable land. They assured the people that land was fertile, it was not a heavily 
populated area and all the villages would be joined together with a road system. The area 
would  also  have  a  railway  link  with  Khartoum,  Kassala  and  Port  Sudan.  Although  it  was  
known that the area had some endemic diseases such as Bilharzia it was said that adequate 
medical services will be provided (Dafalla 1975). This was indeed the case at the beginning of 
the scheme and the people, at least the Halfawi, were provided with adequate services.  
When the Halfawi arrived by trains from Wadi Halfa, their life seemed very different from 
what it used to be and they had to adapt to a different climate, environment, and various 
ethnic groups compared to the relative isolation of Wadi Halfa. The new way of cultivation on 
broad new hawashas took time to adapt to and many of the staple foods grown in Wadi Halfa 
could not be grown in Khasm el Girba (Dafalla 1975). In later years, Many Nubians grew 
accustomed to New Halfa, but continued to sentimentally regard Wadi Halfa as their ancestral 
home. This longing for Wadi Halfa has resulted in the lack of emotional attachment to New 
Halfa. 
It has also been argued, that the resettlement of the Nubian both in Sudan and Egypt to new 
areas was part of the cultural assimilation into the dominant Sudanese and Egyptian culture 
and economy (Haydar 2008). For many traditional cultures and ethnic groups this is a natural 
consequence of state nationalism that has taken place throughout the world, but the difference 
in forced resettlements is that it often happens very rapidly without the necessary time for 
adjustment and unprompted assimilation. Although the reasons behind the resettlement of the 
Halfawi Nubians is already known at this stage, there is little agreement to why the 
resettlement schemes often end up in failure and a disappointment for both the government 
and the people. The social costs are rarely counted (Haydar 2008). Despite the fact that the 
Nubians  were  promised  a  say  in  choosing  the  new site  of  relocation,  the  final  decision  was  
done against their choice.  
Already in old Wadi Halfa the Halfawi Nubians generally enjoyed more urban professions 
besides agriculture. This did not change after resettling to New Halfa. The possibility for 
absenteeism and accumulating tenancies with fewer tenants together with the generally 
deteriorating state of the New Halfa Scheme resulted in many Halfawi Nubians moving to the 
urban suburbs of Khartoum. The push-factors in New Halfa were so strong for some Halfawi 
Nubians  that  they  even  chose  to  relocate  back  to  the  surrounding  area  of  the  old,  now  
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inundated, Wadi Halfa in the north of Sudan and engage in farming and fishing practices 
(Haydar 2008).  
6.7 Sedenterisation of pastoral nomads in New Halfa region 
 
The Butana grazing lands of the region have always been migrated by the nomadic pastoralist 
groups such as the Beja tribes of Hadendowa and the Shukriya tribes. Moving around the 
region according to changing seasons in search of water and grazing land this ancient lifestyle 
has remained resilient to change. The importance of pastoralism as a livelihood system in this 
arid region has proved environmentally and socially sustainable. The various ways they have 
adapted to the environment and have developed their livelihoods according to the resources 
available, within time and place, should be regarded as a highly developed symbiotic 
relationship with the surrounding land. However in many cases the pastoralists have been 
seen as backward and opposed to modernisation and development. Their contribution to the 
food production is often ignored and their pastoral livelihood is seen as detrimental to the 
environment (Ahmed 2001). With times of increasing demand for efficient land use and 
reform of land tenure the pastoral lifestyle has been seen as out of control and out of reach by 
the state (Ahmed 2001). It has therefore been the objective to sedentarise the nomadic 
population. Since the increase in mechanized agriculture the grazing lands have slowly 
diminished and the access to water has become more challenged. Many nomadic groups have 
had to adapt to the decreasing land availability and consider agricultural activities as an 
alternative livelihood. However, as Abdel Ahmed argues, the externally oriented and 
dependent development model of unequal exchange relations does not offer a favourable 
alternative to the existing nomadic livelihood (Ahmed 2002). The change from an 
independent and flexible lifestyle to a state controlled agricultural production is drastic and 
the exclusion of nomadic pastoralists in the planning process may cause resistance within the 
nomadic groups.  
With the construction of agricultural irrigation schemes such as New Halfa the pastoralists 
were initially compensated for the reduction in grazing land. Many received free access to 
agricultural residues in the schemes or they were incorporated into the scheme as resident 
farmers (Sørbø 1985; Shazali & Ahmed 1999). However, as the pastoral lands were not 
legally registered to the pastoral nomads prior to the scheme, the compensation agreements 
have been detrimental to the interest of pastoralists. Compared to the Nubians the nomads 
received less provision of services and housing (Sørbø 1985). It has also been stated that the 
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pastoralist have been politically marginalised thus unable to defend or understand their rights 
(Shazali & Ahmed 1999). One cannot of course undermine the importance of access to 
education and social services for the nomadic groups for self-empowerment and prevention of 
being further marginalised. 
When the construction of the New Halfa agricultural scheme started the local Shukriya at the 
Butana region were not pleased about the expropriation of their land. They asked for 
compensation for the loss of their land and an agreement was made to compensate monetarily 
to the Shukriya Arabs and other local tribes and to give them tenancy grants apart from those 
given to the people of Wadi Halfa. Although concerned about their future and the resettlement 
the local tribes were receiving their new neighbours with hospitality and on good terms 
(Dafalla 1975). Later on during the first years of the scheme under operation some conflict 
emerged with the farmers and the nomads regarding the feeding and watering of the camels 
and cattle. Even some cases of theft of cotton by the nomadic tribes were noted that escalated 
as high as to 20 per cent of the total cotton production (Dafalla 1975). The pastoralists that 
were given tenancies in the scheme did not give up their pastoral activities but rather adapted 
their livelihood to include both pastoral and agricultural activities.  
Although the sedentarisation of the nomadic tribes of the area was stated as one of the goals 
of the New Halfa agricultural scheme, its success has not been widely discussed or evaluated 
afterwards. In a Project Completion Report of the World Bank’s New Halfa Rehabilitation 
Project (1992) it was stated that in 1978 out of the total estimated 300,000 residents at the 
scheme 68,000 were Halfawi and 148,000 were nomads. Considering the large percentage of 
the nomadic population at New Halfa they have been regarded as somewhat secondary and 
external to the Scheme development. Despite the large share of the nomadic population there 
is little integration between the Halfawi and the nomads and they were settled separately (The 
World  Bank  1992).  The  relations  between  the  Halfawi  and  the  nomadic  tribes  were  often  
based on labour recruitment and market exchange (Sørbø 1985). Despite the incorporation to 
the same agricultural scheme, the livelihood patterns of Halfawi and the nomads remained 
different. Whereas the Halfawi would resort to other, often more urban, professions for extra 
income, the nomads would continue with pasturing. It is also evident, that the original 
structure of the scheme was unequal. The different premises and opportunities embedded the 
idea of differentiation among the various groups of the scheme and promoted unequal 
accumulation of wealth and capital. It is therefore understandable, that the continuity of 
pastoralism was seen as a necessary source of income and a lifeline. As Abu Sin argues, there 
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is a need for an integrated development plan that pays livestock more attention within 
agricultural schemes. He criticized the exclusion of livestock within New Halfa although the 
nomads were included in the scheme as tenants. Especially with fluctuation of the agricultural 
outputs the livestock economy of the nomads together with farming activities could prove 
more rewarding (Abu Sin 1970). As will be discussed in the chapter 7.8 the sedentarisation of 
the nomadic groups did not fully succeed and many have continued their pastoral practices at 
least to a certain extent. Therefore a lot of the nomads in the scheme can currently be regarded 
as semi-nomadic.  
7. For better or for worse; New Halfa today from the residents’ perspective  
 
As was stated earlier, the situation of the New Halfa scheme has not been widely discussed in 
the 21st Century. It seems as if it has been left in the shadows of the past while the focus is on 
the new mega-scale development projects that are being initiated. The purpose of this chapter 
is to highlight the views of the residents in New Halfa today to better understand the current 
condition of the scheme and to know the social  and environmental  risks of resettlement and 
state-driven development initiatives, such as irrigation schemes.  
The results of the interviews are presented and discussed thematically under each heading. As 
the interviews held in New Halfa were semi-constructed with a varying number of 
participants the results will not be presented in a quantitative way but rather with the 
emphasis on the answers that help us understand the situation through the different 
perspectives and socio-economic backgrounds of its residents. To avoid repetition of similar 
answers I will not present all results, but highlight the most common answers and those that 
differ from them. There were some inconsistencies in the statements of some respondents and 
even though some were speaking on behalf of a whole village, for instance in a group 
interview, the generalizations were still subjective. For example someone stating in a group 
interview that the scheme gives good guidance to farmers, it does not necessarily represent 
the experience of everyone in the village. Some of the quotations are translated by interpreters 
and therefore do not follow the exact wording of the respondent. The statements of the 
respondents’ should be regarded as individual positions on the matters and therefore as 
suggestive. Particularly with interviewing the representatives of the older generation of 
Halfawi  Nubians  and  those  who  can  still  remember  their  displacement  form  Wadi  Halfa,  
many reflected on life in their old homeland Wadi Halfa with nostalgia. It is probable that the 
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memories of Wadi Halfa have grown sweeter with time and when comparing their current life 
in  New Halfa  to  their  lost  homeland  there  is  a  collective  and  biased  sentiment  that  glorifies  
their past.  
Unless otherwise stated the following interviews have all been conducted at the New Halfa 
Scheme in July-August 2011. The total amount of interviews held in New Halfa was 29. This 
consisted of both individual and group interviews. In addition interviews were held with the 
management of the New Halfa Agricultural Production Corporation, experts at the 
Department of Sociology at the University of Khartoum and with Halfawi people that had left 
the New Halfa Scheme and now reside in the suburbs of Khartoum. However not all interview 
results are presented through direct quotations. The ethnic background is usually mentioned in 
order to highlight the varying conditions in New Halfa according to the ethnic origin and the 
respective villages.  
7.1 Present conditions and challenges for the farmer in New Halfa 
 
Most of the farmers interviewed owned 15 feddans or land according to the original 
resettlement plan; however a few farmers had accumulated up to 100 feddans. The most 
common crops they farmed were cotton, groundnuts, sorghum, wheat and some seasonal 
fruits and vegetables to a smaller extend. According to many respondents the Scheme is 
encouraging the farming of cotton because of its high export value. 
All people are cultivating cotton, because it is well managed and organized thus 
creates better income. (Male, Halfawi) 
Since the cotton company was established the high prices come only from cotton. In 
the past you used to get more money for your products but now you only get good 
money from cotton. (Male, Halfawi) 
The government said we should grow cotton, before we used to grow vegetables. 
Everybody depends on cotton now. (Male, Shukriya, near the town of New Halfa) 
Some of the challenges expressed were lack of financial loans and difficulties in financing the 
high agricultural input, instability of crop prices and fluctuations in the market prices that 
create insecurity. Most respondents mentioned the high agricultural inputs against the low 
outputs as an increasing challenge.  
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New Halfa has poorer quality of land, only two crop rotations per year. I am hoping 
to go back to Wadi Halfa. New Halfa has bad weather and poor productivity of land. 
Agriculture is not viable economically anymore. (Male, Halfawi) 
The prices of agricultural inputs have become higher but you don’t get more money 
for your products. (Group interview, Halfawi, village No. 16)  
Government does not give any money and the productivity is low. Agricultural input 
costs are very high, but the outputs are not enough. Market prices are not enough and 
most products are sold at the local market only. Cotton was recently introduced, but 
there is lack of expertise. (Group interview, Halfawi, village No. 20) 
Inputs and outputs are not equal. Land is now of poor quality, it is not fertile. The 
fertilizers are imported to Sudan. A sack of fertilizer costs 50-90 Sudanese Pounds (8-
15 Euros) and one field of wheat takes up to 10 sacks. The preparation of land is 
therefore expensive. (Group interview, Halfawi, village No. 20) 
According  to  many  respondents  the  managing  body  of  the  Scheme,  The  New  Halfa  
Agricultural Production Corporation, does give assistance for the farmers. However, some 
other residents who do not own land but work as laborers said that the Scheme is not helping 
them. The people who live at the informal settlements receive less assistance. Through my 
personal  visits  to  the  NHAPC headquarters  and  discussion  with  the  staff  I  could  sense  their  
difficult position between the government and the farmers and the constraints due to outdated 
resources and service facilities.  
They give good guidance. All areas have their own unions and village committees and 
they discuss the matters with the management of the scheme. (Group interview, 
Halfawi village No. 16)  
The Scheme does land preparation and irrigation but during harvesting the Scheme is 
asking for money for their services. (Three Halfawi males, village No. 13) 
The Scheme always tries to help people. (Group interview, Halfawi village No. 20)  
We are not receiving assistance from the New Halfa Scheme. (Village leader, Zaghava 
ethnic group originally from western Sudan, community name Dar Es Salaam) 
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We are nomadic people and do not need services. We take our camels and go to other 
places, earn money and come back. (Elderly female, Rashaida, near the town) 
Many farmers mentioned the poor condition of the available farm machinery or the lack of 
them. The machinery available at the Scheme has deteriorated and has not been replaced. 
We try to cut the wheat by our hands, 20-30 days of harvesting by hand. It destroys the 
crop, we cannot afford the machinery, and there is not enough machinery available. 
There are more than 1000 feddans of land only in this village. (Group interview, 
Halfawi village No. 20) 
20-28 years ago the Scheme management was very good, now the machinery is 
deteriorating. Some of the machines are in the hands of the merchants and the prices 
are very high. We need more machines. Water and irrigation system needs machines.  
(Group interview, Halfawi village No. 20) 
According to the respondents the conditions for the farmers have deteriorated and at the same 
time they are increasingly dependent on the external macroeconomic factors and the price 
fluctuations.  In  its  almost  50  years  of  existence  New  Halfa  has  witnessed  environmental  
degradation through loss of land fertility and water contamination. The remaining part of 
arable land is under cultivation and the growth of cash crops such as cotton continues to be a 
major source of revenue for the state. Despite this the benefits hardly reach the average farmer 
and their communities. As has been discussed in the theoretical framework the degradation 
and marginalization of the tenants is a result of the need to intensify land use against the land 
degradation and decreasing fertility to meet the demands of agricultural inputs in order to 
receive better outputs (Robbins 2004). This places the farmer under pressure to sustain their 
livelihoods and dependent on the price fluctuations in agricultural inputs and outputs.  
According to the respondents there were differences to the extent that they have been assisted 
by the NHAPC in farming. Despite the technical assistance everyone complained about the 
increasing costs of farming and the insecurities in the income. Some farmers have managed to 
become successful farmers; however most of the scheme residents have not significantly 
improved their livelihoods due to the scheme. This accumulation of tenancies for fewer 
tenants is a sign of the failure of the scheme as it was initially based on the principle of equal 
sized tenancies for all farmers. Especially for the semi-nomadic groups such as the Zaghava it 
is difficult to receive assistance from the scheme. The operational sustainability of the scheme 
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is also under question as the maintenance of the scheme has proved inadequate. In numerous 
interviews the residents complained about the lack of maintenance of the canals and the 
deteriorating state of the agricultural machinery. The quality of water is often poor and the 
inputs are increasingly high against the outputs. For many farmers the income from farming is 
not enough and they have to have other income sources to balance the costs. 
7.2 Other livelihood means and income sources  
 
Not all the respondents were farmers. Farming is still the main source of livelihood in New 
Halfa, but many respondents had multiple means of income. This often depends on the 
amount of land the farmer has. Besides being a farmer or working as a farm laborer many 
worked  at  the  market  in  town  selling  various  things.  Some  of  the  respondents  were  also  
government employees and agricultural experts. Most of the respondents who were satisfied 
with  their  income  source  were  farmers  and  Halfawi  Nubians  with  their  own  land.  The  
Nubians are traditionally known for being educated and urbanized. Besides farming many 
Halfawi  had  other  businesses  in  the  town  or  hired  farm  labour  for  their  tenancies  while  
pursuing their other careers. The respondents who were previously nomadic pastoralists were 
balancing between a lifestyle of nomadic cattle herding and more sedentary farming. 
According to my impression during the interviews nomadic people such as the Shukriya were 
more integrated to the farming lifestyle compared to the nomadic groups of Hadendowa for 
instance. The people from western parts of Sudan had a wide variety of livelihoods according 
to the work available.  
The employees of the New Halfa Agricultural Production Corporation were paid by the 
government and some of the agricultural engineers in the Scheme also had land of their own. 
However, one engineer at the Scheme management complained about the government not 
paying their salaries for months.  
I have 100 feddans of land and it brings enough income. My children will continue 
with the farming. (Male, from Wadi Halfa, lives at village No. 12) 
I do commercial work at the market and sell things. My income is not good but 
adequate. (Male, originally from Kadugli, South Kordofan state, lives in a community 
of mixed people near the town) 
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My land is 75 feddans with cotton and sorghum. All is sold to the market where I am 
also a merchant. My livelihood means change according to price fluctuations in 
cotton. (Male, Arab, from Khartoum state) 
We have many occupations. We work for the farms we do not own land of our own. 
We have camels and we do cattle herding. Sometimes we go to the Egyptian border to 
collect gold or work as merchants in Khartoum. (Three males, Rashaida people, 
Rashaida village near the town) 
An interview was requested with the Rashaida women in this village. The men were however 
present during the interview and answered some of the questions on the women’s behalf. The 
women’s livelihood was mainly looking after the children, cooking and fetching water from 
the canal. 
One group interview was held at the village No. 20 with Halfawi Nubians. Most of them were 
farmers, merchants and government employees. Among these Nubians there seemed to be a 
strong feeling of disappointment to the Scheme and concern over the youth. 
Most of the youth is unemployed. The youth does not go to the fields, they want a 
salary. The farming should be a surplus to another job. (Group interview, Halfawi 
village No. 20) 
In another Halfawi village (No. 13) the overall sentiment was more positive.  
Young people think that it is good here. Old men say things were better in Wadi Halfa, 
because there we had big houses, natural vegetables, no need for fertilizers, no 
diseases. Livelihood is not bad here, we can pay for food and children can go to 
school but in the past things were better and cheaper. (Three males, Halfawi, village 
No. 13) 
The village No. 20 is one of the original villages built for the Halfawi Nubians resettled from 
Wadi Halfa. The houses are relatively big brick buildings with fences around them. However 
the style and decorations of the Nubian culture are not visible in New Halfa.  
The contrast to the informal village of Zaghava ethnic group nearby is drastic. The Zaghava 
are originally from Darfur region and have come to New Halfa to escape the conflict and to 
work on the farms.  
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We do not own land. We work on the farms. Livelihood depends on the work available, 
sometimes it is very bad. In recent years it has gone worse. High prices for all things, 
no work available, some of us leave to Khartoum, some go as far as to Libya. (Village 
leader, Zaghava ethnic group, Community name Dar Es Salaam) 
Further away from the village No. 13 is a village of the Hadendowa that have originally lived 
in the region as pastoral  nomads. They do not own any land. Their houses are informal and 
built of natural material such as reed, mud and some bricks.  
Sometimes we take our cattle to the Butana region. We have lived here (the area of 
their village) for 48 years. Our livelihood consists of cattle herding and working for 
the farms. The livelihood is mediocre here; 10 years ago it was better, now everything 
is expensive. (Group interview, Hadendowa people at their village) 
In another village for the Rashaida I was given the opportunity to interview the women. The 
village is only for Rashaida people and the houses are built with some bricks and mud with 
fences made of weed surrounding the compounds. The women were eager to present their 
beadwork that they make and sell at the market for income source. The market has replaced 
the need to make everything by hand and exchange of goods gives the women some financial 
freedom. The access to the market in town is slowly changing the nomadic Rashaida culture 
to a more sedentary one. 
We stay at home, make food and make this jewelry. In the past the women made all 
clothes by themselves, now we buy them from the market. Men do the farm work. In 
the past we had land and cattle but we sold them. In the past we were more nomadic 
but now we are more settled here. We came here from the north when the New Halfa 
Scheme started. (Three Rashaida females, at their village) 
The Shukriya pastoral nomads are also indigenous people of the Butana region where New 
Halfa is situated. Traditionally they have always had cattle but since the start of the scheme 
many have also engaged in agriculture either partially or completely. When observed the 
conditions for Shukriya were similar to the Nubian villages, but there was some resentment 
about the original sharing of land and resources in the scheme.  
This is original Shukriya land; we were originally nomadic cattle men. After the 
scheme started we have stayed here. We do farming, cattle herding and work as 
merchants or have government professions. Because of desertification we have 
 86 
 
changed our lifestyle to agriculture. 40% of the scheme was promised to be given to 
Shukriya at the start of the Scheme, but the leader of Shukriya was not educated and 
we were pushed out of the scheme. (Shukriya Male, Shukriya neighborhood, near the 
town of New Halfa) 
According to the respondents the livelihood sources are variable and differ between the ethnic 
groups. Although farming is the main source of livelihood other occupations have 
increasingly been taken to supplement the income from agriculture and to act as a buffer 
during  times  of  small  yields  or  low  outputs.  The  scheme  was  based  on  the  principle  of  15  
feddans per farmer but this is no longer the standard. Among the Nubians there is a high rate 
of absentee landlordism and due to the migration of the Halfawi Nubians to Khartoum many 
have managed to accumulate large shares of land. The town of New Halfa has become a 
significant regional trade and business hub and has created employment in various fields from 
internet cafes to informal street vending. Therefore, in terms of income diversification the 
New Halfa scheme has succeeded in creating new business opportunities. The sugar factory 
and the other industrial activities nearby are also providing employment and income 
diversification for some. This together with the opportunities of informal trade has given 
many residents additional sources of income. During my fieldwork I saw many local women, 
mainly from Beja-speaking ethnic groups, selling handmade crafts and household items on 
the New Halfa market and this has given them an opportunity for an independent income. As 
urbanization and changing lifestyles have also reached New Halfa, urban professions in 
finance, technology and computer-related businesses are creating even wider spatial 
differentiation in development between the urban core of the New Halfa town and its more 
educated citizens and the distant villages and the pastoralist in the peripheries who have 
limited possibilities to access the town. The local pastoralists, traditionally living around the 
New Halfa of today, still remain among the poorest and least healthy in Sudan (Cockett 2010).  
The dependency on the external factors has made it difficult for the farmers to rely only on 
farming as their source of income. The insecurities and fluctuations in the global market 
prices have placed farmers at a very vulnerable position and therefore they are less resilient to 
the negative effects of global economic crises. The shift from traditional livelihood means and 
subsistence farming to a more capitalist mode of farming and economy has therefore had 
negative outcomes. The scheme’s focus on a few crops such as cotton, sorghum, wheat and 
groundnuts gives little flexibility and alternatives during times of low market prices for these 
crops for instance. During my field work in New Halfa I also observed the poor availability of 
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food, especially vegetables, sold at the local market. The local street restaurants had little 
availability of food except from the few staple meals. Although many residents grow 
vegetables for their own domestic consumption the growth of cash crops may result in food 
shortages especially in the areas with limited access to irrigation water.  
Due to the scheme many of the local residents of the area lost parts of their customary land 
and their traditional means of subsistence. Consequently those who became tenants for the 
scheme lost their autonomy in agricultural decision making and influence in rural 
development (Salem-Murdock 1989:5). This evidently changed peoples’ livelihoods and their 
position from independence and autonomy to being subjects to the needs and requirements of 
the scheme. At the same time some managed to accumulate tenancies and become landlords 
while others remained farm labourers with casual work. This caused economic differentiation 
and distribution of labour within the scheme that for many was an unfamiliar social order. The 
shift to the capitalist mode of production due to the scheme also transformed the peoples’ 
assets, such as land, labour and livestock, into commodities (Salem-Murdock 1989:4). This 
gave some better positions and consequently made some inferior, such as the landless migrant 
workers. 
The uneven development that is seen in New Halfa is a consequence of the different positions 
the new inhabitants had since the start of the scheme. It is the differential ownership relations 
in society and the social relations of reproduction that create the inequalities and on-going 
poverty in New Halfa (Gottdiener & Budd 2005). The differences in economical assets 
between the different ethnic groups and communities together with spatial differences are 
likely going to grow stronger. Salem-Murdock among other scholar also argues that the 
scheme has in fact widened the gap between the rich and the poor in the area (Salem-Murdock 
1989). The residents are able to make a sufficient living only by generating income out of 
many tenancies or having other income sources in addition to farming.  
Most of the nomadic groups interviewed have continued their pastoral practices and it seems a 
viable option especially when the income from other sources is not sufficient. However, 
regarding the livelihood and income the migrant workers and internal refugees are the worst 
off since they do not even have the asset of owning livestock or have rights to customary land. 
Some of them migrants have lived in the scheme since the start and some have arrived more 
recently. Most of them live in informal settlements and have therefore limited access to 
resources and services. The people I interviewed for my study were working for the farms but 
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did  not  own  land  of  their  own.  Some  had  also  businesses  in  town  but  out  of  the  different  
ethnic and social groups within New Halfa the migrant labourers were at the most vulnerable 
position in terms of economic and social security.   
7.3 Quality of water and environmental changes 
 
Problems related to the quality of drinking water and the water in the canals emerged in all 
the interviews. All the communities in the New Halfa scheme and immediate areas stated 
problems with the quality of drinking water to varying degrees. Water is taken from the canal 
and purified by using various traditional and modern methods. Some communities near the 
town of New Halfa have access to underground water. Access to water taps and purified water 
depends on the socio-economic status of the community. Whereas some nomadic groups now 
had better accessibility to water since the Khasm el Girba Dam and the canals were 
constructed many Nubians claimed the water being better in the old Wadi Halfa. Water 
shortages seem to occur during summer months when the quality also deteriorates. 
Throughout the history of the scheme there have been several outbreaks of malaria and 
bilharzia epidemics due to contaminated water in the canals. It is no wonder as the canals are 
regularly used for human bathing, cattle crossing and watering. The lack of sewage systems in 
the more informal settlements causes threat to the canals. The use of heavy fertilizers and 
pesticides can also contaminate the canals and make it toxic for human consumption. During 
the  fieldwork  in  the  rainy  season  the  color  of  the  water  within  the  canals  as  well  as  in  the  
pipes was murky.   
The source of water is the tap or pump at the canal. The quality of water is poor, 
people get sick. There are chlorine tablets provided, but they taste bad so people don’t 
use them. (Male, informal settlement for people of mixed origin) 
We take the water from the canal and then store it in the storages. There is no 
filtration station in our village. We use traditional filtration by using little stones or 
sand. (Male, from Khartoum State) 
Water availability is quite seasonal, in summer the availability is quite low. The 
quality of drinking water from the underground source is better compared to the canal 
water. Water is also better available in the canals due to the construction of the 
Tekeze dam in Ethiopia. (Male, Shukriya) 
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Our source of water is the canal or the communal tap in the village. Water quality is 
not good. Sometimes the water causes malaria (due to stagnant waters) and bilharzia. 
(Female, Rashaida tribe) 
People and animals bathe in the canal and the water should not be used for drinking 
at the same time. (Male, Halfawi) 
The quality of water is good from the tap because it is purified with chlorine. (Two 
Shukriya females) 
The quality of water in the canals is not good and it causes diseases. It is better when 
the canals are maintained and the silt removed. The smaller canals are not 
maintained. (Group interview, Halfawi village No. 16)  
There is no cover in the Khasm el Girba Dam main canal. People misuse the water, 
people and animals bathe in it. It takes 60 km to reach New Halfa from the dam, so 
the water is much dirtier here. There are three primitive wells in the village, but the 
water is not pure, the system is old. The quality of water was better before. There is 
enough water available but the problem is the quality. It is contaminated water. 
People use the water straight from the canals as it if was a river. 50 000 people are 
using the canal waters every day. We should have piped water and the canal should 
be covered. We have tried to dig wells but the water is too salty. (Group interview, 
Halfawi village No. 20) 
I get the water with buckets from the canal. There is no storage for water. (Female, 
Hadendowa) 
Source of water for the household is from the canals. All animals drink from the 
canals and all animals die in the water. (Village leader, Zaghava ethnic group, 
Community name Dar Es Salaam) 
We carry the water from the canal and use Moringa Oleifera plant to purify water. We 
still get diseases such as malaria, bilharzia and diarrhea. There is also a donkey cart 
that comes to sell water. (Community with mixed ethnic groups mostly from Darfur 
region, informal settlement) 
According to the interviews, people living at informal settlements and nomadic temporary 
settlements  do  not  pay  for  the  water  but  use  it  freely  from the  canals.  The  original  housing  
 90 
 
provided by the scheme has water storages with chlorine purifications from where the water 
runs through the taps. However the system is old and needs maintenance. Diseases occur 
more in informal settlements where there is no adequate water purification.  
The increased competition for land and water resources in New Halfa has caused decreased 
land fertility and contamination of water in the canals. The use of heavy fertilizers and 
pesticides on the fields and the lack of sewer and human waste management particularly in 
the informal and semi-nomadic settlements has contaminated and polluted the canals through 
run-off and drainage. The direct use of canals for human and animal crossing and washing has 
also contributed to contamination of water resources (see figures 18 and 19). This has led to 
serious outbreaks of water-borne diseases such as malaria, bilharzia and diarrhea that continue 
to be prevalent within the scheme. However there are differences in water availability and 
quality  between the  villages.  The  best  situation  is  within  the  town of  New Halfa  and  in  the  
villages within the infrastructure network. These are mostly the villages of the Halfawi 
Nubians that were constructed by the government. However according to the interviews 
within the Nubian villages there are problems with the water purification stations and many 
are in need of maintenance. 
 
Figure 18. The canals are being used for human and animal washing (Wallin 2011). 
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Figure 19. Tap water is also dirty as many water treatment plants lack maintenance (Wallin 2011). 
On the other hand within the more informal and nomadic villages the water is mostly carried 
from the canals and purified using traditional methods of stone/sand filtration or using plants 
such as Moringa Oleifera. Some villages have also received chlorine tablets for water 
purification but many have complained about the bad taste. Due to this those who have 
limited access to purified water and have to utilize it straight from the canals are at a higher 
risk of falling ill with water-borne diseases and are consequently at an even more 
disadvantaged position.  
The issue of rights to land and its resources has also become contested as the same resources 
are now shared between a growing number of people. The landless people from western 
Sudan have come as refugees or migrant workers but have no access to land of their own. The 
nomadic pastoralists have had to settle with less pastoral land and in addition the access to 
water resources for livestock watering has become limited. The access to land is therefore 
highly unequal and the traditional pastoral territories have been disregarded. Therefore, the re-
territorialisation of social life has taken place in New Halfa and transformed the socio-
physical environment (Delaney 2005). The traditional territories have not been acknowledged 
by the government and consequently the allocation of rights and access to environmental 
resources has been altered in New Halfa. This is demonstrated in the process where the 
resettled Halfawi Nubians have been able to access and utilize the resources to a better extent 
than  the  local  ethnic  groups,  who have  also,  at  least  partially,  lost  their  customary  rights  to  
land.  
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 The increasing demand for higher agricultural outputs has put pressure on the sustainability 
and fertility of arable land. In addition the whole of New Halfa scheme relies on the regular 
flow of the River Atbara and the functionality of the Khasm el Girba dam. The increased 
sedimentation due to upstream run off has decreased the storage capacity and the water flow 
to the scheme canals has been disturbed. Some farmers claim that the water does not always 
reach the farmlands in the northernmost parts of the scheme.  
The increased production pressure and competition on resources will seriously affect the 
environmental sustainability of the New Halfa scheme and its future productivity. Access to 
resources is also socially determined and varies greatly between the scheme residents. The 
increased damming of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia will alleviate the problem of sedimentation 
and the source of irrigation is therefore sustainable. The access to water resources within the 
scheme should however be more socially equal and regionally balanced. Partial covering of 
the canal could decrease the water contamination and evaporation and investments in 
communal water purification stations and communal water taps could help control the 
outbreaks of diseases. The scheme continues to rely on the government for financial 
assistance and lack of funds seems to be the underlying cause for the lack of water 
infrastructure maintenance. 
7.4 Housing, infrastructure and services 
 
The field work was done visiting approximately 10 different villages and settlements. 
Villages within close proximity to the town of New Halfa were visited as well as villages 30-
50 km away from the center. There are more nomadic villages further away from the center 
but due to poor road conditions and the rainy season they could not be reached for this study. 
Within this spectrum there are formal and informal settlements with a varying degree of 
infrastructure and services. The villages near the New Halfa town are generally well 
established with formal housing, roads and services nearby. The close proximity to the town 
gives better access to services such as schools and the New Halfa hospital. The villages 
further away have less access to services, especially during the rainy season when the roads 
become muddy thus making transportation nearly impossible.  
The cost of services was also mentioned in many interviews. Depending on the socio-
economic group not all have equal access to health care and schools. During the field work 
we passed the New Halfa hospital on several occasions always noticing the hassle around the 
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hospital gates as many patients could not afford to stay inside the hospital or the hospital was 
at  its  full  capacity.  Families  of  patients  had  gathered  outside  and  beds  were  brought  to  
accommodate the sick relatives. The problem seemed to have been prolonged as many 
roadside restaurants and services had been established near the hospital entrance to cater for 
the waiting patients and their families. When discussing the matter with locals many said the 
hospital is too small for so many people and it has poor facilities, but people cannot afford to 
travel to Khartoum for treatment.  
Usually villages are about five km away from each other. There are services at the 
center of New Halfa but not all villages have services. It is difficult to get good 
medical care. If you are really sick you have to go to Khartoum to get proper hospital 
treatment, but this is too expensive for many. (Male, originating from Nuba Mountains, 
informal settlement near the center) 
The challenge in New Halfa is poor roads. There are too few tar roads, cars are 
sinking in the mud during rainy season. (Male, Halfawi, Village No. 7) 
There is only a clinic or a dispensary at some villages, no doctors. Some of the 
medicine is expired. The canals are difficult to cross during the rainy season and there 
is no clinic at my village. More roads are also needed. Pregnant women cannot go to 
the town for childbirth because roads are very bad in autumn. The services should be 
extended from the center. (Male, originally from Khartoum state, now lives at the New 
Geli village near the sugar factory) 
I live in an informal settlement at the outskirts. There are no schools or hospitals and 
there is a lack of infrastructure. (Male, Shukriya) 
The people closer to the center are better off. (Male, Rashaida) 
There is no problem in the town but the villages lack services and maintenance. (Two 
males, Halfawi, from village No. 2)  
There are enough services in New Halfa but you have to pay for everything which is 
the problem. (Male, Halfawi, from village No.2) 
When you are sick you cannot stay in the hospital but you have to stay outside of the 
hospital. (Young males, Rashaida, village name Saura) 
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The infrastructure available also depends on the original layout of the residential areas and 
villages. The resettled Halfawi Nubians received ready built houses in villages with roads, 
electricity and water storages as compensation for their relocation. The Shukriya were given 
land but many had to build their own houses. Many of the informal settlements are inhabited 
by wage labor workers that have come from other parts of Sudan to work on the farms or they 
are nomadic pastoralists from the region that have started to settle at the scheme. Although the 
houses  of  the  Halfawi  are  built  by  the  government  and  have  the  best  infrastructure  
surrounding them they are starting to deteriorate and give problems. The houses that were 
built by the Scheme have roofs made out of poisonous asbestos. This is causing health 
problems for the residents but the roofs have not been replaced. 
The town itself is good, but in the villages it is difficult. Our houses have roofs made 
out of asbestos and they give asthma and cancer. They have promised to change them 
for a long time. (Male, Halfawi) 
We need more gardens for recreation. Many people complain about the asbestos roofs 
but there is no reaction. Those who can afford to fix the roof themselves have done 
that. (Two males, Halfawi, from village No. 4) 
In Wadi Halfa local material was used to build houses, in New Halfa, the material is 
useless. (Group discussion, Halfawi, village No. 20) 
Asbestos causes diseases. Some pipes were also made of asbestos but they were 
replaced four years ago. A lot of people suffer from kidney failure and we don’t know 
why. There is a clinic and a school in the village. Sometimes the clinic does not have 
sufficient supplies of medicine and equipment. (Group discussion, Halfawi, village No. 
20) 
The informal settlements fall out of the infrastructure network and most of them have no 
electricity, road connections or services. Many informal settlements have been established for 
a long time but they are waiting to be registered officially. This is especially problematic for 
those who are partially settled but continue to move with the livestock from time to time.  
We live in a shantytown. The livelihood is good in New Halfa, it depends on the food 
we can find. We have no electricity, roads or services in the villages. The water in the 
canals gives stomach pain. Some kids go to school in the next village. We do not own 
this land, we work for the Arabs. The village is not registered. The state says we 
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should be compensated and moved to another place but we are not sure where it is. 
(Female, Hadendawa, nomadic informal settlement) 
Ten years ago the government built houses for us. Before this was a shantytown. 
(Shukriya Male, Ali Karrar, Shukrya neighbourhood, near the town of New Halfa) 
It  is  evident  that  the  scheme  cannot  keep  up  with  the  demand  for  services  and  due  to  the  
limited financial support from the government the infrastructure remains outdated and 
insufficient. For the sustainability of the scheme it would be essential to support the services 
and infrastructure so that outbreaks of diseases could be controlled and residents could have 
access to health and educational services, despite the location of their villages. It would also 
be important to better acknowledge the permanent presence of the migrant workers that is 
benefiting the agricultural system through workforce. However, the interviews and the 
observation proved that the difference in the living conditions and service sector between the 
Halfawi villages and the central Shukriya villages in contrast to the informal settlements of 
the semi-nomadic groups and migrants was drastic. Although the infrastructure was overall 
outdated within all of the villages visited, in many informal settlements the complete lack of 
infrastructure placed its residents at a very vulnerable position in terms of lacking the basic 
human needs such as provision of clean water, housing, health services and transport 
connectivity.  
7.5 Equality and integration 
 
The question of social equality and integration in New Halfa is contested as the circumstances 
have varied between different communities from the start. The displaced Nubian Halfawi 
were resettled in their own villages with houses and tenancies as a compensation for their loss. 
Other nomadic groups were also given tenancies but not all received housing. Some other 
nomadic groups of people from the region have later joined the scheme due to sedenterisation 
policies and better access to services and markets. The interviews pointed out that inequality 
exists among different villages and they continue to fragment the scheme.  
I think there are more services in the Nubian parts. (Male, from Khartoum State) 
All the villages have equal opportunities. (Three  males,  Halfawi,  from  Square  6  in  
New Halfa Town) 
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Poor people also need hospitals, schools and good food. This is not happening. 
(Female, Shukriya) 
There is a big difference between living in the town or in the villages. (Two males, 
Halfawi, from village No. 4) 
We are sharing the same water resource, however despite this access to water 
depends on the location of the village. (Group interview, Halfawi village No. 16)  
Now children who can afford go to University on Kassala or outside of Sudan, even as 
far as India. Just old men are staying here. (Group interview, Halfawi village No. 16) 
The workers on the scheme (referring to migrant labor and wage farm labor) have 
settled in New Halfa sharing the same resources with us for 45 years. It is also their 
homeland as much as for the people of Wadi Halfa. The Scheme was built for a limited 
number of people. Now people from Kordofan, Gedaref, Kassala, Darfur, even Eritrea 
and Ethiopia, come here to share the same resources. Most of the people of Sudan are 
here with us. Their houses are not like ours though. If the resources are arranged it is 
enough for us all. Their villages are like slums. They want to stay here because they 
can find work here. The government says they can plan them good areas, away from 
here to avoid conflict. However, they refuse to go. The areas they live in are not 
designed for housing but for agriculture. There are ethnic, social and political issues 
involved. They do not have their own land, they are just workers and they brought 
their families with them. They are considered as residents, but not completely. (Group 
discussion, Halfawi, village No. 20) 
The communities are not equal. We are seen as refugees. (Village leader, male, 
Zaghava ethnic group, Community name Dar Es Salaam) 
The opportunities are not equal. The situation for Halfawi is better because they were 
compensated. We don’t have schools, electricity or roads. The shantytowns are not 
good. (Young males, Rashaida, village name Saura) 
We are not equal. Halfawi have all things, land, education and houses. (Female, 
Rashaida) 
When the Halfawi came we were here to welcome them. We built their houses. This 
village is established before them. It should be registered. We still don’t have proper 
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houses. All people suffer from this. We are not receiving any help. The government 
does not come to see how the people live. (Community with mixed ethnic groups 
mostly from Darfur region, informal settlement) 
The respondents highlighted the big differences between the villages and ethnic groups. In 
one interview the Halfawi respondents stated that all villages are equal, but this is most likely 
due to not knowing the conditions at other ethnic villages, lack of interaction and a sense of 
exceptionality that justifies their better circumstances. In many of the responses from the 
other ethnic groups there is a sense of bitterness towards the Halfawi Nubians and their better 
conditions. It seems that after almost 50 years since the Nubian resettlement, it is difficult to 
justify the unfair conditions between the Halfawis and the other ethnic groups.  
With the interview results and my observation in New Halfa it can be stated that there is little 
social integration and contact between the different ethnic groups. Since the start of the 
scheme, the social and economic differentiation has existed and promoted unequal 
accumulation of wealth and tenancies. The Halfawi Nubians from Wadi Halfa were 
compensated due to their resettlement. This gave them the feeling of entitlement and 
exceptionality, as if the scheme was there to only compensate for their loss. The choice of 
naming the scheme New Halfa already supported this outlook and their superior position 
within the scheme. Because of this the Halfawi Nubians were reluctant to interact with the 
other residents and rather chose to continue living in isolation. It is possible that this sense of 
alienation was caused by the lack of feelings of attachment and belonging to New Halfa that 
led to resentment.  
Some of the local nomadic tribes were also sedentarised and incorporated into the scheme but 
with less benefits and opportunities. Many of them chose to continue their pastoral livelihoods 
for additional income. This caused conflict with the Nubians over access to pastoral land and 
over the entry of livestock to farmlands. Most of the migrant labour that arrived before the 
Nubian resettlement to construct the scheme’s housing and urban facilities is still residing at 
New Halfa, some better off than other, but most of them living in unregistered shantytowns 
without proper infrastructure such as running water or social services. Whereas many Nubians 
are now able to practice other professions besides managing their tenancies, many migrants 
are working as seasonal farmers on land they do not own. The living conditions of the farm 
workers and migrants can be described as desolate and excluded. As many of the migrant 
workers or people from other parts of Sudan now residing in the scheme have had to settle 
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with whatever land is left available, they are often located in places that have limited 
connectivity and mostly non-existing service availability. The fact that they only interact with 
other scheme residents in the form of subordinate work relationship or trade in the market 
leaves little possibility for neutral and equal interaction. 
Despite the difficult conditions the migrant workers from West and South Sudan have settled 
to the different environment of eastern Sudan well. This is most likely due to impossible 
conditions in the conflict areas of Darfur and Nuba Mountains that worked as push-factors 
and due to the fact that they came to New Halfa by choice in hope for a better life. However, 
according to Haydar the Halfawi Nubians were generally treating them with uneasiness, doubt 
and avoidance (Haydar 2008). This is most likely due to the feeling of entitlement to the 
scheme that is still prevalent among Halfawi and the reluctance to share the limited resources 
with the ever-growing population.  
The interview results for this study did not indicate major conflict  between the Nubians and 
the migrant workers. However no social contact or relationships was mentioned between the 
Halfawi  and  other  ethnic  groups  and  the  isolation  of  the  different  groups  was  tangible.  The  
possible conflict scenarios are disputes over access to natural resources and over limited 
social services. According to the people in one of the informal settlements near the town of 
New Halfa the children go to the school in the nearby village and the water is collected from 
the canals despite the fact that they are not officially registered as residents of the scheme and 
do not pay for the water as the other registered residents do. Therefore the conflicts arise 
when limited resources and territories are being utilized by groups with different levels of 
entitlement, not because of ethnic or cultural disputes.  
Different livelihoods or introverted social and cultural behavioral norms can to some extent 
explain the divide, conflict and lack of integration between the different ethnic groups within 
New  Halfa.  However,  as  the  interviews  point  out  there  is  different  levels  of  entitlement,  
access to resources and services between the residents. The assets were set unequally from the 
start as the Halfawi Nubians received better benefits and opportunities as a compensation for 
their resettlement. Although their compensation was necessary, this entrenched the social 
differentiation within the scheme and caused the formation of power hierarchies between the 
different residents as some managed to accumulate a large amount of tenancies and the other 
could not improve their livelihoods through wage farm labor. The result of this unequal 
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treatment between the relocated Nubians and the host Arabs was the increasing ethnic 
seclusion (Salem-Murdock 1989).  
The fluctuating macro-economic conditions, deteriorating environmental resources and the 
policies that neglect rural development have led to increased conflicts that are often based on 
livelihood  needs.  This  has  not  been  improved  by  New  Halfa  scheme  that  implemented  
unequal land-tenure systems and based some at an advantage in comparison to the other 
residents. The fact that the residents were situated in different villages according to ethnic 
origin further embedded the idea of differentiation and segregation within the residents.  
7.6 Interview with a Halfawi family that has left the New Halfa Scheme 
 
A  busy  suburb  of  Kalakla  in  Khartoum  is  home  to  many  Halfawi  Nubians.  This  is  not  the  
only Halfawi community in Khartoum but one of many. Some of the Halfawi have been 
living there since the inundation of Wadi Halfa and some have left New Halfa in search of a 
more urban life of better opportunities. I interviewed two men and a younger boy that have 
left the New Halfa Scheme to hear their perspectives on the situation.  
The situation in New Halfa was very bad as the fertility of the land was declining. The 
crops we farmed did not give enough income for the family. We could not choose 
which crops to cultivate because the Scheme or the government decided everything for 
us. Although the plots were smaller in Wadi Halfa but the quality of life was better.  
This experience is shared by many that have left the scheme. Especially when considering the 
Nubian mentality of self-determination the experience in New Halfa can be understood as 
being challenging. The alienation from the decision-making processes regarding farming as 
their livelihood has withdrawn them and many have lost interest and motivation. One of the 
men could remember the process of displacement from Wadi Halfa as he was 9-years old at 
the  time.  Like  many other  Nubians,  he  also  spoke  about  Wadi  Halfa  as  their  homeland  and  
expressed his longing for the place. Although the resettlement was a sad event for many, there 
was also excitement among some Halfawis. However the experience of living New Halfa was 
mostly explained in negative terms.  
One of the problems at New Halfa is the lack of guidance from the management on 
how to cultivate and assistance when there are problems. Water is also a problem. 
There is siltation and the water does not go on the fields. Water is polluted and there 
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is lack of purification methods. This has caused diseases such as malaria and 
bilharzia especially during the rainy season. The government did try to alleviate the 
problem and it is a bit better now.  
The issue of asbestos being used in the houses built for the Halfawi was also discussed. The 
men knew many people with cancer and asthma caused by the asbestos. They stated that 
many promises have been given to fix the problem but nothing has been done. According to 
the men the size of the houses and the villages is too small for the growing population. Some 
people have decided to move away. They also mentioned the nomadic tribes coming to stay at 
the outskirts of the villages and sharing the same resources. Because of these issues many 
Halfawi have decided to leave the scheme. The existence of a strong Halfawi community 
within Khartoum can also make it easier for the Halfawi to leave New Halfa. Especially with 
the growing trend towards more urban professions it is likely that the young generation of 
Halfawis  in  New  Halfa  will  leave  for  Khartoum  to  study  and  never  return  to  the  farming  
practices.  
7.7 Interview with Mohammed Nuri Hamid, a Nubian politician at Kalakla 
suburb, Khartoum 
 
I also met with a Nubian former politician who knew the situation of New Halfa well. He also 
had a vivid memory of Wadi Halfa and the displacement process. 
The government was choosing where to resettle the people. There were also other 
options such as east of Dongola as well as north and south of Khartoum. The 
government chose New Halfa. The people did not want to move from the desert area 
to a rainy area which was so different from their former livelihood area. The Halfawi 
used to farm fruits, they were not originally farmers. They were often educated and 
worked in the trade as the border between Sudan and Egypt was an important trade 
center. Some of them got an income from tourism as there were many significant 
archaeological sites in Wadi Halfa. Land productivity was very high in Wadi Halfa 
throughout the year. It was a desert area with cold winters and therefore suitable for 
winter crops. Winter crops are also more expensive and give a better profit. 
(Mohamed Nuri Hamid) 
When asked about adapting to the new environment and the relationship with the local ethnic 
groups Hamid said the Nubians are known to be peaceful people but some conflicts did occur.  
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The Nubians were suspicious of the nomadic Shukriya in New Halfa. There was a 
conflict between the educated Halfawi and the local nomadic tribes. Halfawi thought 
they are lower cast. On the other hand the nomads considered the land their 
traditional land which caused conflict. This is the same cause for the conflicts in 
Darfur.  
According to Hamid the reason for many Halfawi leaving New Halfa is understandable.  
It is also the normal case of urbanization. People want better opportunities in 
Khartoum. Agriculture is not for educated people. The fathers are saying to their sons 
to go to Khartoum, study and send back money. Farming does not create enough 
income. It is difficult to keep people in New Halfa. It is a rainy area and the 
infrastructure needs to be improved. Development will be difficult but the government 
is doing its best.   
The interview with Hamid also concurs with the negative overview of New Halfa and 
supposes that the number of Halfawis staying in New Halfa will eventually decrease. He also 
spoke of the educated nature of the Halfawi and stated that New Halfa does not give enough 
opportunities especially for the young generation of Halfawis. It is therefore highly likely that 
the coming decades will see a growing influx of Halfawi from New Halfa to Khartoum. It is 
probable that some will continue as absentee landlords while working in Khartoum and 
benefiting from the migrant workers within the scheme that carry out the farm labor.  
8. Victims or beneficiaries of development? 
 
The last section will discuss the case of New Halfa as a project of resettlement and 
sedentarisation of nomadic groups and conclude to what extend it succeeded in this goal. 
According to many scholars it appears that the New Halfa scheme has failed in most of its 
target goals and has not contributed towards the development of its residents’ livelihoods. 
Although New Halfa has in general contributed towards the wider national economy through 
crop exports and revenue it has also made the tenants more dependable on the cash crop price 
fluctuations and the global economy. In terms of global capitalism the tenants can be seen as 
subordinate agricultural producers who have no say in what to grow and how to grow and yet 
the financial gains of their work do not trickle down to the farmers. 
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New Halfa has also witnessed a decrease in the equity of resource distribution. The income 
inequity emerged since the start of the scheme and despite the more modern means of 
agricultural production, the overall sustainability of the scheme is under question. The 
declining state of the environment and the growing need of extraction or utilization of natural 
resources can also be expected to be seen among the most marginalised and poorest in the 
communities. As discussed in the theoretical framework, the degradation and marginalization 
thesis (Robbins 2004) is also witnessed in New Halfa. The farmers are in the periphery when 
it comes to power and decision-making and they often lack the capital and financial buffer 
during economic hardship. Thus they have little alternative to overexploitation of natural 
resources. This is in line with the concept that people’s environmental behaviour is often 
affected by their individual financial decision-making as well as the global policies and 
economy (Eskonheimo 2006). For instance in the case of New Halfa in Sudan, the national 
and international fluctuations in the market price of cotton have had direct impact on the 
farming choices and thus people’s livelihoods.  
In the original master plan the equal sized tenancies of each farmer should have been enough 
to support the livelihood of the farmer and their families. However this failed from the start 
and supported the economic differentiation that began to emerge within the scheme. Farmers 
started to accumulate land and take measures in their own hands. Although the scheme tried 
to  control  this  the  growth  of  the  elite  minority  of  well-off  farmers  could  not  be  stopped  
(Salem-Murdock 1989). Although some, mainly Shukriya farmers were allocated farming 
land; most of the nomads did not receive tenancies. This enabled the more well-off farmers to 
increase their profits as workforce was well available and they could afford the machinery and 
fertilizers that were needed in maximizing the profits. Although this was discriminating 
against the poorer tenants it also gave many a reason to stay within the scheme. On the other 
hand the poor success in agriculture for some encouraged the growth of the urban sector 
within the town of New Halfa. This has created a substantial amount of professions and new 
forms of business that was not anticipated in the planning of the scheme (Salem-Murdock 
1989).  The  fact  that  the  planners  of  the  scheme  did  not  pay  attention  to  individual  
differentiation and right of decision of the farmers was one of the factors that contributed to 
the failure of the scheme as a development initiative. Therefore it was only through these 
individual choices and actions that the scheme became beneficial for some of its tenants. The 
importance of self-determination and empowerment within development initiatives therefore 
cannot be overemphasized.  
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New Halfa scheme did improve livelihood for some who managed to accumulate land and 
assets but on the other hand those left with small tenancies struggled to the extent that some 
decided to leave the scheme. Some of the nomads, the landless migrant workers and IDPs 
were also at  a disadvantaged position and had to settle with the work they were able to find 
without having their own tenancies. The varying distribution of economic assets and 
opportunities within the scheme has promoted further segregation and disputes between the 
residents. The relationships that are limited to those between tenants and wage workers do not 
provide a favorable setting for equal social intercourse. Therefore, the fact that those who 
were displaced due to development were compensated and those displaced due to conflict 
were not shows the problematic of the role of the state being both the violator of rights and 
arbiter of justice (Assal 2008). The focus should be more on securing the rights of all 
displaced despite their background and the cases of forced migration should be dealt with 
comprehensively. However, the basic rights of IDPs have been neglected in Sudan for a long 
period of time due to discriminatory policies and political reasons. The question of identity 
and the climate of politicized Islam have further complicated matters (Assal 2008). In the case 
of New Halfa, there is therefore a need to realize the equal rights of all its residents and the 
migrant laborers and IDPs should be seen as important assets of agricultural workforce that 
are  the  prerequisites  of  continuity  and  sustainability  of  the  scheme.  For  those  coming  from  
conflict regions with their livelihoods disrupted New Halfa has been able to offer a chance to 
improve their situations. The fact that many of them have come to New Halfa by choice is 
also an important factor to consider when other groups, such as the Halfawi, are still bearing 
the social consequences of forced displacement.  
Therefore, although New Halfa was not overall a successful development project it did result 
in some residents improving their own economic situations and income generation, that would 
not have taken place without the scheme. However, the state’s one-sided view of development 
contradicted with the local livelihoods. Those who did not adhere to this imposed idea of 
development were left with fewer possibilities for alternative development strategies. 
Consequently, development that is coerced has little chance of sustaining itself and if any 
lessons can be learnt, it is crucial to incorporate the beneficiaries in the planning process of 
development projects and acknowledge the possibilities and consequences of economic and 
social differentiation. 
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8.1 New Halfa as a showcase of resettlement 
 
The outcome of a development initiative that includes a human component is always difficult 
to predict and despite careful planning the external impacts may redirect the course and cause 
unforeseen challenges. Although the planning and implementation process of the resettlement 
of the Halfawi Nubians was thoroughly thought of, especially in terms of practical 
arrangements and compensation (Dafalla 1975), it did not succeed in its goal of engineering 
new social territories. The abovementioned results have shown the degree of resentment and 
withdrawal by the Halfawi Nubians and the emerging economic differentiation between the 
resettled and the host population due to unequal compensation. In the future the Halfawi 
Nubians within New Halfa will be an increasing minority and the already established multi-
ethnic communities of mixed origins will have to be better incorporated into the scheme to 
secure its sustainability.  
As Philip Woodhouse (1988:29) states “irrigation systems are designed by engineers, 
operated by agriculturalists and evaluated by social scientists” without really communicating 
with each other and sharing their knowledge. There is not much to gain in debating whether 
dams should be constructed and people resettled or not. The fact that dams are increasingly 
being built and people consequently resettled calls for a holistic approach that combines the 
work of engineers, agriculturalists, social scientist and the people involved to better plan the 
development initiatives. It must be understood, that without including the communities at 
stake in the planning process the development and resettlement projects will unlikely be 
successful.  
Haydar  concludes  in  his  study  on  the  resettlement  of  the  Halfawi  Nubians  that  the  use  of  
resettlement  as  a  development  strategy  proved  to  fail  in  the  long-run  and  the  growing  
migration  to  Khartoum by the  Nubians  in  New Halfa  is  just  one  proof  of  the  failure  of  this  
attempt (Haydar 2008). In addition to Haydar many scholars have criticized the resettlement 
and labeled it as a failed development initiative. Many have argued that it will lead to further 
impoverishment and marginalization and it is not sustainable in the long run. On the other 
hand, despite the hardship and failure that continues to plague the scheme there are a few 
positive outcomes that should not be overshadowed. Some farmers have managed to become 
successful landlords and offer work for the growing amount of migrant workers and the town 
of New Halfa has become a regional hub for urban trade and professions.  
 105 
 
If we go back to the resettlement of the Nubians that happened almost 50 years ago it can be 
stated that the displacement altered their lives significantly and irreversibly. The Halfawi 
Nubians lost their previous livelihoods, territoriality, historical entitlement to their land, 
patterns and networks of social organisation and much of their cultural integrity. The fact that 
they were not adequately consulted about the resettlement and the place or resettlement was 
decided against their choice shows the lack of acknowledging the negative social impact that 
dam constructions and top-down development initiatives continue to have. Although the 
Halfawi were compensated for their displacement in many ways, they were not incorporated 
into the planning of the resettlement and their future role was seen as mere producers of 
agricultural revenue for the state.  
If  we  discuss  the  eight  risks  of  the  impoverishment,  risks  and  reconstruction  (IRR)  model  
(landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, increased morbidity and mortality, 
food insecurity, loss of access to common resources and services and social or communal 
disarticulation (Cernea  2005)),  the  issue  of  landlessness  and   social  or  communal  
disarticulation have been heavily experienced by the Halfawi Nubians. The compensation did 
not substitute the customary ownership of land in Wadi Halfa or make justice to the loss of 
cultural land of old Nubia where they in many ways felt ‘belonging’. Therefore, the loss of 
cultural identity and material livelihoods is a risk that has potentially led to impoverishment 
for  the  Halfawi  Nubians  in  New  Halfa  (Cernea  2005).  On  the  other  hand,  the  risks  of  
joblessness, homelessness, increased morbidity and mortality and food insecurity were 
counteracted by giving the Halfawi Nubians a tenancy to cultivate as a profession, a home to 
settle in, health and educational services and freehold land for personal subsistence farming. 
Therefore they received a relatively secure source of livelihood, at least during the first 
decades of the scheme when the land was still fertile and the yields sufficient.  
Due to the compensation the Nubians received, they are today some of the most well off 
residents in New Halfa. This is not however only because of the compensation but also 
because  of  the  many  Halfawi  who  left  the  scheme  and  allowed  the  remaining  Nubians  to  
accumulate their tenancies and become landlords that hire farm labour that enables them to 
seek additional income sources, often more urban professions. The risks of social and 
communal disarticulation also materialised to the extent that the original kinship-based 
communities were largely dispersed and many cultural traditions lost in the transition. The 
shift from a self-determined, partly subsistence, farming to a large irrigation scheme where 
the crops were chosen by the management also led to lack of ownership and dedication for the 
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Halfawi. The fact that they became the subjects of the resettlement instead of being proactive 
contributors with power of decision to some extent paralyzed them and caused withdrawal 
from the scheme. Therefore this can also be seen as a materialisation of the Sudanese ruling 
elite  using  their  political  and  territorial  power  by  violating  the  territorial  dignity  of  the  
Nubians and subduing them to the status of a farmer in New Halfa that provides revenue, 
above all, to the state. The local population in the New Halfa scheme region was not 
compensated adequately for the loss of pastoral land and having to share resources with the 
scheme residents. The involuntary displacement of the Nubians consequently caused 
difficulties in settling in the new social environment. Therefore the resentment for social 
integration from the side of both resettled and host population can be understood.  
Sudan has not succeeded in the equitable use of natural resources and the centralised power 
elite  continues  to  control  the  economy  and  territories  by  making  decisions  on  behalf  of  the  
stakeholders, such as the farmers, leaving people without the rights to decide over their own 
livelihoods (Abdalla  2008). Therefore this eventually leads to further political and territorial 
marginalisation of the Nubians and other residents of the scheme. The resettlement of the 
Nubians was however successful, in theory and partly during the first operational years of the 
scheme. When the New Halfa scheme was constructed it was modern with its farming 
technology, large –scale irrigation systems, urban services and advanced infrastructure. The 
town of New Halfa was designed by engineers and the canal layout was very modern 
compared to Wadi Halfa. However, the quickly deteriorating conditions and the changes in 
the agricultural inputs and outputs forced many to look for additional sources of income and 
some to leave the scheme. The amount of research done on the increasing differentiation and 
diversification of livelihoods in New Halfa is also a sign of the failure of the tenancy farming 
in being an adequate source of income for the tenants (Sørbø 1985; Salem-Murdock 1989). 
Although some were able to economically benefit from the scheme there is no evidence that 
the resettlement raised the overall living standards of the majority in the scheme (Salem-
Murdock 1989; Haydar 2008). It is therefore often stated that resettlement projects are one of 
the least satisfactory of development interventions. It also undermines the importance and 
possibilities in indigenous systems of production and superimposes the ideals of the modern 
capitalistic modes of production for development (Haydar 2008). This system failed to create 
wealth  for  the  farmers  in  New Halfa  and  the  ones  who managed  to  make  a  living  did  it  by  
accumulating tenancies, having off-scheme businesses in the town of New Halfa or elsewhere 
or continued with pastoral livelihoods. This is contrary to the original operational principle of 
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the scheme and goes to show the failure in meeting the aims of the scheme. The planners did 
not consider the individual choices, farming methods and differentiation between the farmers 
and did not include them in the planning and implementation process. The failure of the 
resettlement was therefore the lack of understanding the importance of inclusive participatory 
planning that eventually resulted in lack of attachment and ownership from the residents’ side. 
8.2 The situation of the nomadic groups in New Halfa 
 
The nomadic groups, with the exception of some representatives of the Shukriya semi-
nomadic group were generally worse off than their Nubian counterparts according to the 
observation. Many of them lived outside the infrastructure network and in villages that were 
not officially registered as part of the scheme. When visited during the rainy season some of 
the villages had become completely inaccessible and some of the houses constructed of 
natural materials had been damaged due to the rainy and wet conditions. However, the most 
visible difference was the lack of infrastructure and services. The Shukriya were most well off 
in terms of housing and sufficient income from cultivation. However within the Shukriya 
there are big differences with income and benefits. Salem-Murdock speaks of special 
Shukriya elite that include particularly those with lineages associated with the traditional 
rulers that has profited greatly from the involvement in the scheme. As a consequence the gap 
between the rich and poor Shukriya has widened (Salem-Murdock 1989:12). The field work 
results for this study also agree with his observation. During my field work I went to visit two 
Shukriya families close to the town in well established neighbourhoods with proper 
infrastructure. Their conditions were comparable to those of the Halfawi Nubians in the area. 
However, their situation today may have benefited from the various urban income 
opportunities within the town. 
The other nomadic groups, such as Rashaida, Hadendowa and Zaghava are generally 
economically deprived and have little personal assets. The nomadic groups in the scheme had 
fewer benefits from the start. Although the scheme originally gave the Shukriya and other 
nomadic groups of the region possibilities in farming in the form of tenancies the nomadic 
villages were situated further away from the town of New Halfa and often lacked the same 
services as the Nubian villages had. The availability of education and health services 
undoubtedly improved living standards and gave opportunities for many nomads. However 
the quality of services deteriorated and due to the loss of fertility in the land and water 
shortages the nomadic groups continued with their pastoral livelihoods. The negative 
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consequences of the scheme for the nomads were the decrease in the pastoral and migration 
land for their livestock as well as the increase in water-borne diseases.  The nomadic groups 
were given some benefits such as the 15 feddan land to cultivate per tenant but many chose to 
continue their pastoral livelihoods in addition to farming as it remained an important source of 
income and independence (See figures 20 & 21) (Sørbø 1977; Sørbø 1985). It is evident that 
due to the establishment of the New Halfa irrigation scheme parts of the traditional Butana 
grazing land had been appropriated by the state practicing their control over traditional 
territories of indigenous groups. Therefore, as discussed in the context of political ecology, 
the environmental changes directed by the state have politicized the environment and altered 
the social construction of the socio-physical relations within the region. The territorial rights 
of the nomadic groups of people have been the target of intervention by the dominant political 
group that has overruled their rights as irrigation schemes were seen as a better, more 
productive, method of land use (Yong Ooi Lin 2008). Therefore, the environmental 
transformation that took place in New Halfa was part of the economic and political context of 
that  time (Paulson  et  al.  2003)  and  also  manifested  the  hegemony of  the  Sudanese  political  
core and its attempt to mainstream and uniform the ethnic fabric of Sudan to the extent that it 
undermines the rights of ethnic minorities.  
Hence, construction of the Aswan High Dam, the displacement that followed and the 
construction of New Halfa irrigation scheme have all been part of the state agenda to 
modernize and develop the nation but have also changed the social structure of entitlement to 
natural resources. Furthermore, as was stated in the aims of the New Halfa scheme, in 
addition the goal was to promote national integration and state-directed social change by 
incorporating both the isolated previously isolated Halfawi Nubians and the independent and 
mobile nomadic groups into the scheme. It has been stated that development projects tend to 
displace and target indigenous and marginalized ethnic groups as they are often seen as 
undeveloped, loose and therefore a hindrance to national unity. Furthermore, these projects 
tend to make them lose their  own social  networks and strategies of development (Yong Ooi 
Lin 2008). Out of fifty large dams surveyed in a study by Scudder, 26 cases included the 
displacement of indigenous people (Scudder (2005) cited in Yong Ooi Lin (2008)). Thus, it 
can be said with certainty that indigenous groups of people are at a particularly vulnerable 
position considering state-directed development projects and their consequences. Moreover, 
they are also often residing in resource-rich regions which attract further attention (Yong Ooi 
Lin 2008). As the indigenous groups are not always aware of their rights as a citizen they may 
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also lack the necessary skills to protect their rights to their customary lands. As was stated by 
a Shukriya male in one of the interviews (chapter 7.2) the leader of the Shukriya was not 
educated and at the time of the construction of New Halfa they were not able to fully fight for 
their rights, allocation of land and better inclusion. In the context of land ownership and 
territorialism this is particularly difficult as the nomadic pastoralists have regarded the land as 
common property and have consequently lacked experience of exercising decision-making 
power (Eskonheimo 2006). Moreover the Unregistered Land Act of 1970 left many traditional 
ethnic groups without rights to the land they have utilized (Eskonheimo 2006). This can have 
many detrimental consequences to their sense of belonging, community structure and 
livelihood methods.  
 
Figure 20. Many of the nomadic Rashaida have settled in the outskirts of New Halfa (Wallin 2011). 
 
Figure 21. The Hadendowa are original nomadic people of the area but continue to feel excluded from the scheme 
(Wallin 2011). 
Pastoralism  was  never  really  supported  by  the  government  as  its  support  to  the  national  
economy was seen as non-existing and the pastoral lifestyle as backward. The situation of the 
nomadic groups is problematic as they are politically and socially marginalised yet their 
lifestyle can in many ways contribute to the food production in the region. They receive little 
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assistance from the government or the scheme unless they abandon some of their pastoral 
lifestyles and sedentarise as farmers. With the current unattractive situation of the New Halfa 
scheme this seems unlikely to happen. The government of Sudan continues to undermine 
pastoralism, which according to Shazali & Ahmed stands to, strictly in economic terms, the 
leading foreign exchange earner to the national economy (1999). The independence, 
flexibility and sustainability of pastoralism is however too erratic to fall under government 
control. But then again as the customary pastoral territories continue to decrease the nomadic 
groups have sooner or later no choice but to adapt their lifestyles and incorporate to the 
Sudanese economy.  
The treatment of the nomadic groups as secondary by the state officials in the planning and 
implementation of the scheme and the deteriorating agricultural conditions have encouraged 
most of the nomadic groups to continue engaging in pastoral activities to at least a certain 
extent. Some have managed to accumulate farming land and have become completely ex-
nomadic or semi-nomadic However, the majority tends to continue benefiting from 
pastoralism as livestock remains a viable source of income and security, especially 
considering the uncertain prospects for the agriculture in New Halfa.  
8.3 Future prospects for New Halfa and Sudanese agriculture  
 
With  the  increasing  demand  for  energy  and  ‘more  crop  for  drop’  Sudan  will  continue  to  
follow the trend of hydro-engineering within the Nile Basin. The growing demand for the 
waters of the Nile, particularly due to the population growth and the increasing hydro-
engineering in Ethiopia, may cause disputes and strain the relations between the Nile basin 
countries.  Sudan  has  not  yet  fully  utilized  its  share  of  the  waters  as  stated  in  the  1959 Nile  
Waters Agreement and is therefore currently initiating new dam projects and irrigation 
schemes. Although the water scarcity will likely hit Egypt the hardest, Sudan has embarked 
on  a  mission  to  develop  the  water-infrastructure  in  the  northern  parts  of  the  country.  New  
dams will lay the suitable ground for more irrigated agriculture and consequently more people 
will have to be displaced or their lives altered. Ideally it would be important to confirm 
adhering to the recommendations and guidelines given by international initiatives such as 
World  Commission  on  Dams  (WCD),  International  Rivers  Network  and  the  Nile  Basin  
Initiative which work towards sustainable socio-economic development of these 
environments. Many impact assessments, policy notes and guidelines have been made that 
help to analyze the broader impact of hydro-engineering on the Nile, to mitigate negative 
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consequences and ensure sustainable development. Protection of human rights is also vital. 
Indeed, the WCD states that ‘No dam should be built without the demonstrable acceptance of 
the affected people, and without the free, prior and informed consent of affected indigenous 
and tribal peoples’ (World Commission on Dams 2013). Large scale intensive irrigation 
projects such as New Halfa have also been put under scrutiny to assess their sustainability and 
viability. The International Rivers Network has stated that large scale irrigation schemes in 
desert climates have major drawbacks and lack sustainability in the long-term. Consequently, 
physical targets have not been met, costs have not been recovered and profits have been less 
than expected. Evaporation, salinization and water-logging of agricultural lands have also 
been prevalent. Furthermore, the landless and poor farmers have been displaced and the gap 
between the haves and the have-nots has widened. In addition, the local food security is often 
not improved (International Rivers Network 2004).  
Therefore, regarding the new irrigation schemes it would be advisable to reassess crop 
choices, modernize irrigation methods and focus on good governance and sustainable 
maintenance (Oestigaard 2012). The development of water efficiency and methods of 
reducing water losses is crucial. However, the construction of dams upstream will 
consequently decrease evaporation downstream which can further save water. Furthermore, 
good governance is of paramount importance as the rights and livelihoods of the farmers will 
have to be safeguarded. The empowerment and inclusion of individual farmers in irrigation 
schemes’ management and planning will benefit the sustainability and the profitability of 
these schemes. The growth of water-consumptive crops such as cotton may become 
environmentally unsustainable in the future, but so far it is preferred as it generates export 
incomes well. However, it is important to make sure that the farmers receive enough income 
to support their livelihoods despite the fluctuations in the cash crop prices.  
With this in mind the future prospects for New Halfa are challenging to outline. The Halfawi 
Nubians continue to migrate out of the scheme and the young generation seems more attracted 
to urban professions and possibilities. The nomadic groups will likely continue with their 
pastoral practices and participate in farming according to possibilities. The continuing flow of 
migrant workers and internally displaced people from other parts of Sudan will most likely 
play a bigger role in the future of the scheme and those already established will engage with 
farming activities and urban professions to a larger extend. It depends on the Sudanese 
government and the NHAPC management how well their presence will be acknowledged and 
supported within the scheme.  
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One of the challenges of combining social resettlement and irrigation schemes as a 
development project is the lack of consideration for the future. How will the host population 
and the resettled population integrate and promote the development of the scheme? When will 
the resettled become ‘settled’ and the memory of resettlement left in the past? It is difficult to 
estimate the lifespan of a resettlement project and the time required for an irrigation scheme 
to become self-sustaining. The social and economic differentiation within the scheme that was 
caused by the planning has slowed down this progress and the scheme continues to be 
fragmented and isolated from the rest of the region. The scheme has not adequately taken the 
nomadic host population into consideration and they have not been attracted to leave their 
pastoral practices and join the scheme. For the future it is important to consider the rights and 
preferences of the nomads and acknowledge the economic benefits of pastoralism as a 
sustainable land use pattern. However as the Sudanese policies have favored large-scale 
agricultural development the value of the local environmental knowledge is threatened.  
9. Conclusion 
 
As the example of New Halfa goes to show the development-induced displacement of people 
is often not considered thoroughly as a process that has long-term effects and an irreversible 
negative impact on the self-determination and integrity of the targeted group of people. This 
eventually became the loss of the scheme as the Halfawi Nubians never became rooted and 
attached to their new home in New Halfa. The resettlement gave them an advantage in terms 
of  compensation  and  a  sense  of  entitlement  and  superiority  within  the  scheme.  This  
consequently left the rest of the scheme residents with less benefits and possibilities although 
they were the majority of the New Halfa agricultural scheme. The challenges of New Halfa, 
in terms of land degradation and loss of irrigation water became evident soon after the start. 
The poor agricultural revenue proved a disappointment to the government and the local 
people and despite the rehabilitation attempts the scheme never reached its original targets of 
productivity. Some of the Halfawi Nubians left the scheme as some accumulated tenancies 
and became landlords while pursuing other businesses. Nomadic groups never abandoned 
their pastoral practices completely as they proved to be an important source of income and 
independence. In the later years the scheme has suffered from serious outbreaks of water-
borne diseases and deterioration in the service and infrastructure within the scheme.  
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Today the scheme is operating with the limits of the available irrigation water with means that 
contradict the original principles of equal sized tenancies. The economic differentiation within 
the scheme is increasing and the residents remain in their segregated villages as in the original 
residential plan. The migrant workers, internal refugees from west Sudan and the newly 
settled nomadic groups reside in informal settlement such as shantytowns that are excluded 
from the infrastructure and service sector. They are increasing in amount and become possibly 
the major workforce within the scheme in the future.  
Understanding that dams change the landscape greatly but also affect livelihoods of thousands 
of people receives little attention. The displacement and uprooting of the Nubians from Wadi 
Halfa has been seen as an attempt of social engineering by the government and the Sudanese 
political elite’s way of practicing their territorial power and hegemony against the minority 
ethnic groups within Sudan. Sudan continues to build new dams on the river Nile with 
disregard to the guidelines laid out by the international organizations. The debate over dams 
seems to have been juxtaposed between those who acclaim the dams as endless generators of 
development  and  prosperity  and  those  who  stress  the  negative  environmental  and  social  
consequences. Dams continue to be built and produce significant amounts of sustainable 
hydroelectric energy. Indeed, irrigation schemes as side products of dam construction and as 
destinations of resettlement can substantially promote the food security for the growing 
population and the economic growth for the nation. Largely, though, they seem to fail to meet 
their targets. Including the people affected as beneficiaries of this development and as active 
participants in the implementation process may mitigate the poor prospects for the scheme. 
More importantly, this can only be achieved if the rights of people to choose and direct their 
livelihoods are respected and secured.  
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Annex 1. 
Case Study of New Halfa Agricultural Scheme 
Marianna Wallin 
 
New Halfa Community Questionnaire 
 
 
Background information: 
 
 
1. Ethnic group 
2. Community/village name 
3. Household members 
4. Have you lived in New Halfa for long or are you new here? 
 
Livelihood/occupation: 
1. Livelihood means/ occupation 
 
2. Income sources 
 
3. If the respondent owns land/ is farming, how many feddans of land they own and what is 
grown on it? 
 
 
4. Have the livelihood means changed in the past years? If so, why? 
 
Water resources: 
1. What is the source of water for your household? 
 124 
 
 
2. How is the quality of water in the canals? 
 
3. Is water well available throughout the year? 
 
4. Quality and source of drinking water? 
 
5. What are the changes in the water quality or availability in the recent years? Is it better 
or worse? 
 
Questions about the New Halfa Management: 
6. Are you able to secure a good livelihood in New Halfa? 
 
7. Have there been changes in the quality of life in New Halfa in the past years? 
 
8. Do you think the cost of water and resources is ok (adequate) in terms of your income? 
 
9. What are the challenges in New Halfa? 
 
10. Is the New Halfa management giving you help and guidance with farming and 
irrigation? 
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11. Are there enough services such as schools, hospitals, shops and transport means in New 
Halfa? 
 
 
12. Is your community able to participate in the management of New Halfa in any way? 
 
 
13. Do you think all communities in New Halfa have equal opportunities and benefits in the 
New Halfa Scheme? 
 
 
 
14. What are you hoping for the future of New Halfa? 
 
 
 
